

**VOTE-BY-MAIL
TRANSITION REPORT**

12505

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INTRODUCTION

Across the country, voters are finding that voting-by-mail saves time, is convenient and extremely easy. To allow King County voters to join the 34 other counties in Washington that conduct all elections entirely by mail, the King County Executive proposed and the Metropolitan King County Council adopted Ordinance 15523¹ on June 19, 2006 authorizing vote by mail elections. This recommendation was endorsed and supported by various stakeholder groups and oversight committees, and is reinforced by the voting patterns of King County voters.


As King County moves to this single, common voting system, voters will be kept well informed regarding voting procedures and instructions. Voters will experience a more efficient system in which they will be able to verify that their ballot was received and track its progress on the way to tabulation. The streamlined system outlined in this report will allow King County Elections (KCE) to focus its efforts on the election system preferred by the majority of voters and deliver an effective system that features transparency and accountability.

A vote-by-mail (VBM) system will be just that: all registered, King County voters will receive their ballot in the mail prior to the election, and must return their ballot postmarked by Election Day. To the 62 percent of voters in King County already casting their ballot by mail, the process with which they have become familiar and comfortable will continue. Voters new to this process will be educated through a variety of outreach efforts and public information to help make the new process clear and understandable.

The vote-by-mail transition in King County will eliminate traditional polling places. The structure and expectations King County establishes now, in moving to vote-by-mail, will have a long and lasting impact for its citizens and stakeholder groups. In addition to being secure, transparent, and accountable, this system must also be sustainable. The policy decision to conduct all elections by mail has been made. Therefore, policy decisions that follow should reinforce that public policy by prioritizing voting by mail alternatives based on legal requirements, such as eliminating barriers to casting a private ballot, and by resisting the temptation to replicate the polling place model when implementing the regional voting center and ballot drop box concepts.

All of the criteria and options presented in this report will accomplish the critical objective of ensuring County residents that all voters will have accessible voting options that ensures their privacy, continuing to build public trust and confidence along the way.

¹ Full ordinance text can be found in the appendix, page section 1.



The vote-by-mail elections process in King County

This report reflects considerable due diligence in reviewing existing options and practices currently in place. The criteria outlined here are based on best practices and lessons learned from those jurisdictions who currently conduct all vote by mail elections. Based on previous lessons learned, it is expected that the transition to VBM will occur during a non-countywide special election early in 2008, in order to fine-tune improvements in anticipation of the primary and General Election in 2008.

Although not included in this report, the ballot tracking and tabulation business cases will be a comprehensive evaluation of current business practices and the technology solutions that meet the County's mandate for secure, transparent, and accountable elections. The technology King County invests in today must withstand years of population growth, high turnout, and wear. Due diligence and careful approach now will ensure the purchase decision can be supported internally for years to come. Mail handling equipment with redundant quality control and multiple audit tools has finally arrived to the market place and King County must be prudent in this purchase and base its decision on impacts the technology will have on the entire voting system. This detailed analysis requires additional time to research vendor options as more information will facilitate a sound decision.

Transition Overview

The transition to vote-by-mail (VBM) will be a collaborative and inclusive effort that will involve support and collaboration from the King County Executive and staff, Council members and Council staff, and every staff member of King County Elections. Implementation of the overall vote-by-mail system components represents a new way of doing business for King County Elections and will require support and involvement of stakeholders, media and the general public.

Transition work and planning will be led by the Vote-by-Mail Transition Leadership Team (TLT), which includes managers from the Records, Elections and Licensing Services (REALS) Division and the Elections Section working with Waldron & Co. on transition planning, organizational effectiveness and management and leadership development. The TLT will be supported by the Vote-by-Mail Transition Team, staff solely dedicated to the vote-by-mail transition work. Please refer to the organizational chart in section 2 of the appendix for more detailed information regarding the structure of the TLT and the Transition Team.

RESPONDING TO MOTION 12299

The purpose of this report is to lay out the plan and process by which King County will transition to conducting all elections entirely by mail. As part of the authorizing legislation, and prior to conducting all elections by mail, Motion 12299 requested the County Executive to:

“transmit to the council a report that identifies the estimated capital and operating cost of regional voting centers and drop boxes, including staffing costs for temporary workers and sheriff deputies that may be needed at regional voting centers and in the transport of ballots, a map identifying the location of regional voting centers and drop boxes and security measures that will be put in place for regional voting centers and drop boxes. Implementation of vote-by-mail shall not occur until the council has approved the report by motion.”

This report is responsive to the above motion. The plan for regional voting centers and a separate plan for ballot drop boxes are included in this report. The Regional Voting Center (RVC) Plan outlines the purpose, anticipated services, security, and staffing model in a regional voting center. Additionally, the RVC Plan includes:

1. the criteria to be used in the identification and selection of RVCs,
2. the timeline anticipated in order to facilitate the implementation of RVCs for the transition to vote-by-mail.

The County Council's expectation that this report be reviewed and approved by motion provides KCE the opportunity to receive policy direction on the criteria and process outlined for identification and selection of RVCs and ballot drop locations.

In addition to the above two plans, the County's 2007 Adopted Budget includes a proviso requiring the Executive to submit a detailed plan for the transition to vote-by-mail. The above noted proviso requires the following:

“...The detailed plan for the transition to vote-by-mail shall include itemized tasks required for implementing vote-by-mail, showing task duration, dependencies between tasks, resource requirements and availability, timing of tasks, milestone dates and other relevant information. The tasks shall include a comparative analysis of available options for election equipment and software, including equipment and software to be purchased with the Help America Vote Act grant funding that the county has been awarded, as part of preparing the business case for purchase of that equipment and software, taking into consideration relative security, costs, reliability, functionality and usability, among other relevant factors.”

This report includes a narrative description and various other project planning documents that are responsive to the proviso and that will be used to manage the implementation of vote-by-mail for the duration of the transition process.

In preparing this report, Elections' staff prioritized the regional voting center ballot drop box plan in order to meet the required February 15 report deadline and to create a timeline by which decisions for tabulation equipment and ballot tracking and accountability equipment can be made.

VBM TRANSITION PLAN

This plan presents an overall work program and schedule for making the transition to a vote-by-mail elections system. The following eight major elements must be addressed in the coming 12 – 14 months, before King County transitions entirely to VBM to ensure a successful transition:

1. Placement of ballot drop locations
2. Establishment of regional voting centers
3. Communications
4. Ballot tracking and accountability
5. Precinct alterations
6. Upgraded ballot tabulation system
7. Automatic signature verification
8. Election Distribution Center supply management

ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS

As with any project, there are several baseline assumptions and known risks that have been documented for the purpose of moving the planning process forward. The following list of assumptions and risks have formed the foundation by which all future work will be built. They include:

Security

The security of King County's election system is a paramount priority. Strong security engenders public trust and confidence in the administration of elections in King County and in our democracy. Effective security does not rely on a single process, feature, or policy. Effective security requires a number of interrelated processes, systems, and policies that complement and build on each other. King County's elections security includes: an open and transparent elections environment, physical and personnel security, legal and procedural security, and technical and systems security. The following security assumptions have been made:

Assumptions

1. The County Council will work collaboratively with KCE and the Office of the Secretary of State to ensure the integrity and security of the elections system and update and revise the existing security plan.
2. Security will be a primary element in the consideration and evaluation of various vendor solutions in the business cases developed for upgrading ballot tabulation and ballot tracking and accountability.
3. The King County Election Security Plan² will be updated during the transition to VBM and is included as an element in each of the major tasks necessary to transition to VBM.
4. KCE will incorporate working with an outside independent security expert to assist with the design of security elements in a consolidated elections facility.

² The King County Elections Security Plan is located in section 3 in the appendix.

Stakeholder Involvement and Communication

For increased confidence in elections administration in the county, the transition process must be transparent and accountable, and communication must be effective. Poor communication could risk the implementation timeline, public acceptance, voter participation and possibly erode public trust and confidence in the administration of elections.

Extensive outreach, education and public information will need to occur to inform voters of the transition to vote by mail at least four months prior to the first VBM election. Both internal and external communications plans are being created and initial meetings have taken place with some key stakeholders.³ Implementation requires a mailing to all voters 90 days prior to the first election conducted entirely by mail.

With the County Executive and County Council's support improvement in operations as well as public confidence will continue to improve. The following steps are imperative:

1. KCE will maintain open lines of communication in seeking stakeholder input, and implement an optimized system.
2. KCE will provide stakeholder updates and will have public information and outreach strategies with regard to voter groups.
3. Internal staff communication will also be critical to ensure seamless transitions and that work has already begun.
4. KCE will continue to demonstrate the improvements through results in successful elections, even before the start of countywide, all-mail balloting to continue to build public trust and confidence now and in the future.
5. A successful transition to vote-by-mail will be ensured through on-going progress by KCE with the help of internal communications, sound oversight, clear policy direction and key legislative changes.

Oversight

Assumptions

1. KCE will submit vote-by-mail transition plans and business cases as required to the King County Executive and King County Council in a timely manner. Thorough submissions by King County Elections in conjunction with timely review and approvals are essential to maintaining the transition schedule.
2. Technology projects will be managed within the Information Technology Governance structure. It is imperative funding to support the VBM transition work and schedule be released on a timely basis to adhere to the approved time frame.
3. KCE will continue to look to the recommendations of the Citizens' Election Oversight Committee (CEOC) and previous recommendations made by other oversight groups as the transition to all-mail voting continues.

³ King County Election staff have identified critical stakeholders whose input in the transition to vote by mail will be critical. A list of those key stakeholders is located in the appendix, section 4.

Legislative Processes

Assumptions

1. The King County Council will approve the proposed ordinance increasing the current number of registered voters allowed per precinct in King County Code to match the State's legal limit. Under a VBM system, permanent absentee voters can no longer be subtracted from precinct totals. If this legislative change is not made, 1,200 new precincts and additional ballot versions could be required, adding greater complexity to administering elections, and increased processing time and cost. Increasing the number of voters per precinct to the State's limit will allow KCE to keep approximately the same number of precincts.
2. The King County Council will not place the elected auditor issue on the ballot earlier than 2009, for possible implementation in a subsequent year. An earlier time frame will have a negative impact on King County's ability to recruit, hire and retain the best candidates for a new REALS Director to lead the VBM transition.
3. In 2007, the Secretary of State will certify use of the accessible voting unit (AVU) for provisional voting, and adopt new requirements for automated signature recognition equipment and software.
4. To enable implementation of VBM, the selected tabulation equipment will be state and federally certified, or will receive certification before December 2007.
5. It is assumed that there will be no unforeseen or unanticipated King County, Washington State, and/or federal legislative changes that will impede the transition to VBM by King County Elections.
6. The schedule for transition to VBM in 2008 incorporates the assumption that the 2007-2008 elections calendar will not be altered unexpectedly. This includes the presidential preference primary in February or March 2008.

Facilities

To ensure the success of a countywide vote-by-mail system, voters will need to feel that the new system will be convenient and easy to use as KCE continues to build confidence and credibility in a system aimed at making the public's vote count. To meet this need, initial policy direction indicated that regional voting centers and ballot drop boxes will be available for VBM elections. This report contains various criteria that should be reviewed and used as a guide for determining where these facilities are located.

While not required to conduct VBM elections, a single consolidated facility for KCE remains a high priority. Consolidation will achieve outcomes articulated by the CEOC, including higher security, better on-site management, greater staff productivity, increased staff morale, and ultimately greatly elevated public confidence. This is a recommendation of both the CEOC and the King County Executive and has been endorsed by the King County Council.

Regional Voting Centers (RVCs)

Regional voting centers will provide accessible options for early voting and will have mail ballot collection boxes that will allow voters to return their ballot at key sites without having to pay postage. Established primarily to allow voters with disabilities the ability to cast a private and independent ballot, RVCs will provide accessible voting options for early voting in the 20-day period before Election Day.

This report does not identify or select specific sites or provide the number of sites to establish. Tasks completed for this component include: research on other jurisdictions, confirming location criteria, space and staffing needs.

Implementation will require creation of a disability advisory committee pursuant to state law, negotiations for securing locations, equipment procurement, policy and procedure documentation, staff training and voter education.

Ballot Drop Locations

Ballot drop locations will provide voters the opportunity to return their ballot to King County Elections without using postage. It is recommended that several secure sites be identified throughout the county based on specific criteria. Tasks completed for this component include: jurisdictional research regarding the use and placement of mail ballot drop locations, receptacle and location criteria. Implementation will require equipment procurement, negotiations for securing locations, voter education, procedure documentation, and staff training.

Election Systems Equipment and Software

This plan describes the elements and steps for putting new equipment and software necessary to hold VBM elections into place. Each of these components is essential to a successful VBM transition; however, the major dependency in the transition to vote-by-mail currently is the solution for upgrading the ballot tabulation system.

The ballot tabulation system must be looked at as an entire system – ballot building, central count tabulation, and accessible voting. Combined with the election management and voter registration system, the ballot tabulation system is the back bone for administering elections in King County. While research, investigation and initial planning on regional voting centers and ballot tracking and accountability can be accomplished, many specifics can not be determined until a solution for ballot tabulation technology is determined. Additional dependencies and detailed sub tasks can be found in the Detailed Transition Schedule in section 5 of the appendix.

Ballot Tracking and Accountability

Automated ballot tracking and accountability will allow voters to track their ballot as it moves through the elections process enhancing voters' ability to verify participation and increase their confidence level in the process. Voters will be able to follow their ballot online and have updates on its progress at various points in the system. Such an automated system will enhance the efficiency of election operations by eliminating manual operations. Tasks required for this

component include research and selection of the ballot tracking system through the development of a business case, procurement, staff training, procedure documentation of the selected system and voter education.

Upgraded Ballot Tabulation System

The ballot tabulation equipment that King County currently employs is not suitable for an entirely vote-by-mail elections system. To handle the capacity of nearly a million ballots, comprehensive research and selection of an upgraded, higher speed and higher volume tabulation system must occur. This upgraded system will provide security, efficiency and accurate tabulation of ballots. After development of a business case and selection of an upgraded system, tasks required for implementation include equipment procurement, equipment acceptance testing, policy and procedure documentation of the selected system, and staff training.

Automatic Signature Verification

Signature verification of absentee ballots is currently performed manually by trained staff as ballots are returned to King County Elections. Automating this process will have considerable impact on ballot processing time. An automatic signature verification system will serve as a component of the ballot tracking and accountability system, and new state-wide administrative rules must be written and procedures documented prior to implementation. This component will likely be a phased in approach and will include collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of State.

Election Distribution Center Supply Management

A transition to a vote-by-mail system will involve new equipment and voting facilities. Tasks required for supply management in this new voting environment include: development of an equipment management plan to determine what will be stored, prepared, and maintained at the Election Distribution Center; and a plan for decommissioning existing equipment that will be unnecessary for vote-by-mail.

Assumptions

1. The new ballot tracking and accountability equipment and software will integrate with KCE's other existing systems or costs will be high and implementation will be significantly delayed;
2. The selected equipment and software solutions will be available and ready to be integrated within the existing timeline for implementation in 2008 to be possible; and
3. As identified in the January 26, 2007 KCE report to the King County Council, improvements will continue to be made in the Voter Registration System to document process changes, eliminate production backlogs and update registration records.

Phased-in Implementation

Phased-in implementation of VBM will allow the careful work load planning, training, troubleshooting and ability to make adjustments that can ensure successful implementation. Based on research and lessons learned from other vote-by-mail jurisdictions, it is assumed that the first implementation of VBM in King County will be held in a non-countywide special election with a limited number of voters, such as a school district levy vote, to ensure KCEs procedures work well, ensuring time to fine tune and improve as needed prior to larger elections.

Management Leadership and Staffing

Full management staffing and continued organizational development internal to the KCEs office are necessary for staff to be ready and able to conduct a successful transition to VBM.

Assumptions

1. As required by the King County Council, appointment of the REALS Director and Superintendent of Elections will occur prior to complete implementation.
2. The transition to VBM will redefine election processes and change staff roles and responsibilities, likely resulting in changes to the organizational structure. KCE will work collaboratively with staff in seeking their feedback and support regarding staffing impacts and adjustments.
3. Staff training on new and upgraded systems will be critical to the successful transition to VBM. KCE managers and staff are currently managing heavy work loads of the day-to-day operating demands of running up to six elections a year. Careful planning, monitoring and measuring of results during the transition will be important to ensure that a high level of performance is maintained.

Transition Schedule

The change to an entirely vote-by-mail elections system will not occur overnight, King County Elections will pilot and phase-in system components, to allow for the best possible success.

This transition schedule targets the April 2008 special election as the first vote-by-mail election if all of the previous assumptions hold true. Under this timing, two vote-by-mail elections may be conducted in advance of the 2008 primary and General Election.

King County Elections is operating under the assumption that the presidential preference primary will be held in February or March 2008. A presidential preference primary or any large, countywide election would serve as a poor choice for the first election conducted entirely by mail. The voter turnout and focus of this countywide election would be difficult to ascertain because of the uncertainties and changing nature of the presidential nominating system. If the presidential preference primary is canceled, as was in the case in 2004, the schedule may be altered and the first election conducted entirely by mail could be in the February or March 2008 special elections.

The following reports and business cases will be submitted to the King County Council for their approval as stated below.

March 30, 2007

Business case recommendations for ballot tabulation solution


May 15, 2007

Business case recommendations for ballot tracking and accountability solution

July 27, 2007

Proposed recommendations for regional voting center and ballot drop locations

For the detailed transition schedule developed to guide work efforts, see section 5 in the appendix.



For implementation of vote-by-mail in April '08, appointment and confirmation of the REALS Director and Superintendent of Elections must occur no later than Jan. 1, 2008.

Key components of the VBM transition have differing milestones and as the transition progresses, additional milestones will be established.

Vote-by-Mail Transition Milestones 2007/2008

BALLOT DROP BOX PLAN

Though the majority of voters in King County already prefer to cast their ballot by mail, King County intends to offer voters the option to deliver their voted ballots by providing ballot drop boxes throughout the county. Specific locations will be selected using the criteria outlined below, by detailed demographic analysis and research involving voter turn-out statistics and presented to the Council by July 27, 2007. A proposed motion adopting the selection criteria is provided with this plan. These drop-off locations and receptacles will provide a secure, convenient option for individuals who wish to hand deliver their voted ballot.

LOCATION CRITERIA

Jurisdictions in Washington and Oregon are using two types of locations for ballot drop boxes: private businesses and government facilities.

Jurisdictions using private businesses as drop locations have experienced a variety of difficulties. As a result, this plan focuses on voter density, geographic examination, and an investigation of municipalities and public facilities. Possible drop locations include city halls, King County Community Service Centers and, in Seattle, Neighborhood Service Centers. Other possible locations might include other government facilities like libraries or fire stations and other accessible public buildings.

City halls are often cornerstones of local communities and usually very accessible by mass transit. Citizens are accustomed to visiting their local city hall for a number of government services. Placing a ballot drop box at a city hall or at one of King County's Community Service Centers would be logical to voters and easy to communicate to the public.

In Seattle, the geographic size, population density and travel habits of voters may result in a different solution. Using Neighborhood Service Centers would make for easy, local access.

Neighborhood Service Centers are located in most major districts within Seattle, including Ballard, Capitol Hill, Downtown, Lake City, Lake Union/Fremont, University, and Queen Anne/Magnolia. These facilities currently provide local government-oriented services, and ballot drop boxes there would be easy to communicate to the public.

The proposed site identification and selection criteria for ballot drop boxes are as follows:

⁴ Voter density in King County is illustrated on the King County Voter Density map in section 6 of the appendix.

⁵ Locations are illustrated on the City Hall and King County Community Service Center Locations map in section 6 of the appendix

⁶ Locations are illustrated on the Seattle Neighborhood Service Center Locations map in section 6 of the appendix.

1. Ability to place the drop box inside a facility to ensure security, this is paramount as drop boxes placed outside are viewed as a security risk.
 - a. Ability for the public to gain easy access inside the facility during reasonable hours in the days leading up to the election consistent with other selected drop locations and from 7am to 8 pm on election days
 - b. Facility accessibility meeting current federal and state standards including:
 - i. Parking
 - ii. Building entrance
 - iii. Passenger drop-off areas
 - iv. Sidewalks and walkways
 - v. Halls and corridors
 - vi. Doors
 - vii. Lighting
 - viii. Separate ingress and egress doors
 - b. The facility must be available for each August primary and the General Election in November in addition to possible special elections in February, March, April and May.
2. Voter population density
3. Geographic dispersion
4. Traffic flows and public access to the location via public and private transit
5. The cost of servicing or staffing the location based on arrangements that can be made with the facility owner.

SERVICES PROVIDED

Research in VBM counties in Washington and Oregon suggests voters enjoy the option of delivering their voted ballots this way. King County Elections recommends beginning with a modest number of drop locations, and re-evaluating the number and locations frequently in terms of voter population density, rate of use, and relative costs.

HOURS OF OPERATION

State law requires that drop boxes be available from 7 am to 8 pm on Election Day.

The hours of operation for the days leading up to Election Day will be determined by arrangements that can be made with the facility owner. The goal in setting the hours for the drop locations will be consistency among the various locations so that messaging to the community is not confusing.

SECURITY

Security of voted ballots is King County Election's most fundamental goal and accountability and transparency when retrieving and transporting ballots from the drop boxes is essential.

Ballot Security

Ballot security will be ensured through placement of the drop boxes inside facilities through either fixed permanent boxes or a non permanent box that is

monitored by staff. Pursuant to state law and code staffing would be bipartisan teams of two individuals.

For locations that have a fixed permanent drop box located inside a facility, teams of two employees would be assigned to retrieve ballots on a daily basis, in three teams of two.

All ballots will be transported in uniquely numbered sealed containers following protocols established in the King County Elections Security Plan. As ballots are returned on a daily basis from staffed locations or picked up from permanent fixed boxes, date and time notations will be made through scanning a barcode either on the returned sealed ballot container or fixed drop box. This will provide for easy accounting and record keeping.

Location Security

Indirect security will be gained by locating drop boxes in high traffic areas. Sites with existing video surveillance equipment will be prioritized. Augmenting existing sites by adding surveillance equipment will be considered on a case by case basis. Many government facilities are secure locations, housing surveillance cameras, police departments or other security personnel.

Security by King County Sheriff's Deputies

Ballots are currently issued, managed and tabulated at 509 polling locations throughout King County and in much of the nation without the presence of a police force. While KCE will continue to utilize deputies to provide site security at our mail ballot processing facility, this plan does not include using deputies to staff ballot drop locations or retrieve ballots from fixed drop boxes. It does not appear to be necessary nor would it be cost effective to employ King County Sheriff's Deputies, at overtime rates, for drop box security.

STAFFING

Staffing needs and costs will be determined by the number of drop locations established. Further, these needs and costs will be dependent on arrangements that can be made with facility owners, the placement of a fixed drop box would not require staffing and locations where a fixed drop box could not be placed would require staffing.

Staff hired to perform ballot retrieval in teams of two will need to demonstrate appropriate knowledge, skill and abilities prior to deployment. These include, but are not limited to: the ability to operate a county vehicle and safely drive to a ballot drop-off location, ability to empty contents of the ballot drop box, ability to use a barcode scanner for tracking purposes, and ensure the safe and secure delivery of all ballots taken from all fixed ballot drop boxes to the King County mail ballot processing facility. These positions would be classified as Administrative Specialist I paid at an hourly rate of \$15.23 (2007 rate). The number of teams needed would be dependent on the number of locations established with permanent fixed drop boxes.

Staff hired to monitor drop boxes and return ballots in sealed containers at the end of each day would be similar to those currently used in polling locations. KCE would work with county political party organizations to identify individuals for these positions. They would be paid an hourly rate of \$7.93 (2007 rate).

REGIONAL VOTING CENTER PLAN

A regional voting center is a non-precinct based voting location specifically designed for voters with disabilities. Any eligible voter may cast a ballot at the RVC, regardless of the precinct in which they reside. Voters will be able to cast a regular or provisional ballot on the accessible voting unit (AVU). In addition, the RVCs will serve as a mail ballot collection site which will allow voters to securely deposit their voted ballot. RVCs will be located throughout the county and open for the 20-day period leading up to and including Election Day.

Focus on Accessibility

King County has pledged to bring maximum accessibility to the voting process and King County voters. To ensure this pledge is met and well-received within the disability community, King County will re-establish the Disability Advisory Committee to assist in the establishment of each RVC. Group meetings will include discussions on outreach efforts, transportation and location planning, and accessibility assessments.

LOCATION CRITERIA

Regional voting center locations will be selected based on a certain set of evaluation criteria. To assist in evaluating the needs of voters with disabilities, King County Elections is planning to collaborate with an academic research team from Rice University. In addition, King County Elections will re-establish a Disability Advisory Committee, as required by State law, to make recommendations and provide assistance in the location and selection process. Additional geographic and jurisdictional analysis will also be used. King County Elections will be prepared to submit a proposed list of RVCs by July 27, 2007, subject to Council policy guidance on the selection criteria and proposed plan. A proposed motion adopting the selection criteria is provided with this plan. RVC locations must meet the following criteria:

1. Availability of a minimum 2,000 square feet solely for Elections' use, depending on the geographic location of the facility,⁷
2. Geographic dispersion
3. Voter population density
4. Availability for lease for approximately 25 consecutive days, at least six times per year prior to elections conducted in February, March, April, May, August, and November
5. Government owned/controlled space preferred
6. Must be in an environment that is conducive to voting and that is relatively distraction free.
7. Facility accessibility meeting current federal and state standards including:
 - a. Parking
 - b. Building entrance
 - c. Passenger drop-off areas
 - d. Sidewalks and walkways

⁷ Please refer to section 7 for the layout with minimum 2,000 SF and 10 accessible voting units.

- e. Halls and corridors
 - f. Doors
 - g. Voting area
 - h. Accessible restroom facilities
 - i. Lighting
 - j. Separate ingress and egress doors
8. Ability to secure sensitive equipment and ballots with methods consistent with the King County Elections Security Plan. This includes securing accessible voting units in a room or cage with a uniquely numbered seal on a nightly basis. Additional security options may include:
- a. Unique keyed door knob lock cores
 - b. Video monitoring
9. Close proximity to bus lines with regular and accessible service
10. I-Net, KC-WAN, or Broadband connection to manage voter activity/information in real time
11. Phone lines available in the immediate voting area
12. Clearly marked streets from major arterials to facility

Once provided policy direction, King County Elections will work collaboratively with a Regional Voting Center consulting group to use the above mentioned criteria to locate and recommend viable locations for both the RVCs and ballot drop-off locations. The RVC consulting group will consist of two King County Elections' staff members, two Council staff members, two members of the Citizens' Election Oversight Committee, one member from the Disability Advisory Committee, and one member of the King County Elections' Voting Rights Act Section 203 Community Coalition. This consulting group and King County Elections will provide the Council with RVC and ballot drop-off location recommendations by July 27, 2007.

SERVICES PROVIDED

Unlike a traditional polling place, the RVC is designed specifically for use by voters with disabilities. Voters choosing to cast their ballot at an RVC will do so using the accessible voting unit. Voted mail ballot drop boxes, voter registration/change of address forms and educational materials and literature will be available for voters.

The configuration of the vote center location can make a dramatic difference in the level of success and overall voter traffic flow. Recent research conducted on vote centers concluded that the following elements must be considered when setting up RVC facilities:

- Competent staffing
- Physical access to technology
- Spacing locations of voting machines within the vote center
- Floor space
- Site accessibility
- Parking

Casting a Regular Ballot

Election workers at an RVC will have a real-time connection with the voter registration database via a computer through a broadband data communication line. Voters will check-in with RVC staff, show proper identification and sign their name using a stylus and digital tablet. If the voter is eligible to vote in that election, a voter access card will be issued allowing the voter to cast a regular electronic ballot. The federally required AVU is equipped with audio and visual technology that allows voters with limited vision to vote a private and independent ballot.

Once issued a voter access card, a real-time notation will be made in the voter's registration file indicating a ballot was issued at an RVC. This notation will prevent that person from future voting in that election, either at another RVC or by mail ballot. If a mail ballot has been received from a voter, a notation will be on the voter's record. This real-time connection and check-in system will ensure that a voter is only allowed to cast one ballot per election. If a voter does not meet eligibility requirements, either by failing identification or voter record indications, the voter will only have the option of voting a provisional ballot.

Casting a Provisional Ballot

While certified at the Federal level, the AVU provisional ballot module is not currently certified in Washington State and is not yet in use in King County. King County Elections' staff and the Office of the Secretary of State are confident that the provisional ballot module will be certified for use at the RVC well in advance of the countywide implementation of VBM.

1. Utilizing the provisional ballot module on the AVU will streamline security and increase cost effectiveness in RVC operations. An RVC with the AVU provisional ballot option precludes the need to supply large-format paper ballots with every possible race offered while still providing the voter the most options on a ballot until eligibility can be determined. Offering print-on-demand paper provisional ballots requires security for blank ballot stock and database, as well as ongoing printing and maintenance costs and upfront capital costs for additional hardware.
2. Electronic provisional ballots are coded within the AVU to remain uncounted until the voter's eligibility has been determined by King County Elections prior to certification. While giving the voter the opportunity to vote for every race they believe they are entitled, only votes cast in races for which the voter is eligible will be counted.

Mail Ballot Collection Box


A collection box for voted mail ballots will be located at each RVC site, open during the RVC's business hours. These ballots will be collected by election officials on a daily basis in accordance with specific security, chain of custody and operational procedures.

Voter Registration/Change of Address Forms

While the primary functions of the RVC will revolve around ballot casting and collection, voter registration and address forms will be available. Completed forms will be processed at the King County Elections administrative office.

To be eligible to vote in an election, current Washington State voters must have their registration updated 30 days prior to the election. Voters with new registrations in the State of Washington may register to vote, in-person, 15 days before the election. The RVCs will be considered remote subsidiaries of the elections office, and as a result, voters may complete forms at the RVC to meet the 15-day registration requirement.

The space plan for each RVC will be designed for maximum accessibility, security, and privacy when casting an electronic ballot.



Hours of operation

Hours of operation will be uniform for all RVCs to reduce confusion from center to center. King County Elections will work closely with Metro/Access to meet the needs of the community in terms of transportation, taking into account Metro bus and Paratransit Access van service areas and route times for each RVC. Final operating hours will be determined following data gathered via the proposed academic research and with the recommendations of the Disability Advisory Committee.

SECURITY

RVC facilities must have the ability to secure sensitive equipment and ballots with methods consistent with King County Elections' Security Plan.⁸ This includes the ability to secure AVUs in a room or cage with a uniquely numbered seal on a nightly basis. Other security options may include uniquely keyed door locks and video monitoring, a monitored alarm system, and emergency management measures. King County Elections will consult with security industry experts to ensure the RVC site selections meet the standard security requirements of King County Elections and the Office of the Secretary of State.

STAFFING

Research from other counties, including Larimer County, CO and Harris County, TX, with similar early voting centers indicates voter flow is steady in urban areas Monday through Friday, with peaks during lunch and after work. Highest usage of early voting sites was at the beginning of the early voting period and during the final days leading up to Election Day. See section 8 in the appendix for early voting trends in Tennessee.

Staffing is a significant portion of an RVC budget and a critical element to a successful election. Each RVC will adhere to the following staffing model:

Regional Center Coordinator

Percent of program managers' time necessary for development, oversight, and coordination of a number of RVCs.

Help Desk Staff

Percent of central help desk staff required to service calls from RVC that cannot be addressed by on-site supervisor.

Information Technology Support/Troubleshooter

Percent of IT staff to support service calls from RVC. Floating position to travel between centers as needed.

Supervisor (1 per RVC)

Supervises RVC staff and technical on-site troubleshooter for elections system equipment. Manages observers and flow of voters.

⁸ The King County Elections Security Plan is located in section 3 in the appendix.

Official Paid Political Party Observers (one for each major political party)

As an official paid observer appointed by the county political parties, observers will ensure open and transparent operation of the RVCs.

Greeter (1 per RVC)

Maintains general information table at the entrance of the RVC. Greeter queues voters in line, reminding voters to have proper ID available for processing. Directs voters to appropriate receptacle for voted mail ballots. Monitors RVC entrance to keep it free of any electioneering.

Computer and Logbook Specialist (4 per RVC)

Ensures that identification requirements are applied equally to each voter; checks voter for valid ID. Checks voter eligibility. Determines if voter needs audio ballot (English or Chinese). Voter signs name on digital tablet. Makes notation in voter record to indicate voter cast an AVU ballot. Voter is given access card for AVU machine. Directs voter to AVU specialist or Provisional Ballot specialist.

Provisional Ballot Specialist (1 per RVC)

Direct customer service support associated with the management of provisional ballots issued at RVC. Provides routine customer service following defined policies and procedures for issuing a provisional ballot.

AVU Specialist (1 per 3 AVUs placed at RVC)

Assigns voter to AVU and provides instructions on how to use the equipment. Makes sure that ADA requirements are met, pathways are clear and that the voting process is running smoothly within the AVU voting area. Directs voter to Exit Specialist once ballot is cast. At least one of the AVU specialists must be bilingual and able to provide minority language assistance.

Voting Exit Specialist (1 per RVC)

Collects voter access card from voters as they exit the building.

EQUIPMENT

Accessible Voting Unit

The AVU will be the method for a voter to cast a ballot at the RVC. Through the use of a voter access card, a voter will be given access to the ballot style that corresponds to their precinct, and offers all of the races and measures on which the voter is eligible to vote. The AVU offers two modes for the voters: the touch screen ballot with accessible options, such as the high contrast and large text options; and the audio ballot that reads the races and measures to the voter. The voter then registers their choices on a numeric keypad.

The number of AVUs per RVC will depend on three key factors: The final number of RVCs located throughout the county; space available at the chosen facilities; and number of potential voters for that area.

PC – Laptop/Desktop

Six laptop or desktop computers will be needed at each RVC. At the check-in station, RVC staff will use the computer to access Database Information Management System (DIMS), the voter registration system, to look up a voter's registration status, capture and upload the voter's digital signature, make a notation on the voter's record as having cast a ballot, and create a voter access card using the voting card activator.

Digital Signature Capture

A voter will use a stylus to sign their name on an electronic tablet. The tablet is connected to the second computer and will upload the signature into DIMS. The signature is saved in the voter's file for archiving purposes. This is a substitution for the current poll book that is signed by a poll voter.

Voter Access Card activator

The computer will be connected to a voter access card activator. The activator, when attached to the computer, encodes the voter access card with the ballot style information sent from DIMS. This method of voter card activation is currently in use for early voting in King County Elections.

Interconnectivity line (broadband)

In order to maintain security and efficiency, the computer will be connected directly to the Elections office server through an I-NET, KC-WAN, or broadband connection. The type and speed of the data connection will be determined on a case by case basis depending on the size and location of the facility.

Safeguarding the broadband connection will consist of several important measures. First, a firewall will be installed between the computers and the host network at the RVC. Elections staff at the RVC will have to provide a password to access any software applications on the computer.

Second, a virtual private network (VPN) will be employed for the connection between the RVC and the DIMS server. VPNs reduce the risk that outside users might gain access to the secured network by use of encrypted communication protocols.

Software

DIMS

King County Elections uses Database Information Management System (DIMS) to manage the voter registration database. Built on the Microsoft SQL platform, DIMS allows elections staff to track and report voter registration and voting history information.

In order to ensure that voters are issued only one ballot, the DIMS database will be referenced for every voter who chooses to vote at an RVC.

Entering a voter in the system under the category of early voting will immediately suspend their mail ballot. If an AVU early voting ballot has already been issued, a notation will exist in the voter registration database, so that if a mail ballot is received from the same voter, it will be rejected.

Signature capture software

King County Elections is currently exploring vendors for software that will integrate with the digital capture hardware and the DIMS software. The software will need to capture a voter's signature via the tablet and cordless stylus and then append the signature to the voter's file in the voter registration database. Security and file size are crucial factors in the success of the software integration.

Additional technology

Telephone/fax/copier

An all-in-one (telephone/fax/copier) is a cost-effective recommendation to make further connectivity with the Elections office available to the RVC staff.

A telephone will be needed at each RVC for troubleshooting purposes and to provide a backup connection should the interconnectivity be interrupted at any time. The RVC Supervisor will call the Help Desk with questions, and if interconnectivity difficulties occur, RVC staff will use the telephone to query if a voter is registered, eligible and/or has not voted in the election in question.

Television/DVD player

To provide a brief orientation for individuals using the AVU for the first time, the RVC may provide a demonstration video to familiarize voters with use of equipment and procedures for voting-by-mail. The video will be available both in English and Chinese.

Transport of ballots from ballot drop box

The mail ballot drop box will be located at the RVC site, available during the business hours of the RVC, and function as a collection box for voted mail ballots. At the end of each day, RVC staff will follow security procedures for transporting the ballots collected that day.

COST

Estimated one-time and operating cost analysis takes into account the staffing model, services, facilities management, equipment and security costs associated with operating a 2,000 square foot facility open to the public during the 20-day period leading up to and including Election Day. One time costs for computers, furniture, and other equipment and infrastructure costs are estimates, with the understanding that certain locations may have a higher initial cost due to network cabling, security upgrades, etc. The ongoing costs include staffing, phone and data service, rent, etc., can be found in the appendix, section 9.

STATUS UPDATE: BALLOT TABULATION UPGRADE SOLUTIONS

KCE has spent considerable time researching a solution for upgrading the ballot tabulation system. A preliminary analysis based on mandatory criteria of the four active voting system vendors certified in Washington State is complete.⁹

Following is a discussion of the five mandatory criteria and a graphical illustration of the analysis to date. The five mandatory criteria include certification, system compatibility, basic system requirements, technical requirements, and business process needs.

- **Certification**

King County Elections must employ a tabulation technology that meets Federal and State voting system standards and certification. This certification provides the most basic and primary criteria for evaluation. Only vendors that have certified systems or systems currently in the certification process and are active in the state of Washington are included for evaluation in this report.

- **System Compatibility**

King County's election management and voter registration system software, Data Information Management System (DIMS), maintains the database of all registered voters, jurisdictions, candidates, and races in King County. This information is used to build ballots, maintain the current voter file, determine voter eligibility, and mail ballots to registered voters. At a basic level, the ballot tabulation system must be able to integrate with the DIMS election management and voter registration system with minimal effort.

- **Basic System Requirements**

To operate in King County Election's VBM environment, a tabulation system must have three basic system components. These components include ballot building, central count tabulation equipment, and direct recording electronic (DRE) equipment that meets the accessibility requirements for use at regional voting centers.

- **Technical Requirements**

With approximately 1 million registered voters, nearly 300 jurisdictions, and more than 2,500 precincts King County Elections conducts some of the most complicated elections of any jurisdiction in the nation. With six possible election dates per year, a construct of overlapping elections is created between initialization and certification. Thus, it is crucial that King County Elections select a tabulation technology vendor that has the ability to manage the complexity and database size requirements of a large and complex jurisdiction as that of King County.

⁹ Tabulation vendor comparison located in section 10 in the appendix.


• **Business Process Needs**

To manage the anticipated volume of ballots that will be required to be tabulated centrally, pre-processing ballots, as they are received from voters, is a significant comparative advantage. Pre-processing ballots is simply converting the physical ballot image to an electronic image followed by processing the data to determine if there are errors that will cause problems with later tabulation. Once created, the electronic image is saved for tabulation on Election Day. The conversion of the physical image to an electronic image is the most time consuming part of the process, but the tabulation of votes from an electronic image is very fast comparatively.

The ability to pre-process ballots will spread out workload for tabulating ballots another 12 to 15 days in advance of any given election and decrease the overall number of tabulators. This process has significant security and accountability advantages and will allow for a much larger proportion of ballots to be tabulated and reported on Election Day. King County Elections anticipates that all ballots that have been received, signature verified, opened, and duplicated (if necessary) by Election Day will be tabulated and reported by the time of closing on Election Night.

Narrowing down the solution

Using the above mandatory requirements and as shown in the following diagram, the initial field of four vendors as been narrowed to two. ES & S falls out for lack of a DRE and Sequoia falls out for lack of the ability to pre-process ballots (Business Process Needs). This leaves Diebold and Hart for further consideration.



With only Diebold and Hart meeting our mandatory requirements, the next step in the analysis of a ballot tabulation solution is a more detailed evaluation of these two solutions. In order to collect information for this comparison each of these vendors has been invited to provide a demonstration. King County Elections will spend the next several weeks examining the two options and finalizing a detailed business case due to Council no later than March 30, 2007.

The following criteria will be used to compare and contrast the systems in this next stage. The criteria are divided into high, medium and low for the purposes evaluation in a business case. High priority items will be weighted more than medium priority items and low priority weighted the least in the evaluation process.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System security • System cost capital/operating • System integration with DIMS • Impact on VBM transition schedule • Space on printed ballot.
Medium Priority
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Machine sorting processing ○ Institutional knowledge ○ Demonstrated capacity to serve a large complex jurisdiction ○ Customer service ○ Data availability for report writing ○ Maintenance and serviceability
Lower Priority
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Printing process change ○ Practical tabulation speed ○ Physical space requirements ○ Image processing time

While security is listed as a high priority among the various factors for further evaluating tabulation systems, it is overall considered a paramount priority. The security of King County Election's tabulation and voting system engenders public trust and confidence in the administration of elections in King County and our democracy. To this end and as advised by the King County Council, KCE will have its security plan reviewed by an independent outside group. Elections could have this group review and examine the current security plan and potentially advise on the transition to a vote by mail election system regarding security issues.

CONCLUSION

The transition plans and scheduling for regional voting centers and ballot drop boxes and initial analysis of upgraded ballot tabulation solutions are based on the assumptions outlined in this report. While a significant amount of work has been completed, much still remains to be done for the successful transition to VBM.

Specific time frames and hard deadlines presented in this plan and detailed in the appendix are dependent on approval of the motion and ordinance accompanying this report and business cases that will follow by the County Council. Meeting our targeted deadlines not only requires Council approval, but also coordination with selected vendors and collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of State. If all assumptions hold true and work progresses according to the schedule outlined in this report, the transition to VBM will be a successful step in rebuilding public trust and confidence in the administration of elections in King County.



KING COUNTY

1200 King County Courthouse
516 Third Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104

Signature Report

September 6, 2006

Motion 12334

Proposed No. 2006-0387.1

Sponsors Dunn, Ferguson, Patterson, Hague
and Lambert

1 A MOTION declaring the intent of the King County
2 council to approve by June 1, 2009, an ordinance to submit
3 a proposed charter amendment to King County voters
4 concerning an elected county auditor and requesting
5 recommendations from a charter review commission on
6 certain matters related to an elected auditor.

7
8

9 WHEREAS, the duty of supervising elections in King County has been assigned
10 to the director of the department of records and elections, now the records, elections and
11 licensing services division of the department of executive services of King County, a
12 nonelective office, since the charter was established in 1969, and

13 WHEREAS, in its March 2006 Report on King County Elections, the citizens'
14 election oversight committee recommended, as one of its top six recommendations, that
15 elections in King County be conducted by a non-partisan elected county auditor, and

16 WHEREAS, in its February 28, 2006, Final Report, the King County independent
17 task force on elections recommended having an elected auditor and that the charter

18 review commission to be appointed in 2006 consider the issue of an elected versus an
19 appointed county auditor, and

20 WHEREAS, on June 19, 2006, the county council adopted Ordinance 15523,
21 authorizing vote-by-mail elections in King County beginning in 2007 or 2008 after
22 certain conditions have been met, including the appointment and confirmation of a
23 director of records, elections and licensing services and a superintendent of elections, and

24 WHEREAS, proposing a charter amendment to provide for an elected auditor to
25 the voters this year will likely hinder the county's ability to immediately appoint and
26 confirm a well-qualified professional for the position of director of records, elections and
27 licensing services who can ensure continued implementation of critical, time-sensitive
28 recommendations from the independent task force on elections, the Elections Center and
29 the citizens' election oversight committee;

30 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT MOVED by the Council of King County:

31 A. It is the intent of the King County council to approve by June 1, 2009, an
32 ordinance submitting a proposed charter amendment to King County voters at the general
33 election on November 3, 2009, asking the voters if the office of elected county auditor
34 responsible for voter registration and for conducting general and special elections in the
35 county, should be established.

36 B. Upon the formation of a charter review commission in 2006, the commission
37 is requested to evaluate and make recommendations on whether the office of elected
38 auditor should be partisan or nonpartisan, and what specific functions, if any, besides


Motion 12334

39 voter registration and conducting general and special elections should be under the
40 administration of the elected auditor.
41

Motion 12334 was introduced on 8/28/2006 and passed by the Metropolitan King County Council on 9/5/2006, by the following vote:


Yes: 6 - Mr. von Reichbauer, Ms. Lambert, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Ferguson, Ms. Hague and Ms. Patterson
No: 3 - Mr. Phillips, Mr. Gossett and Mr. Constantine
Excused: 0

KING COUNTY COUNCIL
KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON



Larry Phillips, Chair

ATTEST:



Anne Noris, Clerk of the Council

Attachments None



**King County
Elections**

**Security Plan
November 16, 2006**

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INTRODUCTION

Security of the voting process is paramount to ensuring the public's confidence in elections. The King County Elections Section Security Plan is intended to provide a general overview of tasks as well as roles and responsibilities of selected offices and agencies in maintaining the security of the voting process.

In general, elections systems are almost universally composed of two (2) major independent systems that provide functionality for Election Management / Voter Registration and Vote Tabulation. The King County Records, Elections & Licensing Services (REALS) Division employs two such systems. The system used for election management / voter registration is the Data Information Management System (DIMS). The system used to conduct ballot tabulation is the Global Election Management System (GEMS).

The Records, Elections and Licensing Services Division Director has the authority and responsibility to ensure that all employees working in elections are working in a safe environment. In addition, it is crucial that every vote be counted and that the voting process is secure. The Superintendent of Elections or his or her designee is responsible for overall coordination of security concerns during elections. That position will be clearly identified to all employees as the primary point of coordination of security issues.

Effective security does not rely on a single process, feature, or policy. Effective security requires a number of interrelated processes, systems, and policies that complement and build on each other. The systems, process and policies that comprise layers of security for King County Elections are represented in figure 1 on the following page.

These multiple layers of security systems, processes and/or procedures ensure that elections are not inappropriately influenced. External stakeholders such as the media, party observers, Elections oversight groups, the Office of the Secretary of State and the public provide transparency and are integral to the detection of problems with the elections process. The physical and personnel security measures which have been implemented ensure that only authorized individuals are allowed access to critical election spaces, materials, technical systems and ballots. Elections staff and volunteers are trained in elections processes and procedures designed to ensure the security and integrity of the election process. These elections processes are audited and reviewed throughout with many checkpoints for accuracy. This layered approach ensures that if one or even two layers are compromised, bypassed or proven ineffective the security and integrity of the election process is still preserved.

The contents of this Plan are structured to parallel the layers of security shown in figure 1: open and transparent elections environment, physical and personnel security, legal and procedural security, and technical and systems security.

This Plan's focus is on the policies and higher level processes and procedures that are needed to ensure a secure election environment. Detailed processes and procedures that implement these policies will be the subject of specific guidance documents contained in the Election Section's Procedure Document Control Tree (available upon request through the office of the Superintendent of Elections or the REALS Division Director's Office).

Layers of Election Security




Figure 1

This plan is a dynamic, living document that will be reviewed biennially and updated as significant security issues arise or situations change. After every election, King County Elections staff review the lessons learned from that election and make adjustments to processes, procedures, and systems to improve the effectiveness of operations and security. The King County Elections staff also monitors the experiences of other jurisdictions and scrutinizes studies and reviews by third parties. They then adjust policies and procedures in order to avoid weaknesses experienced or identified by others.

All employees who work in elections or who have a role in elections security share responsibility to ensure that our elections remain secure and that they are conducted with the utmost integrity. To this end, all new employees are required to read and become familiar with this Security Plan as well as any implementation procedures that are relevant to their work areas. All employees will be briefed periodically with the key aspects of this plan. All employees, not just managers, are encouraged to suggest ways to improve the security of the election process. King County Elections also welcomes suggestions from oversight committees and other observers on ways to enhance system security.

GUIDING LAWS, POLICIES & BEST PRACTICES

Laws, policies and best practices that apply to elections include:

- Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA): 42 U.S.C. 15301 to 15545
http://www.eac.gov/law_ext.asp
- RCW Title 29A – Elections <http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?Cite=29A>
- WAC Chapter 434 – Secretary of State
<http://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=434>
- KCC Title 1, County Council and Elections
- KCC 2.16.035, Department of Executive Services
- Department Policies and Procedures for the Records, Elections and Licensing Services Division, PER 9-2 (DP)
- King County Election Section policies & procedures
- Quick Start Management Guide for Voting System security, U.S. Election Assistance Commission - <http://www.eac.gov/docs/EAC%20Security.pdf>
- Brennan Center report, "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World," –
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_36343.pdf

Open and Transparent Election Environment

Administering elections is a monumental responsibility and one in which openness and transparency are essential to gaining and retaining public trust in government. It is the process by which citizens of a democratic republic choose their political leaders, and in the State of Washington, it is a system in which the electorate, through the process of initiative and referenda can directly make law. In any other system or process, it would likely be considered contradictory to require openness and transparency around a set of processes while at the same time restricting access and ensuring strong security, but this is exactly what election administrators across the nation must accomplish. For election administrators, openness and transparency are defined literally, they involve a variety of concepts that combine accountability, transparency, security, and accuracy, to enable access, foster openness, and preserve the integrity of the process. In King County, this is achieved through:

- Building infrastructure design and access
 - Open floor plans, viewing windows, transparent security cage material, and optimized viewing areas are all design elements that facilitate transparency. Additionally, available parking and transit serviced facilities helps minimize barriers that might prevent interested stakeholders from observing various aspects of election processing. King County is also actively planning for the consolidation of all election related activity to occur in a single location. A consolidated elections facility will increase accessibility and benefit openness and transparency.
- Observers/Paid political party observers
 - The requirement for official Observers of the Election Process is grounded in state law. The responsibility for providing the official Observers is with the chair of the county major political party central committees, which he or she may delegate to a Chief Election Observer from the committee staff. Any other Observers are public Observers and are covered under separate policy. It is the responsibility of the Records, Elections and Licensing Services Division Director (Director) to designate the locations where the Observers are to be stationed, and the final approval of the assignment of the Observers.
 - Functions of Observers: Observers serve as a check and balance against ballot fraud by watching to ensure that voted ballots are not changed from the way that they were voted by the voter, that no properly voted ballot is removed from the Election Process without authorization of the County Canvassing Board as provided in RCW 29A.62, nor any other ballot is added to or substituted for the legitimately voted ballots except as provided by law. Each Observer shall also serve to witness the action of the other. This applies to substitute Observers as well when used.
- Documentation of policies and procedures
- Public disclosure of records
- Media access and interest
- Oversight Groups

Physical and Personnel Security

The first line of defense against unauthorized access, tampering with elections results, or other illicit activity is physical and personnel security. If unauthorized individuals cannot get to areas or systems where election activity takes place, they are unable to tamper with or affect the process. Ensuring that Elections personnel do not inappropriately influence or tamper with results starts with selecting highly trustworthy individuals and through additional layers of checks and balances to ensure they do not have the opportunity or inclination to create harm to the process.

Physical

Access Control: Access to the election office and work areas is limited. The physical layouts of the Administration Building and the Election Distribution Center are such that people entering are either recognized or asked to display ID badges. All authorized employees are issued name tags and ID badges and are required to display identification at all times. Staff are issued proximity key cards for opening authorized doors.

In the King County Administration Building (553 Admin), doors are equipped with door position switches that transmit an alarm to the security dispatch center if held open or opened without a valid access card. Duress alarms for protection of staff are located in various locations. Duress alarms are monitored at the security dispatch center 24/7. An alarm condition or duress alarm initiates a camera call-up. King County Employee photos have been loaded into the Access Control System, each card access event calls up the employee picture along with the access granted or denied message at the security dispatch center. Security cameras are located in strategic locations.

Access to the Temporary Election Annex (TEA) facility requires an entry code for the building exterior doors during non-working hours. Keyed suite access is limited to Election supervisors and leads who are assigned keys based on a key plan that limits access to ballot processing spaces to ballot processing supervisors only. All temporary Elections staff, non-Elections county personnel (including building maintenance personnel), and visitors/observers are required to sign in and wear identification badges. Visitors and unofficial observers are required to be escorted through ballot processing space and/or are restricted to observation areas controlled through ropes and stanchions to prevent access to ballot processing staff and election related material.

Polling Locations (approximately 500 locations) - Most polling places do not have hired security in place but will use 9-1-1 to summon local law enforcement officers if a situation arises (specific guidance has been provided to poll workers in the "Emergency Procedures" section of the Poll Worker Guidebook). In a few polling locations, additional security may be hired to maintain the safety of workers and voters.

Election Distribution Center (EDC) Facility - Access to the election work area is limited through personal recognition or display of badges. Uniformed security is present when live voted ballots are on site.

Because of its use in the tabulation of results, GEMS at the Administration Building and the Temporary Elections Annex (TEA) receives extra scrutiny. GEMS tabulation servers are housed in a secured, locked environment, which can only be accessed using key cards by an authorized entrant. This secured, locked room serves as the location where the election database is prepared and where the ballot layout and design quality assurance process is performed. Only authorized elections personnel are permitted to enter the secured server

room unless escorted by an authorized entrant. GEMS server access is given only to key, qualified, and authorized personnel.

Access to the ITS Data Center is controlled by cardkeys and limited to ITS staff. All non-ITS personnel are required to sign in before being admitted and to be escorted by ITS personnel.

Authorization for keycard access to ballot cages and tabulation areas will be granted on an as-needed basis and shall be authorized by either the Director or Assistant Director of REALS or the Superintendent of Elections. All such authorized individuals shall be named on a list and posted at the entry of each cage. Additionally, cage authorized employees shall wear color-coded cage-access credentials:

Uniformed Security Presence: Commissioned police officers in uniform are assigned to the building and provide 24/7 on-site security once voted ballots begin to be processed. During high volume processing, additional officers are assigned to ensure full coverage.

On Election Day, uniformed guards (either off-duty police officers from the City of Seattle, Facilities Management Security Officers or King County Sheriff's Office deputies) are stationed at key points to protect the entry and exit points of elections buildings being used for critical functions. They are present during election ballot counting and transportation of ballots. The security function for various facilities is coordinated between the Assistant Superintendent of Elections Operations, a Facilities Management Division Elections Security Coordinator, and the King County Sheriff's Office Special Operations Section.

Video Surveillance: The Temporary Election Annex (TEA) interior space is monitored by surveillance cameras and motion detection devices on all ballot storage cages and GEMS server locations.

In the King County Administration Building, which houses the administrative offices of the REALS Division, the Elections Operations Unit, the Voter Services group and the Technical Services Group, there are security cameras in multiple key locations.

In the Election Distribution Center (EDC), there is video surveillance of the ballot cages.

All video is recorded 24/7 to a DVR with an archive capacity of 25 to 30 days for post-event review.

Wiring and Data Communications Equipment Closets: These closets are areas of vulnerability where if not properly controlled, could create disruption to communications and data connectivity. All cabling closets will be locked at all times. Keys, combinations, and/or key cards are limited to Elections Technical Services and ITS. Keys are available in sealed key boxes with logs for emergency use if key individuals are not available.

Key Control: All keys to Election spaces are tightly controlled and distributed to individuals with a demonstrable need for access to the space(s) the keys are for. A record of who has been issued a key is maintained. Keys and county identification are collected upon termination. Should a keyed door be compromised through the loss of a key, Elections staff will take immediate action to have the appropriate door (s) re-keyed.

Accessible Voting Units (AVUs) and Optical Scan (OS) Voting Devices: Accessible voting units and precinct count optical scan voting equipment are stored in a secured limited access warehouse facility. Voter access, supervisor, and administrator cards for the AVUs in addition to memory cards for each unit are secured in a locked room with limited access.

The outer case of each of these units is sealed with uniquely numbered, tamper-evident seals. Each of these units, in addition to the associated components are tracked with an electronic inventory system to maintain a documented chain of custody.

These measures enable it to be detected if a unit has been tampered with by either a poll worker during the three days in advance of the election or staff member at any time. By maintaining a documented chain of custody we can detect who may have tampered with a device or when it would likely have occurred.

Pursuant to state law, the accessible voting units create a voter verifiable paper audit trail during the voting process that is securely maintained for the legal retention period. This process is similar to the one used for optical scan paper ballots.

The voter verified paper audit trail is the number one recommendation by critics of electronic voting. This physical security of a voter verified paper audit trail combined with a transparent process, legal, procedural, and technical security measures combine to make a secure and accountable elections system that provides the blind or disabled the ability to cast a secret and independent ballot for the first time.

Servers and Electronic Media:

All sensitive equipment and supplies are secured in locked cabinets, closets and drawers inside the GEMS server room. All computer media and removable data stores like CDs, CD-RWs, diskettes, etc. are locked and secured when not needed. Data backups like CDs and data tapes should be taken off-site to a secure location for disaster recovery.

Locking rack mount cabinets for all GEMS servers have been installed at both the REALS Division administration office (Administration Building) and the Temporary Election Annex site. This security feature deters any attempt at "plugging" into the system, or maliciously trying to shut the system down.

Personnel

Employees, volunteers and observers who work during elections must practice a high level of security. Only authorized personnel with a specific need for access are to be allowed in sensitive areas, including computer equipment rooms, ballot storage areas, and tabulation areas. Others will be accompanied by an escort in sensitive areas at all times.

Upon implementation of this plan and to the extent allowed by law, police background checks will be required for new hires, prior to employment, for personnel who work in areas of heightened security. Heightened security areas will be specified by the Director of REALS in a separate document.

Training about areas of responsibility, sensitivity of information, security of ballots, and chain of custody for the ballots is necessary for all employees and volunteers, and is accomplished through individual work units in training and orientation by work group leads and supervisors.

All personnel and observers are required to wear visible credentials at all times.

A dedicated elections staff recruiter focuses on hiring qualified temporary employees to assist with the various tasks of administering an election. Implementing core skills testing for temporary workers is a significant body of work, but it essentially provides the recruiter with objective information that is used when placing temporary employees into various positions.

Skills and abilities are matched to the positions resulting in greater performance, quality and efficiency. Although hiring temporary workers is dependent on the local job market, the more stringent hiring processes have contributed to an increased attention to detail and adherence to procedures. King County Elections will continue to engage in activities and processes that result in qualified workers being hired.

Legal and Procedural Security

Ballot Programming and Administration: All ballot programming and voting system administration is decentralized in Washington State. King County staff programs and controls these processes in rooms under camera surveillance with controlled and tracked access. All election ballot programming and system administration is performed by qualified King County Election staff. While vendor support personnel are at times on site for advice, they do not perform any actual functions related to the election. This is one of the key recommendations made in the Brennan Center report, "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World."

Ballot & Document Security: Voter affidavits are continually being processed in the elections office. When large deliveries of documents arrive they are opened and date stamped. They are then batched for scanning (signature & data capture). Once this process is complete, the batched documents are stored in trays and kept in locked storage cabinets for data entry. When work is being processed in the elections office, it is removed from storage by supervisory staff and assigned to data entry personnel. At the end of each work shift, affidavits & documents are returned to the storage cabinets and locked.

Live ballots, absentee ballots and provisional ballots are handled with an additional level of security. In the elections office absentee ballots are issued over the counter using the Ballot-On-Request module. Ballot stock used to print these in-house ballots is tracked by a stub numbering system and an audit log. Ballot stock remains in locked storage throughout the day and is only accessed when needed. Only authorized elections staff have access to both the ballot stock and the issuing module. This function is assigned only to full time elections staff. These individuals are specially trained to issue and produce ballots using the Ballot-On-Request (BOR) module. At close of business each day, the BOR operators log out of the system. The Superintendent of Elections or a designee is responsible for reviewing the audit logs and coordinating ballot accountability.

All live ballots and ballot stock are secured in the ballot cage area and only authorized personnel have access to this area. While ballots are not actively being processed, the ballot cage remains secured with locks, numbered seals, and ingress/egress is recorded on an access log.

Accessible Voting Units and Precinct Count Optical Scanning Devices: Only federal and state certified voting equipment is used in King County. Prior to deployment all voting equipment is thoroughly acceptance tested using detailed checklists. Prior to acceptance and use, equipment is tested in a mock election and firmware is hash code tested to ensure that programming code delivered by the vendor is the same as that tested and certified by independent laboratories during the federal certification process. A hash code is the result of running data or the object code for an application through a mathematical algorithm. This hash code is unique to that set of data or object code. Changing only one bit of information will result in an entirely different hash code.

In advance of every election all accessible voting units and precinct count optical scan units to be used in the election are tested to ensure that the logic and accuracy of the ballot programming is correct. This legally-required testing is conducted in the presence of political party observers and is open to the public. During this process memory cards containing the election-specific programming (and ballots cast information accumulated on Election Day) are sealed in the units with uniquely numbered tamper evident seals. The unique seal numbers are tracked from the time they are sealed in the warehouse by election staff until the units are returned by poll workers on election night. This enables King County

to detect if the memory card has been disturbed or tampered with during the three days in advance of the election poll workers have the equipment.

Polling Place Security for Accessible Voting Units: Studies of jurisdictions that experienced problems with recent implementations of electronic voting equipment share a common theme of inadequate poll worker training and insufficient procedures. King County Elections carefully tracks lessons learned across the nation and has implemented best practices and security standards. In King County, each polling place is staffed by sworn election workers, who have attended mandatory training. There are numerous checks and balances in place, including separation of duties as each voter moves through the polling place:

- On Election Day, a separate judge is dedicated to the accessible voting units. That judge receives specialized training and maintains control of the machine key. A training video is mailed to every Inspector and AVU judge a week before the election to remind poll workers about important procedures from their training session.
- Before opening the polls, a "zero proof" printout from each voting machine verifies to election judges there are no votes stored on the memory card and that the races are properly coded for the precinct and election. This report is printed twice (one is kept in the security canister for auditing purposes, and one is sent to canvassing), both are signed by three election workers.
- A voter access card is issued only to qualified voters and not issued until proper identification is shown. Only then is a voter access card programmed for the voting machine.
- The voter access cards can only be programmed for one-time use only and are collected after voters are finished voting by the AVU judge.
- Each voter is escorted to an accessible voting unit by an AVU Judge.
- Troubleshooters are assigned to regional zones of between 12 and 16 polling places patrol polling places on Election Day and respond to AVU issues such as printer issues or to replenish supplies and troubleshoot problems. This specialized group of 55 people receive 16 hours of mandatory, hands-on training before each election
- A summary report printout from each AVU confirms the total number of ballots cast on each unit. Three copies of this report are printed (one is kept in the security canister for auditing purposes, one is sent to canvassing, and one is posted in a public place). These are again signed by three election workers.

Post Election Audits: For each primary and general election the REALS Director requests that the political parties select three precincts and a race in each precinct be recounted pursuant to law. This process compares the hand recount of the optical scan ballots and AVU ballots cast in the polling place against the accumulated electronic results.

Prior to certification of each election a random audit of 4% of the accessible voting units deployed in the election is performed. The audit compares a hand recount of the voter verified paper audit trail against the electronic accumulation of results. This is another of the recommendations made in the Brennan Center report, "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World."

Ballot Tabulation System and Central Count Equipment Testing: Prior to every election, the GEMS database and central count tabulation equipment are subjected to extensive testing that culminates with the official Logic and Accuracy Test the Friday (four days) before the election. This rigorous testing procedurally checks that the data base and each machine properly records, counts and tabulates results correctly. Each central count device must pass logic and accuracy testing. An extensive audit trail is maintained of this process including detailed checklists. The Logic and Accuracy test of the GEMS database and central count tabulation equipment is conducted in the presence of political party observers and is open to the public. During the primary and general elections, the Office of the Secretary of State is present for the Logic and Accuracy test.

Two Person Rule: To ensure against the possibility of the illegal manipulation of voted ballots, any time voted ballots are not in a sealed container in a secured area during the Election Process, they shall be in the presence of no fewer than two observers who shall not be of the same political party. Ballot processing shall not be curtailed if the requested Observers have not been provided. The Superintendent or Assistant Superintendents may assign pairs of observers at times other than as prescribed above when in his or her opinion, it is warranted.

At any other time ballots in sealed containers are not secured in a vault, they shall be in the presence of at least two Elections Section staff members.

External Data Storage Mediums: Procedures have been created related to the manual handling, storage and disposition of data transfer medium (CD, DVD, disk) for security touch points related to DIMSNeT. These procedures are located in the DIMSNeT Operations and Maintenance Plan, portions of which are available by request through the Superintendent of Election's office or the REALS Division Director's office.

Technical and System Security

The technical security features include the computer security components necessary to ensure data integrity and security of IT and other technical systems, as well as prevent unauthorized access into election systems through the use of best practice tools, processes, procedures, and policies. Proper management of the technical security environment for the system is critical to prevent any unauthorized access to elections systems and data, even if an unauthorized individual has circumvented other layers of security. Technical Security is the last barrier to someone intent on malicious action, though the other layers of security would facilitate detection (e.g. armed Sheriff's deputy security, camera surveillance, and key card access records.)

General

Passwords: Per county IT policy, all systems and users are required to use passwords to log on to workstations, the network and all systems. Passwords must be "strong" passwords. A "strong" password is one that:

- is at least eight characters,
- uses at least three of the following: uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, or special characters (e.g. #, @),
- is not a user's (or user's family) first or last name, birthday, phone number, part of an address, or user's login, and
- can not be found in a dictionary.

County policy requires that network and Windows passwords be changed at least every 90 days. This policy is enforced by Active Directory software. A special password policy for GEMS is discussed in the next paragraph. When changed, a password must be sufficiently different than the last six passwords used. Passwords must never be written down unless they are kept in a locked container. Password must never be shared. Any password that is suspected to have been compromised must be changed immediately. Audit logs should also be checked to determine if anyone inappropriately accessed the system or data and to determine if any malicious modifications were made. Supervisors must immediately notify Technical Services when any employee is released, particularly if they are released under adverse conditions, so that system access can be terminated.

All system and other critical passwords will be written on a piece of paper, folded in half with the writing on the inside, placed in a sealed envelop with the envelop flaps taped with tape that can be written on, initialed across the tape so that the initials from paper across the tape to paper, and the envelope stored in a locked contained in Technical Services. In the event that emergency access is required to a password protected system, permission must be obtained from the Technical Services Manager, Election Superintendent, Assistant Director, or Director. For the tabulation GEMS, the Assistant Superintendent of Ballot Processing and Delivery may also grant permission to open a password envelope. In the event that a password envelope is opened, the password must be changed at the earliest opportunity.

GEMS passwords will be changed based on the election cycle. A new password will be used when an election is initialized, immediately prior to the official Logic and Accuracy (L & A) test, and upon certification of the election. Between the official L & A Test and certification of the election, two-person integrity will be required for access to the GEMS database – that is, the GEMS server password and the GEMS database software will never be known by the same individuals. The server password will be set and known by Ballot Processing and Delivery personnel and the GEMS database password by Technical Services personnel. Before the official L & A Test and after certification of the election, both

passwords may be known by individuals and will normally be limited to Technical Services personnel.

Anti-Virus Software: All King County systems and workstations must have anti-virus software installed (with the exception of GEMS – discussed in the following paragraph). Such software must be set for automatic updates and virus definitions kept up to date. Desktop profiles are set to ensure live updates. Laptop users need to exercise caution to ensure their definitions are maintained.

The tabulation and development GEMS servers are not attached to any external network (Ballot on Request GEMS workstations are). In a closed system, virus infection is extremely unlikely, but it is possible. The potential problem with anti-virus software is that it could affect the GEMS system operation. Diebold Elections Systems Inc. (DESI) has recommended that King County installs and run the anti-virus software during installation of any software and for any updates and then REMOVE the software from the GEMS server. By removing the software, it would remove any potential viruses but also prevent anti-virus software from affecting GEMS operations.

Security patches: The majority of users of Election's systems are using workstations with Windows XP operating systems. All software can have vulnerabilities that allow unauthorized individuals the ability to access systems and potentially access and alter data and modify the systems. This has been particularly true of Microsoft operating systems and applications. As vulnerabilities are discovered, Microsoft (and other vendors) will release security patches. The Information and Telecommunications (ITS) Division evaluates these security patches and determines which patches will be applied to county systems. It is mandatory that any workstations and systems attached to the county network be patched. Generally, this is accomplished automatically by ITS over the network. Users must ensure they leave their workstations powered on when notified by ITS. Laptop users must also ensure that they leave their workstations connected to the network when these updates occur or they must manually ensure the updates are applied if they can't leave the computer attached.

Data backup: It is essential that data be backed up frequently in the event of catastrophic failure to computer or storage systems as well as accidental deletion. In the event data is lost, it can then be restored from the backup. A copy of the backup should also be stored at a second site in the event the primary site suffers damage rendering the backup unusable. For systems connected to the county network, the Information and Telecommunications (ITS) Division provides this service for network disk drives and for servers (e.g. DIMS) they operate on our behalf. Data stored on individual workstations are **NOT** backed up by ITS. It is the responsibility of the user to either back up the data themselves or put a copy of the data on a network drive. ITS does a complete back up once a week and an incremental back up daily. The DIMS System Administrator should request additional complete back ups that coincide with significant events.

GEMS servers are not attached to the network. As a result, ITS does not back up these databases. It is the responsibility of the GEMS systems analyst(s) to perform frequent backups, particularly at critical election events. GEMS backups during tabulation are discussed in the *GEMS specific* section. Specific backups during the development and testing periods are discussed in Election Section Procedures. A copy of the GEMS database as it is at the time the election is certified must be kept for 22 months.

Certification: All software and hardware involved with collecting and tabulating votes must be certified both by the federal government (currently by the Election Assistance Commission) and Washington State Secretary of State. Currently King County uses the

following items that must be certified: GEMS software, AccuVote Optical Scanner and firmware, AccuVote –TSx touch screen hardware and firmware, and Express Poll 2000. Any upgrades to this equipment must also be certified. In addition to state and federal certification, King County Elections will perform acceptance tests on any new or upgraded hardware or software before placing in service.

Hash Codes¹: Before installing or upgrading any software on any system involved with collecting and tabulating votes, King County Elections will verify the software received is the same as that certified through the use of hash code testing.² Procedures for hash code testing are provided in separate documents. In addition to testing software on receipt, King County Elections will work towards periodic hash code testing of a percentage of randomly selected devices for each election to verify that software installed is the certified version and has not been tampered with. For some software (e.g. GEMS application) the software can be tested in place. Other software (e.g. OS scanners) is tested by removing an EPROM from the device and testing it through use of an EPROM reader. Still other software (e.g. AVU) can only be tested by testing the source media (e.g. CD) and re-installing the software on the device. King County Elections is also instituting the practice of hash code testing the GEMS application at the start of each day to prove that the application software is the certified version and hasn't been tampered with. Additionally, the database will be hash code tested at the conclusion of each day's operations and again at the start of the following day's operations to prove that the database had not been tampered with. The database will also be hash code tested upon certification of the election so that any future reporting from the database can be certified to have come from the certified election database. A listing of valid hash codes for certified software can be found at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) web site - <http://www.nsr.nist.gov/vote.html>.

Hash code testing validates that the ballot tabulation software is exactly the same as the software tested and analyzed in the federal and state certification process, and provides election administrators and observers in King County with the assurances needed to be certain that no changes to applications or other critical files have occurred.

Workstation Security: Except for ballot tabulation work, the majority of the work done in elections occurs on desktop workstations connected to networked business applications (e.g. DIMS). As a result, security for systems like DIMS starts with the individual user and the security measures they employ at the workstation level. Thorough security practices and implementation on the servers and networks can be threatened if users don't follow proper security practices at the workstation level. Practices such as leaving their workstations logged on when leaving their workspace or overnight; or writing their password down on their desk blotter can easily provide an unauthorized user access to DIMS defeating the authentication provisions of the database. The more rights the user has in the system, the larger the impact. Users must adhere to the following practices at the workstation level:

- Follow the password policies discussed earlier
- Always lock their computer (or common use computers such as the front desk) when leaving their workstation
- Never give their password to another individual

¹ A hash code is the result of running data or the object code for an application through a mathematical algorithm. This hash code is unique to that set of data or object code. Changing only one bit of information will result in an entirely different hash code. It is similar to an electronic signature.

² All software currently in use has been hash code tested and verified.

- Never install software on their workstations that has not been approved by Technical Services
- Maintain up to date anti-virus definitions and software. Never turn off anti-virus protection
- Do not install any additional hardware unless approved by the Technical Services Manager. In particular, never install any modems or wireless devices.
- All employees are to have read and acknowledged the King County computer acceptable use policy

Laptops: Laptops because of their portability present unique challenges in the security arena. A laptop will frequently be out of areas that are physically secure and in the event of loss or theft leaves information more susceptible to compromise. This unique vulnerability requires additional restrictions. The storage of personal identifying information on a laptop is prohibited unless the information is stored in encrypted format.

No non-county employee laptops are to be connected to the county network. Public Wi-Fi is available in certain buildings throughout King County to enable visitors to access the internet. The public Wi-Fi is not connected to the County's intranet, and access to the county system is protected by the same firewall and other protections identified in the network section below. The county does not provide public Wi-Fi at the Temporary Elections Annex.

Network

Interconnectivity of King County Election's workstations with various election systems servers and connectivity between the different election facilities is accomplished using the county data network. Security of the network is the responsibility of the Office of Information Resource Management (OIRM), Information and Telecommunication Services (ITS) Division. Changes to improve security or rectify problems with existing security arrangements should they arise would be the subject of negotiations between Elections Technical Services and OIRM-ITS.

Architecture³: The transmission of data between the ITS data center and the three (3) Elections locations is carried over I-Net or the KCWAN. The I-Net uses fiber channel leased from a commercial carrier. All switches, routers and other network equipment are King County owned. The KC WAN utilizes King County owned lines. Both the I-Net and the KC WAN are administered by King County ITS. The link to the Elections Distribution Center (EDC) is a 1.5 Mps T1 line. The Administration Building is served by a 100 Mps fiber channel. The Temporary Elections Annex (TEA) is served by a 100Mps link. Both the Administration Building and the TEA use 10/100 Mps lines internally. Routers and switches are in locked wiring and data communication equipment closets to ensure unauthorized individuals cannot get to open ports or areas where they can tamper with the network equipment or configuration.

Connection to the Internet is accomplished through the use of a firewall at the county Data Center. This firewall protects workstations, servers, and systems on the internal network against attacks from the Internet. Measures implemented within the firewall shield IP addresses from the internet reducing the potential for successful malicious activity from external sites. The county also performs anti-virus scanning and intrusion detection at the firewall.

³ Detailed architecture diagrams and specifications are included in a separate document that has restricted distribution.

Servers and software (i.e. GEMS) used for the tabulation of ballots and the reporting of results are not connected to the Internet or to the county's intranet. The local area network for tabulation purposes consists only of tabulation hardware and a local printer. All are physically located in the same space, secured in a separate locked and access-controlled tabulation room or cage.

Election connectivity is via a separate subnet. This provides some measure of protection from problems/attacks affecting other agencies.

Currently, there is no redundant capability for circuits to each building. Any failure of a network link between buildings will leave users unable to connect to the servers until restoration of service. Stipulated response time is 2 hours for switch outages, 12-24 hours for a fiber cut, and 24-48 hours to replace a hub at King Street Station.

Restrictions:

The use of modems on the King County network are prohibited both by ITS and Elections. In the event there is no other way to establish a network connection, the use of a modem must be approved by the Technical Services Manager and the county's Chief Information Officer (CIO). Any use of a modem will only be permitted if there is absolutely no other way to establish communications and will require stringent conditions to ensure adequate security.

Users with legitimate needs to connect to the network from external locations will be provided with Virtual Private Network (VPN) accounts or through a GoToMyPC account. VPNs use tunneling technology with encrypted links to protect the data transmissions. They also use the Active Directory authentication to ensure only authorized users are permitted to connect to the network. GoToMyPC also uses encryption technology and is Internet based using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) not modem based.

There are no wireless devices used within the tabulation system or with any voting device. To prevent any perception of such (through detection of signals with sniffers), wireless technology is prohibited from being used within the ballot tabulation area at the Temporary Election Annex (TEA). Although the county has wireless access points (public_Wi-Fi) at the Administration Building, they are outside the county's firewall and would require a VPN connection to access the internal county data network. Any individual making use of the public Wi-Fi in the Administration Building should be aware that this is an unsecured link and that others may be able to see contents of any transmission. With this in mind, work with data that includes private personal identifying information and other sensitive information will not be conducted unless done over a VPN or through the use of other encrypted links. The use of wireless access points on the Elections subnet portion of the network is prohibited.

Because of the network infrastructure design and safeguards, the use of Active Directory, and other technical best practices, significant barriers exist to help prevent unauthorized access to elections systems and data.

DIMS Specific

DIMS is a fully integrated election management system used to manage voter, jurisdiction, polls & precinct, and contest functions. DIMS does not have any functionality related to vote tabulation or any data related to votes cast. It is the backbone of the majority of functions performed by the King County Elections Section. Failure of this system or inaccurate information would present significant challenges for Election's operations. In addition to the

mentioned functions, DIMS is a key source of initial (candidate and jurisdiction) information to initialize election preparation in GEMS. Inaccurate or inconsistent information in DIMS would severely impact GEMS ballot preparation. Maintaining a secure and reliable DIMS database and environment is a top priority for the Technical Services Group. Although DIMS security is important, since it does not involve the tabulation of votes, it does not come under the same scrutiny as GEMS does and is not subject to some of the more stringent requirements (such as federal certification). DIMS is also not subject to the same level of security concerns related to the manipulation or destruction of election results since they are not maintained within the DIMS application.

Security for the DIMS applications is a shared responsibility between Election's Technical Services Group and the county's Office of Information Resource Management (OIRM), Information and Telecommunication Services (ITS) Division. As the system owner, Technical Services is responsible for setting the policies and standards for ITS to implement with respect to the DIMS servers (which are housed and operated by ITS). ITS is responsible for the physical security of the servers and the personnel security of administering the servers and interconnecting network. ITS is also independently responsible for the operation and security of the county's internet (I-Net) and Wide Area Network (KC WAN).

King County is also reliant upon the Washington State Office of the Secretary of State (OSOS). OSOS operates the state's Voter Registration Database (VRDB) which is tightly integrated with King County's DIMS. Any lapses or breaches in OSOS's VRDB security could potentially cause good data in DIMS to be overwritten by corrupt data from VRDB. King County Elections monitors the DIMS database, and changes that occur via the VRDB are logged electronically within the DIMS system. Should such a situation occur, King County would work in a coordinated manner with the OSOS to resolve any problems or concerns. The network link is also an additional security touch point that impacts our system.

Architecture⁴: King County Election's DIMS architecture consists of two environments – test and production. The test environment consists of a single server. The production environment consists of an application server for the DIMS application, a SQL server for the database, and an image server. Additional servers that are related to DIMS are the web server and IVR server. All servers except the IVR server are housed in the Information and Telecommunications Services (ITS) Division's Data Center, located on the 24th floor of the Seattle Municipal Tower. King County ITS has the responsibility for the physical security of these servers and the administration of the computer operating system and the SQL database used by DIMS. Users access the system through thin client deployed on individual computer workstations. DIMS users are resident at all three Election locations – Administration Building, Temporary Elections Annex (TEA), and Elections Distribution Center (EDC). Users at all three locations are dependent on the county's data network for access to the server(s).

User Authentication: DIMS maintains its own authentication system that governs not only who can log on, but what rights they have once they have been authenticated. DIMS relies on the Windows password. Within DIMS, users are assigned a user level. This user level governs what subsystems and menus the user has access to and whether they have read only or modification rights. The DIMS administrator maintains user permission tables based on the supervisor's determination of the appropriate access level required to perform their job. DIMS logs all user actions including the end user's login-id, date/time stamp, and data values before and after the change.

⁴ Detailed architecture diagrams and specifications are included in the separate document that has restricted distribution.

SQL Database Access: Permission to the SQL database from DIMS application is obtained through an ODBC connection using Windows Active Directory authentication. The SQL permissions are granted to local groups on the KC domain. Membership to these groups is controlled by Elections Technical Services and administered by the Distributed Computing Systems (DCS) section of ITS.

Installed Software: Internet Information Services (IIS) software is prohibited from being installed on any DIMS server. This closes a potential vulnerability for unauthorized users to access the system.

External Access: Access to Elections' separate subnet will be granted to the DIMS service engineer for database administration and maintenance using the county's VPN network. The DIMS service engineer is required to notify Technical Services whenever they will modify the application and obtain positive consent before making the change.

Business Continuity: The DIMS test server is capable of serving as the DIMS production server in the event of failure. Data is backed up daily (weekly full, daily incremental) providing for restoration of data with a maximum of 24-hour loss.

In the event of an extended loss of KCWAN connectivity to the TEA, the signature verification process would move from that location to the Maynard Room of the Administration Building. Other Elections' procedures provide details on the mechanics of moving operations.

Voter registration data, most of which is considered public information, and the DIMS application, are protected by barriers such as network architecture design, user authentication and use of Active Directory to manage permissions, external access restrictions and protocols, and detailed event logs. These measures, particularly coupled with the other security measures provide a significant level of security and assist in the prevention of unauthorized access or modifications.

GEMS Specific

GEMS is a comprehensive system used to design and build ballots, tabulate central count ballots, accumulate results from polls and early voting (from memory cards), and report election results. GEMS is also used to print ballots for over the counter absentee ballots and provisional ballots.

GEMS is administered by King County Election Technical Services personnel. The Information and Telecommunications Services (ITS) division also provides an analyst to assist in the administration of the system. Authorized users include personnel from Voter Services and Ballot Processing and Delivery units who print ballots. Operation of GEMS for central count processing is shared between Technical Services and Ballot Processing and Delivery.

Architecture⁵: GEMS is installed on only a limited number of workstations/servers. GEMS is installed on two primary servers – one at the Administration Building that is used for development of ballots and testing and the other at the Temporary Elections Annex (TEA) that is used for final testing and tabulation. There is a backup server at each location. Neither of these servers nor their backups are connected to an external network (i.e. outside

⁵ Detailed architecture diagrams and specifications are included in a separate document that has restricted distribution.

the TEA Tabulation Room or the Administration Building GEMS Room) and are prohibited from being so. Any sharing of data files (to the website, Secretary of State, or for other administrative reporting) is done by using portable media, such as CD or diskette. Internal networks exist with each set of servers in the way of printers, AccuVote scanners, and AccuVote TSx Accessible Voting Units (AVU). The use of wireless networking devices on any GEMS server is strictly prohibited. Modem banks that previously existed for electronically reporting results from precincts on election night have been disconnected and will be decommissioned. An external hard drive is connected to the TEA primary GEMS server for data backup purposes.

In addition to these servers, GEMS is also installed on four workstations for specific business purposes:

- Two workstations at the front counter at the Administration Building for Ballot on Request
- A workstation at the TEA for Ballots on Request
- A workstation in the TEA IT office for administrative reporting

GEMS will not be installed on any other computers without the express consent of the Technical Services Manager and the Superintendent of Elections.

Configuration and Implementation: Several restrictions are imposed on the equipment and operation of GEMS servers and workstations. These are necessary to ensure a higher than normal level of security to systems involved in tabulating results or that can produce ballots whose distribution must be control once printed. These restrictions will make unauthorized access more difficult as well as prevent authorized users from taking inappropriate actions that could impair the integrity of the election process.

BIOS: A BIOS password will be assigned on all GEMS servers. Further, the BIOS will be configured to ensure the boot (startup) sequence is restricted to the internal hard drive preventing booting from unauthorized removal media (e.g. CD, floppy diskette, USB device). This will ensure that normal access controls are not bypassed and prevent unauthorized modification of applications and/or data.

Installed software: Software not required to operate GEMS or to enhance security of the system will be installed on the GEMS servers (this restriction does not apply to workstations with GEMS for purposes other than tabulation). This includes GEMS and hash code program. Specifically, Microsoft Office, Microsoft Access, and any other software that enables users to work with Direct Access Objects (DAO) or ActiveX Data Objects (ADO) are strictly prohibited. Although GEMS uses the Jet 4.0 database engine (e.g., Access database engine), MS Access is NOT installed on the GEMS system used for tabulation or ballot development. Activists have pointed to being able to "back door" access to the GEMS database with MS Access application. By not installing (or removing) MS Access, it ensures there is no "back door" on the GEMS tabulation system. Installation of IIS on GEMS servers or workstations hosting GEMS is prohibited.

Use of Access Software: Use of Microsoft Access with GEMS will be limited to a workstation that is used to produce administrative reports⁶. Access is never to be used directly on the GEMS database. The data will be retrieved from the GEMS database through the use of a read-only connection to GEMS from a separate Access application.

⁶ The ability to obtain GEMS data from outside of the GEMS application is necessary because GEMS does not have sufficient reports to meet the various needs of elections administrators, council, and other groups. Since GEMS itself is required to be certified, making quick changes to meet the imposed reporting requirements (either by Diebold or internal staff) is unrealistic.

The GEMS database should always return the same hash code as when it was saved of the tabulation server.

System Configuration: Prior to the official Logic and Accuracy test, the configuration of the tabulation system will be documented in accordance with other Election's procedures. After the L & A Test, the configuration of the tabulation system will not be modified without the express consent of both the Superintendent of Elections and the REALS Division Director. Any approved modifications will be documented on the System Configuration Log, include notification to the Office of the Secretary of State and the King County Canvassing Board. Should such a situation arise, a new Logic and Accuracy test will be conducted according to the established process.

Tabulation Operations: To ensure the security and integrity of tabulated results, several additional steps are taken when ceasing daily operations (including the completion of Logic and Accuracy Tests) and when resuming operations on a subsequent day. A Cards Cast Report will be produced when ceasing operations as well as when resuming operations. The two reports will be reviewed by GEMS administrators and political observers to ensure cards cast when resuming is the same as when operations ceased. Party observers will sign this report attesting to the fact that there was no change. This step will be taken any time there is an interruption in operations such as for lunch, breaks to backup and restore the data base, etc. At the cessation of daily activities, the GEMS database will be backed up to at least three CDs – 2 for storage in the blue bag and one for off-site storage. CDs will be produced in the presence of party observers and will be done to new shrink wrapped CDs. CDs will be sealed and initialed by observers. Before resuming operations on a subsequent day, the database will be restored from a sealed CD rather than using a database resident on the system. Finally, a hash code report will be produced after the back up and again after data is restored. The hash codes will be compared by the GEMS administrators and party observers to ensure no change. Matching hash codes indicates that there was no change in the database⁷.

Audit Logs: Before the Logic and Accuracy Tests, the Window's audit logs for the tabulation server will be cleared. During the tabulation process, these logs will not be cleared. After certification, the logs will be printed and kept with other election records for 22 months.

Business Continuity: As discussed in the architecture section, each primary server is paired with a backup server. In addition, each primary server can serve as a backup to the other. However, since neither server is attached to the network, the database would need to be transported to the other site by removable media (e.g. CD). Application software on the two primary servers is maintained in an identical state. Since the Administration Building primary server is not connected to central count devices, it can serve as a backup to the TEA primary server only in a limited state. In the event of a long term need, additional hardware (if available) could be transported and configured to duplicate the TEA setup. The TEA primary server is fully capable of backing up the Administration Building system with no changes. Alternatively, either server could physically be transported to the other site or even to a third site if necessary for longer term needs.

The TEA GEMS server is served by an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to facilitate an orderly shutdown and securing of the GEMS database including procedures for Cards Cast Report, hash coding, and backup to CD.

⁷ It is critical that the hash code program be run against the backed up version of the database, NOT the original database. The database is compacted on backup and will yield a different hash code that will not be equal to the hash code of the restored database the next day.

The GEMS tabulation system and tabulation database is the most secured system in use by King County Elections because of its use in tabulating and reporting election results. The hardened physical security measures significantly restrict unauthorized access, and since the tabulation equipment is not networked to any other system, physical access to the server would be required in order to attempt any unauthorized access. Access (i.e. physical access not Access software) logs, log-on credentials, logic and accuracy tests, and hash code testing are all additional measures taken by King County to create a barrier, minimize or eliminate opportunity, and provide for the security and integrity of the tabulation system.

Accessible Voting Units and Precinct Count Optical Scanners Specific

By administrative code, voting units deployed in Washington State are not equipped with wireless technology. Pursuant to state certification requirements memory cards from the accessible voting units and precinct count optical scan units are uploaded directly to the Global Election Management Systems server.

The tabulation system for the accessible voting units utilizes a Key Card Tool encryption program that sets an encrypted code that is required for any voter access, supervisor, administrator or memory card to be used in a device. This code is changed prior to each election by King County Elections staff.

The ballot selections made by the voters on the accessible voting units are stored in three locations: 1) in a printed version on the voter verified paper audit trail, 2) in flash memory within the accessible voting unit tablet, and 3) on an internal memory card stored and secured with a tamper-evident seal within the voting device. The electronic results are encrypted in both the flash memory and on the memory card. In the event of a recount, the paper ballot (or VVPAT) becomes the official ballot.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Elections require participation and responsibility at all levels of government. The list of responsibilities below is not intended to be exhaustive but does provide an overview for various aspects of the elections process.

United States Government

- Provides certification of voting tabulation systems

Washington State Government

- Office of the Secretary of State (OSOS) election review and advisory
- OSOS provides certification of voting tabulation systems
- Updates RCW Title 29A – Elections
- Updates Title 434 WAC – Secretary of State

Cities

- Local security used for jurisdictions with polling locations

King County Government

- Oversees federal, state, and local elections for geographic King County

King County Departments

Department of Executive Services (DES)/Information and Telecommunications Services

DES/Records, Elections and Licensing Services Division (REALS)

- Primary responsibility for overseeing, monitoring and reporting results for elections held in King County
- The verification of absentee ballot signatures
- GIS staff will maintain the geographic boundaries of all major and minor jurisdictions in King County.
- Voter Registration Staff process voter registration affidavits and documents.

DES/Facilities Management Division

- Facilities Security Personnel shall assist the King County Sheriff for security at the King County Administration Building during elections as outlined in Facilities Security Policy and Procedure Manual, Section 5 Special Programs & Assignments, sections 5.95.0 through 5.95.6, July 2003.
- Provide security enhancements for King County owned facilities used for election polling, tabulation and verification activities.

DES/Office of Risk Management

- Polling locations service agreements review

Office of Information and Resource Management (OIRM)

Information and Telecommunications Division

- Supports the Election Management Voter Registration System (DIMS)

- Supports the technical infrastructure required to operate the DIMSNeT software, data and user access through an MOU for 2004 and an SLA agreement for 2005.
- Provides cyber security and cyber assistance

King County Sheriff's Office (KCSO)

- Provide security staffing at King County unincorporated locations and King County owned facilities

King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office

- Provide legal counsel

SUMMARY

Effective security does not rely on a single process, feature, or policy. Effective security requires a number of interrelated processes, systems, and policies that complement and build on each other. The systems, process and policies that comprise layers of security for King County Elections are represented in detail throughout this plan, and illustrated graphically on Page 4, Figure 1.

These multiple layers of security systems, processes and/or procedures ensure that elections are not inappropriately influenced. External stakeholders such as the media, party observers, elections oversight groups, the Office of the Secretary of State, and the public provide transparency and are integral to the detection of problems with the elections process. The physical and personnel security measures which have been implemented ensure that only authorized individuals are allowed access to critical election spaces, materials, technical systems, and ballots. Elections staff and volunteers are trained in elections processes and procedures designed to ensure the security and integrity of the election process. These elections processes are audited and reviewed throughout with many checkpoints for accuracy. This layered approach ensures that if one or even two layers are compromised, bypassed, or proven ineffective, the security and integrity of the election process is still preserved.

This Security Plan details the many safeguards in place that protect elections in King County. Many of these safeguards are not unique to King County Elections, they are deployed throughout election agencies across the state and country. Although many of the safeguards in place today were implemented before they became recognized best practices, or recommendations by outside stakeholders, they are nonetheless based on lessons learned internally, through observation of others, or were existing legal requirements.

The security of elections in King County is also the result of a genuine commitment by election administrators to cooperate with outside stakeholders. Local stakeholder recommendations for improvement have proved beneficial and many have been implemented. The Elections Section continues to be receptive to recommendations made by all interested parties in so much as they positively contribute to election security, election integrity, public trust, openness, transparency, and accountability.

Election administrators and public officials continue to implement and improve safeguards to protect the integrity of elections, as all share responsibility for protecting this process. A key element to improving election security is the participation of voters, state and local officials, political parties and other stakeholders all working in tandem with election officials to identify security threats and areas of opportunity for improvement.

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

King County Elections staff have identified critical stakeholders whose input in the transition to vote by mail will be critical.

- Executive and staff
- County Council, Council staff
- Citizen's Election Oversight Committee
- KC Democratic Party
- KC Republican Party
- KCE Staff
- Elected officials
- City Councils
- Secretary of State
- Vendors (high speed tabulation and ballot tracking)
- U.S. Postal Service
- Section 203 Coalition
- Minority language advocates
- Jurisdictions (schools, fire, sewer districts, cities)
- Disability Community
- Metro/ Access Transit
- Media
- Bloggers, critics, special interest
- Voters
- Registration Drive Groups
- League of Women Voters
- Municipal League
- Washington Bar Association
- Judicial elections, campaign finance
- Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce
- Rotary
- Bellevue Chamber and other smaller city chambers
- Candidates
- Unions
- Political analysts

VBM Transition Schedule

Please note that this is a living document. Details will be added as business cases are approved and vendors are selected.

ID	% Complete	Task Name	Duration	Start	End	2006	2007	2008	2009
1	22%	VBM Transition Planning Schedule	777.25 days	Sun 1/1/06	Qtr 4 2006	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half
2	0%	First Special Election entry VBM conducted	0 days	Tue 4/22/08	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008
3	0%	Project Contingency	20 days	Tue 3/25/08	Qtr 1 2008	Qtr 2 2008	Qtr 3 2008	Qtr 4 2008	Qtr 1 2009
4	100%	Initial Research and Report	27 days	Tue 1/3/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
8	100%	Transition Team Startup	43.38 days	Mon 11/6/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
9	100%	Transition Team Selection	13 days	Mon 11/6/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
10	100%	Election Staff Kick Off Meetings	4 hrs	Thu 11/16/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
11	100%	Finalize Core Team Roles and Responsibilities	1 day	Tue 11/29/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
12	100%	Develop Initial Schedule	40 days	Mon 11/6/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
13	100%	Transition Team Kick Off Meeting	3 hrs	Wed 12/20/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
14	100%	Scope Finalization	3 hrs	Thu 1/4/07	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008
15	44%	Legislative Requirements	449.18 days	Sun 1/1/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
16	24%	Ordinance #15823	449.18 days	Sun 1/1/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
17	0%	Appointment and confirmation of Director and Supl.	0 days	Sun 1/1/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
18	30%	Cultural Change Management	173 days	Wed 11/1/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
19	0%	RVC Plan Approval by Council	0 days	Thu 4/12/07	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008
20	0%	Approval of RVC and Ballot Drop Locations	40 days	Fri 7/27/07	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008	Qtr 2 2008	Qtr 3 2008
21	8%	Ordinance #15823	176.38 days	Mon 11/6/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
22	100%	Submittal of Updated Elections Security Plan	7 days	Mon 11/6/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
23	0%	Approval of Information technology business case for high speed tabulation	40 days	Tue 3/27/07	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008
24	0%	Approval of Information technology business case for ballot tracking and accountability	40 days	Tue 3/27/07	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008
25	83%	Ordinance 2006-0473 Proviso	105 days	Fri 11/17/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
26	100%	RVC Plan	66 days	Fri 11/17/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
27	100%	Ballot Drop Report	66 days	Fri 11/17/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
28	100%	Detailed Plan for Transition to VBM	65 days	Fri 11/17/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
29	0%	Council Approval of Report/Plan	40 days	Fri 2/16/07	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008
30	5%	Updates to County Code for Precinct Limitation	46 days	Tue 2/1/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
31	100%	Draft legislation	2 days	Tue 2/7/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
32	100%	Submittal of Proposed Ordinance Change	0 days	Wed 2/15/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
33	0%	Council Adoption of legislation	40 days	Wed 2/15/06	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007	Qtr 2 2007	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007
34	10%	Transition Tasks	762.19 days	Mon 11/20/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
35	15%	Tabulation Upgrade	510 days	Mon 11/20/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
36	0%	System Certification	40 days	Wed 9/12/07	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008	Qtr 2 2008	Qtr 3 2008
37	0%	Federal Certification	0 days	Wed 9/12/07	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008	Qtr 2 2008	Qtr 3 2008
38	0%	State Certification	40 days	Thu 9/13/07	Qtr 3 2007	Qtr 4 2007	Qtr 1 2008	Qtr 2 2008	Qtr 3 2008
39	80%	Data Gathering on Tabulation Options	303.38 days	Mon 11/20/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007
40	80%	Research	40 days	Mon 11/20/06	Qtr 1 2006	Qtr 2 2006	Qtr 3 2006	Qtr 4 2006	Qtr 1 2007

Project: VBM 2.14.07
Date: Wed 2/14/07

Task: [] Milestone: [] Summary: [] External Tasks: [] Deadline: []

Progress: [] Milestone: [] Summary: [] External Milestone: []

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VBM Transition Schedule

ID	Task Name	Duration	Start	2006				2007				2008				2009			
				Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
41	79% Complete Presentation by Vendors that Meet Primary Criteria/ Site Visits	16.38 days	Wed 2/7/07																
42	100% Complete Disbid	3 hrs	Thu 2/15/07																
43	0% Hart	3 hrs	Thu 3/1/07																
44	100% Site Visit to Clark County	1 day	Wed 2/7/07																
45	0% Business Case	21 days	Thu 3/1/07																
46	0% Business Case Draft	18 days	Thu 3/1/07																
47	0% Review Business Case	3 days	Tue 3/27/07																
48	0% Sole Source Process	13 days	Tue 5/22/07																
49	0% Draft Waiver	10 days	Tue 5/22/07																
50	0% Review and Approval	3 days	Tue 6/5/07																
51	0% Procurement	35 days	Fri 6/8/07																
52	0% Contract Development	30 days	Fri 6/8/07																
53	0% Sign Contract	5 days	Fri 7/20/07																
54	0% Implement (Dates and durations are estimated based on previous project experience)	100.83 days	Fri 7/27/07																
55	0% Develop Implementation Plan	13.33 days	Fri 7/27/07																
56	0% Review Implementation Plan	5 days	Wed 8/15/07																
57	0% Take Delivery of Equipment	0 days	Wed 11/7/07																
58	0% Set up equipment	1.5 days	Thu 11/8/07																
59	0% Acceptance Testing	100.83 days	Fri 7/27/07																
60	0% Develop Acceptance Testing Plan	6 days	Fri 7/27/07																
61	0% Individual Unit Testing	5 days	Mon 12/3/07																
62	0% Mock Election (including Stress Testing)	5 days	Mon 12/10/07																
63	0% Documentation	28.75 days	Fri 7/27/07																
64	0% Policies	10 days	Fri 7/27/07																
65	0% Process Map	1.25 days	Fri 8/10/07																
66	0% Confingency Plans	10 days	Mon 8/13/07																
67	0% Update Security Plan	5 days	Mon 8/27/07																
68	0% Training	2.5 days	Mon 9/3/07																
69	0% W/Ballot Tracking and Accountability (BTA)	3.33 days	Fri 7/27/07																
70	15% Current Process Documentation Review	194.48 days	Thu 1/4/07																
71	100% Data Gathering on Options	25 days	Thu 1/4/07																
72	7% Research	25.38 days	Thu 1/18/07																
73	0% Presentation by Known Vendors (last to date)	10 days	Thu 2/8/07																
74	67% K&I	25.38 days	Thu 1/18/07																
75	100% Diabold/VoleHere	3 hrs	Thu 7/13/07																
76	100% Pitney Bowes	3 hrs	Thu 2/15/07																
77	0% Pitney Bowes	3 hrs	Thu 2/22/07																

Project: VBM 2 14A07
 Date: Wed 2/14/07

Task Split Progress Milestone Summary External Milestone Deadline

Please note that this is a living document. Details will be added as business cases are approved and vendors are selected.

VBM Transition Schedule

ID	% Complete	Task Name	Duration	Start	2006				2007				2008				2009			
					Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4
115	0%	Mig 2	2 hrs	Tue 5/8/07																
116	0%	Mig 3	2 hrs	Tue 5/29/07																
117	0%	Mig 4	2 hrs	Tue 6/12/07																
118	0%	Mig 5	2 hrs	Tue 6/26/07																
119	0%	Mig 6	2 hrs	Tue 7/17/07																
120	0%	RVC Location Recommendation Development	67 days	Wed 4/25/07																
121	0%	Development of Plan/Recommendations for RVCs in Special Elections	5 days	Fri 7/27/07																
122	0%	Equipment Procurement	6,67 days	Fri 8/24/07																
123	0%	Documentation	35 days	Fri 7/27/07																
124	0%	Policies	10 days	Fri 7/27/07																
125	0%	Process Map	10 days	Fri 8/10/07																
126	0%	Procedures	5 days	Fri 8/24/07																
127	0%	Updated Security Plan	5 days	Fri 8/31/07																
128	0%	Contingency Plan	5 days	Fri 9/7/07																
129	0%	Training	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
130	4%	Ballot Drop Locations	419,19 days	Mon 1/2/06																
131	100%	Research	5 days	Mon 1/2/06																
132	0%	Ballot Drop Location Recommendation Development	67 days	Wed 4/25/07																
133	0%	Development of Plan/Recommendations for Ballot Drop Locations in Special Elections	5 days	Fri 7/27/07																
134	0%	Equipment procurement	10 days	Fri 7/27/07																
135	0%	Implementation	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
136	0%	Documentation	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
137	0%	Policies	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
138	0%	Process Map	5 days	Thu 1/4/07																
139	0%	Procedures	5 days	Thu 1/4/07																
140	0%	Updated Security Plan	5 days	Thu 1/4/07																
141	0%	Training	5 days	Thu 1/4/07																
142	2%	Communications	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
143	100%	Internal communications Plan	0.33 days	Thu 1/4/07																
144	0%	External Communications Plan	1 day	Thu 1/4/07																
145	0%	Stakeholder engagement	1 day	Thu 1/4/07																
146	0%	Voter Education	0.33 days	Thu 1/4/07																
147	0%	Mailing to poll voters	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
148	0%	Required Voter Notification	10 days	Thu 1/4/07																
149	0%	EDC Supply Management	10 days	Fri 7/27/07																
150	0%	Develop plan for equipment no longer needed	10 days	Fri 7/27/07																
151	15%	Precontract Alterations	32.25 days	Tue 1/2/07																

Project: VBM 2.14.07
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Task Split Progress Milestone Summary Project Summary External Tasks External Milestone Deadline

VBM Transition Schedule

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ID	Complete %	Task Name	Duration	Start	2006								2007										
					Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4						
152	100%	Initial Planning Meeting	0.25 days	Tue 1/2/07																			
153	0%	Determine Council Sponsor	0.5 days	Thu 1/4/07																			
154	0%	Determine Approach - Phase or all at once	0.25 days	Thu 2/15/07																			
155	0%	Establish Criteria	0.67 days	Thu 1/4/07																			
156	11%	Transition Management	830.25 days	Wed 1/28/06																			
157	11%	Election Staff Communication	530.25 days	Wed 1/28/06																			
212	10%	VBM Transition Leadership Team Activities	534.38 days	Fri 11/17/06																			
213	100%	Kick off Meeting	2 hrs	Fri 11/17/06																			
214	10%	Transition Leadership Team Planning Meetings	525.38 days	Thu 11/30/06																			
215	100%	Msg 1	3 hrs	Thu 12/7/06																			
216	100%	Msg 2	3 hrs	Thu 11/30/06																			
217	100%	Msg 3	3 hrs	Thu 12/14/06																			
218	100%	Msg 4	3 hrs	Thu 12/21/06																			
219	100%	Msg 5	3 hrs	Thu 1/4/07																			
220	100%	Msg 6	3 hrs	Thu 1/11/07																			
221	100%	Msg 7	3 hrs	Thu 1/18/07																			
222	100%	Msg 8	3 hrs	Thu 1/25/07																			
223	100%	Msg 9	3 hrs	Thu 2/1/07																			
224	100%	Msg 10	3 hrs	Thu 2/15/07																			
225	0%	Msg 11	3 hrs	Thu 2/22/07																			
226	0%	Transition Leadership Team Meetings	460.38 days	Thu 3/1/07																			
320	4%	Project Management	777.25 days	Mon 11/20/6																			
321	4%	Schedule Updates	775.25 days	Wed 1/4/06																			
478	4%	Transition Team Meetings	775.13 days	Mon 1/20/6																			
635	0%	Transition six month review/deliber/assessment	261.38 days	Fri 6/1/07																			
636	0%	#1	3 hrs	Fri 6/1/07																			
637	0%	#2	3 hrs	Mon 1/23/07																			
638	0%	#3	3 hrs	Mon 6/2/06																			
639	21%	Project Review Board Process	607 days	Mon 11/20/6																			
640	99%	Phase 1 Project Planning Review	287 days	Mon 11/20/6																			
641	100%	Draft Submission	10 days	Mon 11/20/6																			
642	100%	Review of Submission	5 days	Mon 1/16/06																			
643	100%	Submit to PRB	0 days	Tue 2/6/07																			
644	0%	PRB Meeting	0.5 hrs	Mon 2/20/06																			
645	0%	Phase 2 Project Development Review	94.25 days	Wed 2/7/07																			
652	0%	Phase 3 Implementation Planning Review	10 days	Tue 6/18/07																			
657	0%	Phase 4 Production Readiness and Measurement Plan Review	10 days	Tue 7/3/07																			

The Gantt chart displays the project schedule with tasks as horizontal bars and milestones as diamonds. It shows dependencies between tasks across quarters 4, 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the years 2006 and 2007. Key milestones include 'Split' in Q4 2006, 'Progress' in Q1 2007, 'Summary' in Q2 2007, 'External Milestone' in Q3 2007, and 'Decline' in Q4 2007.

Project: VBM 2.14.07
 Date: Wed 2/14/07
 Page 5

Please note that this is a living document. Details will be added as business cases are approved and vendors are selected.

VBM Transition Schedule

ID	Task Name	Duration	Start	2006				2007				2008				2009			
				Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4
662	Phase 5 Value Measurement Review	5 days	Wed 4/23/06																
663	Monthly Monitoring	216.13 days	Mon 2/5/07																
675	2007 Election Events	248 days	Fri 12/15/06																
676	February	49 days	Fri 12/15/06																
677	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 12/15/06																
678	Election Day	1 day	Tue 2/6/07																
679	Certification period	11 days	Wed 2/7/07																
680	March	48 days	Fri 1/19/07																
681	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 1/19/07																
682	Election Day	1 day	Tue 3/13/07																
683	Certification period	11 days	Wed 3/14/07																
684	April	48 days	Fri 3/2/07																
685	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 3/2/07																
686	Election Day	1 day	Tue 4/24/07																
687	Certification period	11 days	Wed 4/25/07																
688	May	48 days	Fri 3/23/07																
689	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 3/23/07																
690	Election Day	1 day	Tue 5/15/07																
691	Certification period	11 days	Wed 5/16/07																
692	Primary	72 days	Tue 5/29/07																
693	Pre-election mode	60 days	Tue 5/29/07																
694	Filling Week	5 days	Mon 6/4/07																
695	Election Day	1 day	Tue 8/21/07																
696	Certification period	11 days	Wed 8/22/07																
697	General	78 days	Tue 8/14/07																
698	Pre-election mode	60 days	Tue 8/14/07																
699	Election Day	1 day	Tue 11/6/07																
700	Certification period	15 days	Wed 11/7/07																
701	2008 Election Events	248 days	Fri 12/14/07																
702	February	49 days	Fri 12/14/07																
703	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 12/14/07																
704	Election Day	1 day	Tue 2/5/08																
705	Certification period	11 days	Wed 2/6/08																
706	March	49 days	Fri 1/18/08																
707	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 1/18/08																
708	Election Day	1 day	Tue 3/11/08																
709	Certification period	11 days	Wed 3/12/08																

Project: VBM 2.14.07
Date: Wed 2/14/07

Task Split: [Progress Bar] Milestone: [Diamond] Summary: [Arrow] External Tasks: [Bar] External Milestone: [Diamond] Deadline: [Line]

VBM Transition Schedule

Please note that this is a living document. Details will be added as business cases are approved and vendors are selected.

ID	% Complete	Task Name	Duration	Start	2006				2007				2008				2009			
					Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4
710	0%	April	48 days	Fri 2/29/08																
711	0%	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 2/29/08																
712	0%	Election Day	1 day	Tue 4/22/08																
713	0%	Certification period	11 days	Wed 4/23/08																
714	0%	May	54 days	Fri 5/21/08																
715	0%	Pre-election mode	37 days	Fri 5/21/08																
716	0%	Election Day	1 day	Tue 5/20/08																
717	0%	Certification period	11 days	Wed 5/21/08																
718	0%	Primary	72 days	Tue 5/27/08																
719	0%	Pre-election mode	60 days	Tue 5/27/08																
720	0%	Filing Week	5 days	Mon 6/2/08																
721	0%	Election Day	1 day	Tue 6/19/08																
722	0%	Certification period	11 days	Wed 6/20/08																
723	0%	General	76 days	Tue 8/12/08																
724	0%	Pre-election mode	60 days	Tue 8/12/08																
725	0%	Election Day	1 day	Tue 11/4/08																
726	0%	Certification period	15 days	Wed 11/6/08																

Project: VBM 2 14.07
Date: Wed 2/14/07

Task Split



Progress Milestone

Summary



Project Summary

External Tasks



External Milestone


Deadline



Deadline

Page 7

King County Voter Density



Legend

- City Halls and CSCs
- Voter Population
1 Dot = 100
- ▭ King County Council
- Streets




Produced by:
GIS Section
Records, Elections and Licensing Services Division
Department of Executive Services
January 2007




King County
2007

City Hall and King County Community Service Center Locations



Seattle Neighborhood Service Center Locations




Legend

- King County Council Districts
- Community Service Centers
- ⊗ City Hall
- ▣ King County Library
- ▤ Seattle Service Centers
- Streets
- Water
- ▨ Forest

Produced by
GIS Section
Records, Elections, and Licensing Services Division
Department of Executive Services
January 2007

King County


REGIONAL VOTING CENTER LAYOUT




Given 2000 SF (40'x50') floor space, with a 10'x10' area per AVU station.

Above illustration shows possible layout design for one regional voting center with a minimum floor space of 2,000 SF and 10 accessible voting units to serve King County voters during a Presidential Election year.


Five Largest Counties - 2006 Tennessee Early Voting



Tennessee 2006 Early Voting



2006 General Election - Tennessee Early Voting



Estimated Capital and Operating Costs for Regional Voting Centers
2/15/2007

RVC Cost Analysis The following is a cost analysis for one regional voting center with a minimum floor space of 2,000 SF and 10 accessible voting units to serve the King County electorate during a Presidential Election year.

Description: A regional voting center (RVC) is a non-precinct based voting location specifically designed for voters with disabilities. Any eligible voter may cast a ballot at the RVC, regardless of the precinct in which they reside. Voters will be able to cast a regular or provisional ballot on the accessible voting unit (AVU). In addition, the RVCs will serve as a mail ballot drop-off location which will allow voters to securely deposit their voted ballot. RVCs will be located throughout the county and open for the 20-day period leading up to and including Election Day.

Cost Per Site:

Item	FTE	TLT	Temp	Days	Hrs/Day	Cost per Unit and/or Hr	Qty	One Time Costs	On-going Costs	Description	Assumptions
Personnel											
Regional Center Coordinator	x						0.2			% of program managers time necessary for development/oversite/coordination of a number of RVC.	Permanent staff assigned to VBM project.
ASIV Supervisor				23	10	20,765.1	1		769	Supervisor support to staff and technical jobs site (includes power for equipment)	18 days work; 8 days training; 1 day setup; 1 day breakdown. Minimum of one ASI or ASIV must be bilingual.
ASI - Log Book Specialist			x	21	10	15,233.7	4		\$12,796	Direct customer service support associated with distribution and management of AVU ballots issued at RVC. Provides routine customer service under clearly defined policies and procedures.	18 days work; 1 days training; 1 day setup; 1 day breakdown. Minimum of one ASI or ASIV must be bilingual.
ASI - AVU and/or Provisional Ballot Specialist					8	15,233.7			31,027	Direct customer service support associated with assisting voters with AVU ballots (regular/provisional). Provides routine customer service under clearly defined policies and procedures.	18 days work; 8 days training; 1 day setup; 1 day breakdown. Minimum of one ASI or ASIV must be bilingual.
ASI - Greeter			x	18.5	8	15,233.7	1		\$2,255	Reminds voters to have valid ID ready and directs voter to Log Book Specialist; accepts voted mail ballots in drop off box.	18 days work; 1/2 day of training. Minimum of one ASI or ASIV must be bilingual.
Official Observers Democratic and Republican				16.5	10	15,233.7	2		30,457.4	Insures transparency and integrity of elections and provides official observation input.	Will staff RVC during operating hours.
ASI - Voting Exit Specialist			x	21	8	15,233.7	1		\$2,559	Collects voter access card after voters cast ballot.	18 days work; 1 days training; 1 day setup; 1 day breakdown. Minimum of one ASI or ASIV must be bilingual.

Item	FTE	TLT	Temp	Days	Hrs/Day	Cost per Unit and/or Hr	Qty	One Time Costs	On-going Costs	Description	Assumptions
Help desk staff							0.2			% of potential help desk staff equipment to service calls from PVC. Items cannot be addressed by on-site supervisor.	
IT Support/Troubleshooter	x						0.2			% of IT staff to support service calls from VSC.	Floating position to travel to remote sites as needed.
Staff training						500	1	550		Cost of training excluding staff wages which are included in the durations noted for each position.	
								One Time Costs	550	Operating Cost per Election	\$35,894

Facilities Management											
Leased space						\$500	200		\$6,000	Lease for VSC person operation to AVUS at 100 SF per workstation = 1000 SF for AV machines. Allows 1000 SF for training services (including tables and chairs).	Rate is based on a daily amount of 800. The cost will vary depending on the location and is negotiated with the space provider. Space requirements is 2000 SF.
Maintenance Contracts									\$300		
Moving/Setup									\$1,000		
Liability insurance									\$200		
Tables						150	8	1,200		Six tables for PVC. Two tables for lease.	
Chairs - Lease						25	24	600			
Materials									\$900		
Office Supplies									\$200		
								One Time Costs	1,800	Operating Cost per Election	\$9,500
Subtotal Facilities Costs:											

Equipment and Security											
Computer Software						400	6	2,400	\$300	Basic operating system and MS Office.	
Digital Signature Capture Software						450	1	450	\$450	Software is to be compatible with DIMS.	
DIMS							n/a	0		Existing software license.	
								One Time Costs	1,800	Operating Cost per Election	\$9,500

Item	FTE	TLT	Temp	Days	Hrs/Day	Cost per Unit and/or Hr	Qty	One Time Costs	On-going Costs	Description	Assumptions	
Direct Recording Electronics (AVU)						2750	10	70	\$9,297	Already owned by KCE. Anticipated 5 Year useful lifespan. Ongoing cost reflects replacement cost.		
Laptop Computers						1500	6	9,000	\$1,125	One per Log Book Specialist and one for Supervisor.		
Network Computers							N/A	1,000	\$500	Securely encrypted, dedicated connection from the central election server to the work stations at the RVC.		
Network Security (Virtual Private Network)						255	4	510	\$100	Improve security and extend geographic connectivity.		
Phone Fax Copier/Printer						500	1	100	\$112	Ongoing costs applies to telephone line fees.		
Security Software (Firewall)						1500	1	1,500		Program or hardware device to filter the information coming through the Internet connection into KCE private network or computer system.		
Tablets and Stylus						500		1,200	\$400	Voters sign using a cordless stylus and digital tablet.		
Transport of ballot costs							18	100	\$2,270	Gas and ballot collection crew (3 teams of 2 crew members; daily ballot pick-up; county-wide; assumes 10 RVC's).		
TV/DVD						200	25	200				
Voter Access Card Activator						395	4	790	\$33	Encodes voter access card with ballot style (regular or provisional); voter uses card to access their ballot on AVU.		
Subtotal Equipment and Security Costs:								One Time Costs	Operating Cost per Election			
								18,600	\$7,427			
Total RVC Costs:								One Time Costs	Operating Cost per Election			
								20,950	\$52,821			

Tabulation Vendor Comparison

Vendor	System	Technology	Certification Date	Jurisdictions that use the vendor for tabulation technology	Analysis of Primary Criteria
Diebold Elections Systems	DRS Scanners and new software interface for GEMS system.	Digital Imaging	Certification is anticipated sometime in Aug. - Sept. Current system certification 1-Feb-06	In WA Klickitat County. LA County, and the entire states of Ohio, Georgia, Utah, Mississippi and Maryland plus many other jurisdictions in California, Arizona, Kansas, and Florida	Diebold's system meets all of the primary criteria: the system is currently in the federal certification process, it integrates with the DIMS system, contains the basic system requirements, can manage the complexity and database size requirements and can pre-process ballots as they are received.
Elections System & Software (ES&S)	Model 650 Scanners and ES&S software	Optical Scan	17-Jul-05	In WA Adams, Cowlitz, Douglas, Grant, Grays Harbor, Jefferson, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Thurston, Waukiakum, Walla Walla, & Whitman. States with jurisdictions that utilize the vendor include Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia	Elections' Systems and Software solution does not meet all the primary criteria. ES&S does not have a certified direct recording electronic device in Washington, nor is it in the certification process. ES&S relies on a product called the AutoMARK for accessibility in Washington. The AutoMARK is a poor choice for King County because it requires a preprinted paper ballot at the time the individual votes. Providing a paper ballots at regional voting centers either printed on demand or from stock on hand is a significant security risk and administrative complexity.
Hart InterCivic	Kodak i830 scanners and Hart InterCivic software.	Digital Imaging	17-Jun-06	In WA Asotin, Benton, Chelan, Clallam, Clark, Columbia, Ferry, Garfield, Island, Kittitas, Lewis, Lincoln, Mason, Okanogan, Pacific, San Juan, Skagit, Skamania, Stevens, and Yakima. Orange County, CA and Harris Count, TX and the city of Philadelphia in addition to other local jurisdictions in Kentucky, Texas and Virginia.	Hart InterCivic's system meets all of the primary criteria: the system is federally and state certified, it integrates with the DIMS system, contains the basic system requirements, can manage the complexity and database size requirements and can pre-process ballots as they are received.
Sequoia Elections Systems	400-C scanners and Sequoia software	Optical Scan	10-Apr-06	In WA Franklin, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish, and Whatcom. Maricopa County, AZ, Cook County and the City of Chicago, the City of San Francisco, San Bernardino County and the state of Nevada in addition to jurisdictions in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon and Wisconsin.	The Sequoia system does not meet the primary criteria. The system does not provide for the preprocessing of ballots as they are received. This prevents taking advantage of the 12-15 day period before election day for pre-processing ballots as they are received.



**King County
Elections**

Vote-by-Mail Transition Commitment

Through our own previous experience we know that internal communication is critical for King County's successful transition to vote by mail. This change will take time; in fact, it will likely be a phased-in process and will rely heavily on input and work from each one of us. To ensure our success, open communication between everyone is not only strongly encouraged, but expected. I commit to open and timely communications with you and ask that you join your colleagues, supervisors and me on this journey. Only together can we work as a unified team, continuing to improve elections in King County.

I pledge to participate in King County's transition to vote by mail. As a member of the King County Elections' team, I am committed to the success of this effort and pledge to share my questions, creative ideas, and concerns with the Transition Team, my supervisor or to members of the Leadership Team directly or via e-mail (vbm@metrokc.gov).

I recognize that my participation is important and valued and likewise, I will value the input, hard work, and commitment of my peers towards this effort.

I will use resources available to me via the VBM Intranet and my peers to stay informed about this change.

I commit to stand by and respect the decisions that are made and continue to work towards making elections accountable and transparent.

Today, I join my colleagues on this journey.

--King County Elections Staff


February 1, 2007

Transition Leadership Team Charter

The Vote by Mail Transition Leadership Team has the following authority with regards to this project:

- Recommend to the sponsor courses of action, critical paths, dependencies and priorities in the planning and implementing a transition to all vote by mail elections in King County.

I, the undersigned, authorize Jim Buck, Sherril Huff Menees, Sean Bouffiou, Scott Baynard, Bobbie Egan, Laird Hail, Garth Fell, Sandy McConnell, Harry Sanders, Laura Lockard and Anne Bruskland to begin work as the Vote by Mail Transition Leadership Team based the scope and major deliverables identified in this Project Plan.




Paul Tanaka, Department of Executive Services Director
Project Sponsor


The Transition Leadership Team has the following responsibilities with regards to this project:

- Collaborate with the Project Manager to:
 - Develop an achievable project plan to deliver successful results
 - Gather project and business requirements
 - Develop work plans (tasks, schedule and resource allocation)
 - Develop plans for project communications, reporting, risk management and quality management, and define project processes
- Draft in collaboration with the project manager, with the Directors approval, the project scope, deliverables, project organization, and team roles and responsibilities
- Inform and involve election staff in the transition to vote by mail
- Implement transition plans and systems in a timely and quality manner


We the Transition Leadership Team accept the responsibilities for this project as outlined above.



Jim Buck


Sherril Huff Menees


Sean Bouffiou


Scott Baynard


Bobbie Egan


Laird Hail



Garth Fell


Sandy McConnell


Harry Sanders


Laura Lockard


Anne Bruskland


Bill Huennekens

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOT DROP BOXES

RCW 29A.48.040

Depositing ballots — Replacement ballots.

(1) If a county auditor conducts an election by mail, the county auditor shall designate one or more places for the deposit of ballots not returned by mail. The places designated under this section shall be open on the date of the election for a period of thirteen hours, beginning at 7:00 a.m. and ending at 8:00 p.m.

(2) A registered voter may obtain a replacement ballot as provided in this subsection. A voter may request a replacement mail ballot in person, by mail, by telephone, or by other electronic transmission for himself or herself and for any member of his or her immediate family. The request must be received by the auditor before 8:00 p.m. on election day. The county auditor shall keep a record of each replacement ballot issued, including the date of the request. Replacement mail ballots may be counted in the final tabulation of ballots only if the original ballot is not received by the county auditor and the replacement ballot meets all requirements for tabulation necessary for the tabulation of regular mail ballots.

[2003 c 111 § 1204; 2001 c 241 § 18; 1983 1st ex.s. c 71 § 3. Formerly RCW 29.38.040, 29.36.124.]

WAC 434-250-100

Depositing of ballots.

Ballots may be deposited in the auditor's office during normal business hours prior to the day of the election, and from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on the day of the election. Places of deposit may be staffed or unstaffed.

(1)(a) Staffed sites must be staffed by at least two people. Deposit site staff may be employees of the county auditor's office or persons appointed by the auditor. If two or more deposit site staff are persons appointed by the county auditor, the appointees shall be representatives of different major political parties whenever possible. Deposit site staff shall subscribe to an oath regarding the discharge of the duties.

(b) Staffed deposit sites must be open from 7:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. on the day of the election and may be open prior to the election on dates and times established by the county auditor. Staffed deposit sites must have a secure ballot box that is constructed in a manner to allow return envelopes, once deposited, to only be removed by the county auditor or by the deposit site staff. If a ballot envelope is returned after 8:00 p.m. on election day, deposit site staff must note the time and place of deposit on the ballot envelope, and such ballots must be referred to the canvassing board for consideration of whether special circumstances warrant consideration, as documented by the deposit site staff.

(c) A staffed deposit site that only receives ballots is not considered a polling place. A staffed deposit site that both receives and issues ballots is considered a polling place.

(2) Unstaffed sites may be used if the ballot drop box is either:

(a) Constructed and secured according to the same requirements as United States Postal Service postal drop boxes; or

(b) Secured and located indoors.

(3) Ballot boxes must be locked and sealed at all times, with seal logs that document each time the box is opened, by whom, and the number of ballots removed. From eighteen days prior to election day until 8:00 p.m. on election day, two people who are either employees of or appointed by the county auditor must empty each ballot drop box with sufficient frequency to prevent damage or unauthorized access to the ballots. Ballots must be placed into sealed transport carriers and returned to the county auditor's office or another designated location. At exactly 8:00 p.m. on election day, ballot drop boxes must be emptied or sealed to prevent the deposit of additional ballots.

[Statutory Authority: RCW 29A.04.611. 06-23-094, § 434-250-100, filed 11/15/06, effective 12/16/06; 06-14-047, § 434-250-100, filed 6/28/06, effective 7/29/06. Statutory Authority: RCW 29A.04.611, 29A.04.530. 06-02-028, § 434-250-100, filed 12/28/05, effective 1/28/06. Statutory Authority: RCW 29A.04.611. 05-17-145, § 434-250-100, filed 8/19/05, effective 9/19/05.]

WAC 434-250-320

Deposit sites.

A county auditor conducting a county-wide election entirely by mail must provide at least two sites for the deposit of ballots. One of the deposit sites may be at the county auditor's office. All other deposit sites must be at geographical locations that are different from the county auditor's office. All deposit sites must meet the requirements of WAC 434-250-100.

[Statutory Authority: RCW 29A.04.611. 06-14-047, § 434-250-320, filed 6/28/06, effective 7/29/06; 05-17-145, § 434-250-320, filed 8/19/05, effective 9/19/05.]