

12578

2007-328

Attachment A

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Project Title:	VBM Transition
Project Subtitle:	Ballot packet tracking and accountability
Project Number: (If Existing Project)	
Date of Submittal:	May 15, 2007
Agency/Department:	REALS, DES
Business Sponsor:	Paul Tanaka
Prepared By:	Bill Huennekens

Project Primary Benefit Alignment:

	Accountability/Transparency	Customer Service/Access	Efficiency	Risk Management
<i>Check one only</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Business Outcomes: (Check all that apply)

Efficiency	<input type="checkbox"/>	Offers a positive return on investment (ROI)
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Improves productivity and/or reduces future expenditures
Public Access & Customer Service	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Improves accessibility of public records
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Improves accessibility to county services, resources, and/or officials
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Improves the quality and/or usability of internal and/or external county services
Transparency and Accountability for Decisions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Makes decisions and decision-related materials more easily available
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Supports ability to track long-term outcomes
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Supports visibility into the decision process
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Supports input and feedback related to countywide decisions
Risk Management	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Intended to improve security and provide legally mandated services and basic operations support
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	Fulfill regulatory requirements
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Provide tactical agency operational improvements
	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Technical Outcomes: (Check all that apply)

Increases architectural flexibility	<input type="checkbox"/>	Utilizes open standards
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Employs web-based technologies
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Utilizes commercial off the shelf software
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Leverages and/or extends integration architecture
Improves data management	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Increases data security
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Increases data privacy
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Improves data accuracy
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Reduces data redundancy
Improves technology operations	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Enhances system reliability
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Consolidates hardware/software
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Standardizes or streamlines existing operations

Project Type: (Will Help Determine PRB Review Plan)

	Implementation	Business Case/Study/Plan	IT Equipment Replacement
<i>Check One Only</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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Project Phase: (Underline project phase applicable to this submittal)

Budget Request:

- Conceptual Review - Provide a concise, informative, high level summary for sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 2.0. Conceptual review summaries should be 1-3 pages only.**
- Formal Budget Request**

Project Review Board Business Case Deliverables

- Phase II - PRB Business Case Presentation**
 - Update for any major changes to scope, schedule, and budget if significantly different from the Budget Request Business Case.**
 - OMB and agency to confirm baseline (current)/ target measurements and identify and plan for future budget actions prior to PRB review.**
- Other – This business case is responsive to Council Ordinance 15623 that provisos HAVA grant funding for the purchase of a ballot packet tracking and accountability system for King County.**

Change Summary from previous submittals of Business Case:

1) Describe any important or significant changes to project scope, schedule, and budget from previous version of business case submittal.

The target date for transition to vote by mail is a special election in 2008.

2) Describe any important or significant changes to expected benefits or ongoing O&M costs and other operational impacts from previous version of business case submittal.

NA, no previous business case submitted.

Executive Summary

On June 19, 2006, the King County Council adopted Ordinance 15523, directing Elections in King County be conducted entirely by mail in 2007 or 2008, effectively establishing King County as the largest local jurisdiction in the United States to conduct all elections by mail. The transition to an entirely vote-by-mail elections system will streamline operations, allowing resources to be focused on the process that voters have chosen in increasing numbers.

The County Council specified four conditions to be met prior to implementation of vote by mail. Among these requirements, the County Council requested a business case for the creation of an electronic tracking system that will allow voters, through the use of the Internet, to follow the movement of their ballot as it travels from King County to the voter and back to King County for counting and crediting the voter for voting.

When King County transitions to all mail voting in 2008, King County Elections will have the technology to allow each individual voter to track the status of their ballot packet; the ultimate indication of transparency and accountability of the vote-by-mail election process. This accountability will build voters' trust and confidence in the integrity of the election process and will improve ballot reconciliation.

This business case analyzes technologies from the four vendors who responded to our request for information. These technologies will allow voters to determine if:

1. Voter's ballot packet has been assembled and handed off to United States Postal Service (USPS).
2. King County confirms receipt of returned ballot packet (i.e. voted and USPS un-deliverables).
3. Signature on ballot packet has been verified or challenged.
4. Ballot packet has been opened for ballot extraction.

Additionally, this business case examines these technologies to see how each would increase the accuracy, accountability, security, transparency and efficiency of our mail ballot processing.

Based on the careful evaluation of the four vendors who responded to our request for information through this business case, King County Elections recommends investment in two: the Pitney Bowes Relia-Vote and VoteHere MiBT solutions.

The Pitney Bowes Relia-Vote and VoteHere MiBT (Mail-in Ballot Tracker) solutions provide the best equipment and software applications available and will enable King County to meet its overall goals – the ability for voters to follow the movement of their ballots from King County, to the voter, and back to King

County for counting and crediting. This solution will provide King County with increased accuracy, accountability, security, transparency and efficiency.

1.1 Problem statement, vision and goals

When King County moves to all vote-by-mail, in early 2008, about 35 percent of registered voters who currently vote at the polls will join the nearly 65 percent of permanent absentee voters and cast their ballots by mail, rather than at their polling places. This increase will result in nearly 1 million voters receiving a mail ballot packet for each countywide election.

The current process of tracking and accounting for mail ballots as they are prepared for mailing, received from voters and readied for tabulation is manual and labor intensive. With the current resources, systems and equipment the ability to achieve the level of reconciliation required will be challenging.

Additional applications and equipment are needed to enhance and effectively alter this process with automation. Change is necessary to achieve the highest level of accuracy, accountability, security, transparency and efficiency.

As King County Elections moves towards an entirely vote-by-mail system, the following goals are sought:

- Improve the **accuracy** of our elections by 1) minimizing the hand-off between staff and processes, 2) minimizing the manual aspects of work such as data entry of reconciliation data and 3) improve the consistency of decisions by utilizing technology.
- Improve the **accountability** of our elections by 1) increasing the amount and type of data we capture and use for reconciliation processes and 2) providing near real-time reconciliation.
- Improve the **security** of our elections by 1) limiting inbound processes performed off-site and 2) minimizing the movement of physical ballots between processes and staff.
- Improve the **transparency** of our elections by 1) creating simple, efficient work flows and 2) capturing and reporting the status of a voter's mail ballot packet at various points in the process.
- Improve the **efficiency** of our elections by 1) eliminating or combining processes where appropriate and 2) utilizing technology to increase through-puts.

In addition, any equipment acquired for ballot packet tracking and accountability will adhere to the established goals and guiding principles set forth in King County's 2006 Strategic Technology Plan, improving efficiency, public access and customer service, transparency and accountability, risk management, technology architectural flexibility, data management, and technology operations. See page six of the King County, Washington, Strategic Technology Plan 2006-

2008, at

[http://www.metrokc.gov/oirm/services/reports/strategic_plan/Strategic Technology Plan 2006-2008.pdf](http://www.metrokc.gov/oirm/services/reports/strategic_plan/Strategic_Technology_Plan_2006-2008.pdf).

1.2 Overview and background

Current Process

Ballot-related materials, voted absentee and mail ballots are currently batched together upon return to King County in trays of 200 to 400 ballot packets (signature envelope, security envelope and ballot). Each batch of ballot packets is monitored as it moves through the process from receipt to tabulation and any transaction to that batch and its associated data are recorded manually on a batch slip. This transaction data is used to validate that all ballot packets are accounted for and any discrepancies are identified and resolved immediately.

The reconciliation and accountability processes and procedures currently in use for the inbound ballot packets were recognized nationally in 2006 as best practices by the National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks.

See, current process flow chart, exhibit 1. For a complete description of the current process and the procedures used, please refer to exhibit 2.

Focus Group Research

To meet the requirements described in the ballot tracking and accountability mandate in section two of King County Ordinance 15523, focus groups were conducted, exploring voters' expectations and preferences for a ballot tracking system. See, exhibit 3, for complete focus group findings.

In order to align with voters' expectations and ensure ballot secrecy and voter privacy, King County Elections (KCE) established the following four ballot packet tracking points to enable voters to track their ballot packets in the outbound and inbound processes.

1. Voter's ballot packet has been assembled and handed off to United States Postal Service (USPS)
2. King County confirms receipt of returned ballot packet (i.e. voted and USPS un-deliverables).
3. Signature on ballot packet has been verified or challenged.
4. Ballot packet has been opened for ballot extraction.

1.3 Constraints and dependencies

Limitations of current ballot tracking and accountability process

Though nationally recognized, the current ballot tracking and accountability process has limitations, especially as a jurisdiction the size of King County transitions to countywide voting by mail.

- 1. Designed for reconciliation.** The process is designed for reconciliation and focuses on accounting of envelopes and ballots to provide assistance for resolving discrepancies across process points in the reconciliation process. It uses total count and does not capture individual voter information on ballot packets as a basis for reconciliation. The system is not specifically designed to allow voters to track their ballot at various points in the process.
- 2. Limited tracking spectrum.** Current tracking begins at the “inbound sort” by capturing absentee voter identification number (AVID). There is no tracking of the individual ballot packet piece in the outbound process, when the ballot packet is sent from King County Elections to the voter.
- 3. Batch level reconciliation.** The current process does not track and account for ballot materials end-to-end at the voter specific level. There is currently no option for a voter to track the movement of their ballot beyond signature verification, nor are there systems in place for ballot processing staff to track beyond this point at the detailed, voter-specific level.
- 4. Labor intensive and time consuming.** The current process involves manual quality control, manual counting of mail pieces and ballots, manual input of total counts with challenge and ballot duplication categories, as well as manual compilation of summary statistics. The process is time consuming, occasionally taking over three hours to reconcile the numbers of signatures challenged for the end of day reports.
- 5. Potential for human errors and inconsistencies in application.** The labor-intensive manual processes can increase the possibility for errors, discrepancies and inconsistencies. It requires substantial quality control efforts to identify and correct errors, discrepancies and inconsistencies.
- 6. Creates processing capacity limitations.** Over 60 percent of voters are registered as permanent absentee voters. On average, 75 to 80 percent of all votes cast in a given election are cast by absentee ballot. When vote-by-mail is implemented, an additional 35 to 40 percent of ballot packets will need to be produced, assembled, processed, tracked and accounted for, requiring

additional staff, space and equipment, along with processing time needed for timely tabulation.

An investment in technology to automate these processes is necessary, to maintain uncompromised quality assurance and accuracy that meets or exceeds current accountability achievements.

Limitations on tracking ballots to the voter level

Part of the research conducted through the focus groups investigated the level that voters wanted to track their ballot and helped define what level of perceived secrecy voters would be willing to give up to achieve the preferred tracking capability. More specifically, voters were asked their opinions of placing a barcode or unique identifier directly on the ballot to confirm it went through a tabulation machine and was counted. Placing a barcode on the ballot would allow tracking of each individual ballot throughout the process, but would create issues of ballot secrecy.

Voters in the focus groups concluded that once their ballot is received they trust it will be counted. They are not interested in the use of a barcode because they fear it may be used to identify how they voted.

As a result of the focus group research and the uncertain legal and political implications, the final step of ballot tracking: confirmation that the ballot was not only opened but actually tabulated is not currently a recommended tracking point. While the encryption technology does exist, there is a tie with the voter to their ballot, posing ballot secrecy issues and legal concerns. This step also has several unknown risks that must be addressed carefully before King County considers ballot tracking to the point of tabulation.

1.4 Specific business objectives

After thoughtfully examining our current process and evaluating the King County Council's requirements for ballot and ballot envelope tracking, the specific business objectives identified for ballot tracking and accountability are:

- 1. Perform ballot sorting, data capture and batching in-house.** This will increase ballot security and provide greater process transparency to the observing public. This will also allow for process efficiency by decreasing transport time and minimizing numerous manual hand-offs.
- 2. Capture the signature image on the envelope.** Working with the image of the signature envelope, as opposed to the ballot-containing envelope itself, will allow KCE to place ballots in secure storage while the signature verification process occurs. Process

efficiency will be gained from side-by-side comparison on a computer monitor.

3. **Implement automatic signature recognition.** The use of automatic signature recognition will provide greater efficiency to the signature verification process. Automating this process will provide greater consistency in evaluating signatures. Ultimately, KCE staff will examine each signature rejected by the software application.
4. **Automate data capture for reconciliation.** Automating data captured for accountability and reconciliation will remove the variable of manual data entry, providing greater efficiency and accuracy. Greater accountability and transparency will be accomplished through improved reporting capabilities.
5. **Capture voter data after a ballot packet has been opened.** The ability to capture data after a voter's ballot packet has been opened and the security envelope with the ballot has been removed, will increase process transparency, allowing the voter to confirm that their ballot is ready for tabulation. This will occur with hand scanners at each opening station or through high speed envelope scanners at quality control stations. Data captured will also provide greater accountability and efficiency for reconciliation purposes.

1.5 Project assumptions and risks

In moving towards implementation of a ballot tracking and accountability system, there are several baseline assumptions and known risks that must be explored. The following list of assumptions relate specifically to upgrading and introducing new components to our current ballot tracking and accountability system and form the foundation by which all future work will be built.

It is assumed that with vote by mail, the standards for transparency, tracking and accountability must be present to assure voters' confidence that their ballots are processed and counted. It is with these assumptions that the current ballot packet tracking and accountability processes and procedures have been studied and evaluated, and technology applications explored to meet the expectations concerning ballot packet tracking and accountability.

Security

- Security and ballot safety will be primary elements in the consideration and evaluation of various vendor solutions for improving ballot tracking and accountability.

Legislation changes

- The ability to track each ballot through the entire tabulation process requires the placement of a unique identifier on the ballot. At any point in time, a court order or adoption of new legislation by Congress or the state legislature could prohibit the presence or use of a unique identifier on the ballot. This will prevent tracking individual ballots once they have been opened and separated from the reply envelope, severing ties between ballot and voter. KCE does not recommend placing a unique identifier on the ballot at this point in time. For more information, please reference exhibit 4, the white paper prepared on ballot tracking with and without a unique identifier.
- The Office of the Secretary of State (OSOS) will have established rules and regulations for the automated signature verification technology software and hardware applications by December 2007, to assure there is sufficient time for installation, training and testing of the module and data compatibility with existing election systems (GEMS, DIMS and web applications).

Equipment

- The selected equipment and software solution modules will be available and ready to be integrated incrementally, assuring a gradual transition to vote by mail with thorough and precise ballot tracking and accountability processes.

Transition Schedule

- It is assumed that there will be no unforeseen or unanticipated King County, Washington State, and/or federal legislative changes that will impede the transition to vote-by-mail in King County.
- The schedule for transition to VBM in 2008 incorporates the assumption that the 2007-2008 elections calendar will not be altered unexpectedly. This includes the presidential preference primary in February or March 2008.

Oversight

- KCE will continue to look to the recommendations of the Citizens' Election Oversight Committee (CEOC) and previous recommendations made by other oversight groups as the transition to all-mail voting continues.
- Technology projects will be managed within the Information Technology Governance structure. It is imperative that funding to support the VBM transition work and schedule be released on a timely basis to adhere to the approved time frame.

Communications

- KCE will maintain open lines of communication in order to seek stakeholder input to implement the optimal system.
- Through education and communication, King County Elections will provide system and equipment information and implementation updates regularly to voters and other stakeholder groups.
- To help ensure success, King County Elections will clearly communicate transition progress internally so that all Elections' staff are aware of the goals, objectives, status, and issues surrounding the transition.

Management and Leadership

- KCE will continue to demonstrate improvements through results in successful elections before the transition to VBM to continue building trust and confidence among voters, elections staff and stakeholders.

1.6 Plan of work, timeline, approach, key milestones

1.6.1 Plan of work, timeline

Prior to establishing an improved system to electronically track and account for movement of ballot packets from King County to the voter and back to King County, the following work must be accomplished.

1. A review of the current ballot tracking and accountability process and procedures. **Completed.**
2. Explore and study the availability of current technologies and related software and hardware applications to track and account for ballot packet materials. **Completed.**
3. Determine and establish ballot packet tracking points for access by voters to meet their information needs. **Completed.**
4. Determine and establish business needs that will support data capture and generation of information for the established ballot packet tracking points while serving the purpose for reconciliation. **Completed.**
5. Determine, establish and document the functional business requirements of a ballot packet tracking and accountability system that will meet the business needs of the mail ballot processing team and generate data and information required for the ballot packet track points. **Completed.**

6. Assess the functionality of each technology application deployed for tracking and accounting for ballot materials individually and how each will work with one another as an effective, integrated solution for managing the ballot packet tracking and accounting process. **Completed.**
7. Evaluate the compatibility and extent of integration of image and data captured by each of the vendor's proposed ballot tracking and accountability solutions with current systems: voter registration data and information management systems (DIMS) and ballot building, tabulation technology systems (GEMS and others). **Completed.**
8. Determine and establish criteria and mandatory requirements for the ballot tracking and accountability system. **Completed.**
9. Evaluate and determine the effectiveness and efficiency of each proposed ballot tracking and accountability solution in regard to each of the established functional business requirements and criteria. **Completed.**

Timeline

Date	Action Items	Status
April 5, 2007	Develop and establish business needs	Completed
April 5, 2007	Develop and establish functional requirements	Completed
April 12, 2007	Develop and establish criteria and mandatory requirements	Completed
April 23, 2007	Evaluation of vendor proposed systems	Completed
May 15, 2007	Information Technology Business Case and recommended solution due to the Council	Completed
June 29, 2007	Council action on Information Technology Business Case and recommended solution	In progress
Sept. 10, 2007	Develop and establish testing and implementation schedule to be negotiated with vendor during contract development.	In progress
Sept. 10, 2007	Contract completed and signed.	In progress

1.6.2 Approach

The transition to vote by mail is a collaborative and inclusive effort that involves every staff member at King County Elections. The business processes currently in place will be altered significantly and in some cases redesigned to implement an enhanced electronic ballot tracking and accountability system. The input, buy-off and involvement of the entire organization are critical. Lessons learned, institutional knowledge of current mail ballot processing core staff, prior capital investments, and

reviews by other jurisdictions using the technology will be leveraged to maximize the opportunity for success and mitigate project risks.

1.6.3 Key Milestones

- **May 15, 2007:** Transmittal of the Information Technology Business Case to the Council.
- **June 29, 2007:** Council action on Information Technology Business Case and recommended solution.
- **First quarter, 2008:** Modular and incremental implementation of tracking and accountability equipment; including delivery, thorough testing and verification of hardware and software.

1.7 Benefits and other impacts

Upgraded ballot tracking and accountability technologies will make ballot processing and tracking more accurate, accountable, secure, transparent, and efficient. New equipment and software will enhance the security of elections administration and contribute to the process of maintaining public trust and confidence in King County's election administration processes.

1.7.1 Customer benefits and other impacts

- Automation in the recommended system will allow King County to create, deliver and process the increased volume of ballots resulting from countywide vote-by-mail.
- Ability for voter to access ballot packet tracking information on the Internet, verifying and accounting for movement of their ballot packet.
- Reconciliation and production of election reports occur in nearly real-time.
- Public trust and confidence will be increased as a result of individual tracking.

1.7.2 Employee impacts

- Manual efforts required to process, track and account for ballot packets will be streamlined; opportunities for errors in processing and tracking will be reduced.
- Staff will be trained in the roles, responsibilities, processes and procedures required with the new system, in turn, enhancing quality assurance and facilitating ballot packet tracking and accountability process management.
- Reassignment and training of staff to perform data integration with other Elections data systems (e.g. DIMS, web applications).

1.7.3 Business process benefits and other impacts

Four main business process benefits will be realized by upgrading King County's ballot packet tracking and accountability equipment and software:

1. Use of up-to-date technology.

New sorting, scanning, and database hardware and software will allow King County to apply technology to enhance operations and reduce manual steps that will improve the accuracy of data collection. The recommended systems employ new security features that reduce the possibility of unauthorized access, modification and/or deletion of system data.

2. Improved process consistency and reliability.

Automation will minimize manual handling and processing of ballot packets, improving consistency and reliability of data captured, and reducing human handling and processing errors.

3. Improved quality control

Automation reduces processing time, allowing more time for quality control and auditing of the process, procedures and data captured.

4. Improved ballot security

Reduced handling of ballot packets allows them to remain in the secure vault until they are ready for opening and tabulation.

1.7.4 Technology infrastructure benefits and other impacts

A cohesive, comprehensive and wholly integrated ballot delivery and processing system with ballot tracking capabilities will strengthen King County Elections' technology infrastructure and meet the county's strategic technology objectives by:

- Strengthening security and information privacy practices by minimizing manual handling and processing;
- Improving processing speed and capacity;
- Improving reliability and accuracy of tracking data captured by auditing and validation reports;
- Improving data storage and processing capacity;
- Improving flexibility and scalability in the application of technology solutions;
- Improving efficiency and enabling electronic integration across systems;
- Using open (vendor independent) standards to promote flexibility, interoperability, cost effectiveness and mitigate the risk of dependence on individual vendors;
- Improving public access to information concerning the status of a voter's ballot package that meet voter expectations and need;
- Improving the quality and timeliness of ballot processing workflow.

1.7.5 Cost benefit analysis

In time, this automated process will mitigate rising costs associated with ballot packet tracking and accountability. The \$2.7 million available in grant resources will support procurement and significantly offset initial costs for the recommended solution.

Automating the current system for vote-by-mail elections will mitigate against rising costs associated with the current labor intensive manual process including staffing, space requirements, equipment and related expenses. With deployment of improved technologies, the quality control for sorting, data and image capture, signature verification and process management will be increased.

1.8 Benefit realization measurements

Based on the benefits described above for customers, business processes, technological infrastructure and cost, the ballot packet tracking and accountability system will be monitored and evaluated. The functional performance of equipment and related software will be measured against established requirements, criteria and anticipated benefit outcomes; ultimately realizing six sigma standards, a goal KCE has established internally.

1.9 Project governance

Elections administration is at the core of public service and local government. King County Elections, the King County Executive, the King County Council and their respective staff have established requirements and guidelines to meet and exceed these voter's expectations for ballot tracking and accountability for the transition to vote-by-mail.

The King County Council has placed a proviso on the funding for an upgraded ballot tracking and accountability system, pending approval by motion of this information technology business case and recommended solution.

Implementation of the solution will be performed under the oversight of the Office of Information Resource Management (OIRM) Project Review Board to ensure appropriately managed scope, schedule, budget and risk.

1.10 Project Management

The VBM transition will be guided and directed by a team of managers from the Records, Elections and Licensing Services (REALS) Division Administration and the Elections Section; serving as the Vote by Mail Transition Leadership Team. This team will set the scope for the transition, monitor risk and quality, and make recommendations on proposed changes to the scope of the transition.

VBM Transition Leadership Team

Name	Position	E-mail address
Sherril Huff	Director Designee, REALS	sherril.huff@metrokc.gov
Sean Bouffiou	Finance and Human Resources Administrator	sean.bouffiou@metrokc.gov
Bill Huennekens	VBM Transition Manager	bill.huennekens@metrokc.gov
Bobbie Egan	Communication Specialist	bobbie.egan@metrokc.gov
Scott Baynard	Superintendent of Records, providing insight as previous Quality Assurance and Improvement Coordinator	scott.baynard@metrokc.gov
Garth Fell	Acting Election Program Manager—Ballot Processing and Delivery	garth.fell@metrokc.gov
Sandy McConnell	Acting Election Program Manager—Elections Operations	sandy.mcconnell@metrokc.gov
Laura Lockard	Acting Election Program Manager – Voter Services	laura.lockard@metrokc.gov
Laird Hail	Elections Technology Services Manager	laird.hail@metrokc.gov
Harry Sanders	GIS Supervisor/Special Projects Manager	harry.sanders@metrokc.gov

1.10.1 Transition planning sessions

Meetings are held weekly, as the election schedule allows, to review work documents, materials and information. Currently, meetings occur each Thursday afternoon and last for three hours.

1.10.2 Facilitation

Meetings of the Transition Leadership Team are facilitated by the Transition Manager with the support of Waldron & Co. staff.

1.10.3 Materials and documentation

Materials and documentation for meetings are distributed to team members by the afternoon before the meeting, at the latest, to give individuals adequate time to prepare for the meeting.

1.10.4 Meeting agendas and minutes

Meeting agendas are prepared by the Transition Manager and minutes are taken by transition support staff. These documents are archived in a shared drive accessible by team members.

1.11 Project staffing

The Transition Leadership Team is supported by a team of staff dedicated to the transition process, the Transition Team.

VBM Transition Team

Name	Position	E-mail address
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Bill Huennekens	Transition Manager	bill.huennekens@metrokc.gov
Courtney Caswell	Functional Analyst (Focus on Regional Voting Centers)	courtney.caswell@metrokc.gov
Colleen Kwan	Functional Analyst (Focus on Ballot Tracking and Accountability)	colleen.kwan@metrokc.gov
Megan Coppersmith	Communication Specialist (Internal and External Communications)	megan.coppersmith@metrokc.gov
Bonnie Duncan	Fiscal Specialist (HAVA Grant Accounting)	bonnie.duncan@metrokc.gov
Alex Herzog	Administrative Specialist III (Transition Administration and Ballot Drop Locations)	alex.herzog@metrokc.gov
Jim Hunt	Functional Analyst (Focus on Information & Technology)	james.hunt@metrokc.gov
Lauren Engel	GIS Analyst	lauren.engel@metrokc.gov

1.11.1 Weekly team meetings

Transition Team meetings are held weekly each Monday morning to plan the upcoming week's activities and work schedule.

1.11.2 Meeting facilitation

Weekly meetings of the Transition Team are facilitated by the Transition Manager.

1.11.3 Meeting agendas and minutes

Meeting agendas are prepared by the Transition Manager and minutes are taken by transition support staff. These documents are archived in a shared drive accessible by team members.

1.12 Architecture and interoperability

The data captured and generated for ballot tracking must be interchangeable electronically with the existing voter registration system and Web application software in use. This electronic integration must be as easy, seamless and as close to real time as possible. This interface should be automated and simple to use, with minimal manual intervention and facilitation.

1.13 Alternatives and feasibility

An alternative to the upgraded ballot tracking and accountability system is to maintain the status quo, relying on the labor intensive, manual process. Due to the increase in mail ballots to be processed, maintaining the status quo will present significant risks, including longer hours, multiple shifts and more processing staff.

1.14 Preferred approach

Outbound mailing of ballot packets

After extensive evaluation of the equipment, office space, staff and commitment necessary to perform bulk insertion of 1 million ballot packets needed for a countywide vote-by-mail election, King County Elections has found continued outsourcing of this process is the best solution. King County Elections will continue to work with the current and any future print and insertion vendors to improve the accountability of this process. Therefore, vendor's responses to outbound insertion solutions were not rated.

Inbound processing of mail ballot packets

After examining our current process and evaluating the King County Council's requirement to provide voters with the ability to track their ballots, King County Elections recommends that technologies be purchased and implemented to:

- 1. Perform ballot sorting, data capture and batching in-house.** This will increase ballot security and provide greater process transparency to the observing public. This will also allow for process efficiency by decreasing transport time and minimizing numerous manual hand-offs.
- 2. Capture the signature image on the envelope.** Working with the image of the signature envelope, as opposed to the ballot-containing envelope itself, will allow KCE to place ballots in secure storage while the signature verification process occurs. Process efficiency will be gained from side-by-side comparison on a computer monitor.
- 3. Implement automatic signature recognition.** The use of automatic signature recognition will provide greater efficiency to the signature verification process. Automating this process will provide greater consistency in evaluating signatures. Ultimately, KCE staff will examine each signature rejected by the software application.
- 4. Automate data capture for reconciliation.** Automating data captured for accountability and reconciliation will remove the variable of manual data entry, providing greater efficiency and accuracy. Greater accountability and transparency will be accomplished through improved reporting capabilities.
- 5. Capture voter data after a ballot packet has been opened.** The ability to capture data after a voter's ballot packet has been opened and the security envelope with the ballot has been removed will increase process transparency, allowing the voter to confirm that their ballot is ready for tabulation. This will occur with hand scanners at each opening station or through high speed envelope

scanners at quality control stations. Data captured will also provide greater accountability and efficiency for reconciliation purposes.

1.15 Opposing arguments and responses

Opposing arguments and views surrounding specific elements of ballot packet tracking and accountability solutions are listed below.

Automatic Signature Recognition (ASR) for signature verification

Concerns have been raised about the difficulty for individuals other than machine operators to observe signature verification in an ASR environment. Observations of this process would be limited, as the bulk of verification will be done through software application and monitored by trained staff.

In implementing ASR, King County Elections would follow rules adopted by the OSOS outlining the use of this technology. The technology is designed to allow for users to set minimum confidence levels for automated signature verification. King County would work under the OSOS guidelines in setting these confidence levels and the information regarding confidence levels would be widely available.

Once the confidence rating is set, the technology accepts signatures that pass a certain level. Signatures that do not pass this confidence rating will not be permanently rejected but rather removed from the batch and reviewed by a trained, human operator. No signature will be rejected without human eyes confirming that indeed, the signatures do not match. The system's reliability and consistency will be audited and monitored constantly to ensure the acceptance and rejection levels are in compliance with state rules and regulations.

The implementation of ASR will not eliminate all human verification but will reduce the number of signature that a human operator will need to compare. A reduction in ballot packets requiring human verification will reduce the number of staff needed to perform the human verification and streamline the process.

It is a logical assumption that the implementation of ASR will result in a more consistent interpretation of signature matches. The software application uses the same criteria and methodology each time, from the same technology used in many other industries.

Barcodes or identifying marks on ballots

Allowing voters to track their ballots entirely through tabulation would require a unique identifier on the ballot itself. The main concerns of placing unique identifiers on the ballot revolve around three aspects: political, legal, and preserving the secrecy of the voter's ballot.

Political Concerns

The State of California has prohibited the use of a unique identifier on the ballot and Washington State may not be far behind. While an amendment was introduced but not adopted in the latest Legislative session, this issue is far from resolved and will likely be discussed in the future.

Ongoing Legal Issues

Four counties in Washington State offer voters a Web interface to track their ballot through tabulation. San Juan County is one of these counties and has been named in a lawsuit to remove this feature. The outcome of the court case is not yet decided and will likely set precedent regarding voter secrecy and ballot tracking in Washington.

Maintaining the secret ballot

The use of a unique identifier on a ballot for the purpose of tracking voted ballots is viewed by some as compromising the voter's right to a secret ballot. While the encryption technology available is compelling, King County Elections does not want to compromise the spirit or legal definition of the secret ballot. Sufficient accountability can be attained with tracking to the return envelope level, not to the ballot.

The ability to track and account for each ballot packet is essential to open and transparent elections. However, tying the voter back to his or her ballot may pose legal concerns and has several unknown risks that must be addressed carefully before King County considers ballot tracking through tabulation.

Enhancing the tracking system already in place, a bar code on the ballot envelope and with other data collection tools and process management software, will improve ballot tracking and reconciliation, and give voters ultimately what they want: the ability to verify their ballot packet was received by King County and their signatures were verified.

King County Elections' recommends further discussion and study of enhanced ballot tracking using a unique identifier on the ballot when and if legal issues in San Juan County are resolved and acceptance of such technology is studied. Until then, we believe the public is best served by tracking ballots by the outer envelope and not using a bar code on the ballot.

2.0 Budget

The need created by the transition to vote-by-mail and the award of a federal grant through the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provide a unique opportunity to improve and enhance King County's ballot packet tracking and accountability

system. The available \$2.7 million in HAVA funds will fund King County's expenditure to purchase, implement, and initially maintain the equipment.

The solution proposed for accountability and ballot tracking purposes will meet strategic business needs, policy directives and add valued service to voters in a vote-by-mail environment.

2.1 Vendor proposals

Proposals can be found with the information submitted in response to the requests for information submitted by each of the vendors in exhibits 5 to 8.

3.0 Vendor background

Diebold Election Systems

Diebold Corporation purchased Global Elections Systems in 2001 to form Diebold Election Systems. Diebold Election Systems products and services are used in Klickitat County, Washington, Los Angeles County, California, Ohio, Georgia, Utah, Mississippi and Maryland along with many other jurisdictions in California, Arizona, Kansas, and Florida

Cowart Gagnon

Cowart Gagnon, a Puyallup based company, has provided mailing processing equipment and solutions since 1988. Spokane County is currently implementing the Cowart Gagnon equipment investigated by King County.

K&H Printing

K&H Printing has provided a variety of election services to counties in Washington since the 1940s. K&H currently prints ballots for Snohomish County and provides an automated ballot tracking and accountability system. Note: K&H Printing chose not to submit a bid for this project.

Pitney Bowes

Pitney Bowes is a Fortune 350 company that has provided mail processing services for 85 years. The technology underlying the Relia-Vote system is used in over 25 Fortune 500 companies.

The Relia-Vote system has operated in Orange County, CA since 2004 and was used in 9 counties during the 2006 election cycle.

VoteHere

Founded in 1998, VoteHere is a division of Dategrity Corporation and is based in Bellevue, WA. The system is currently used for ballot tracking in over 20 counties in Washington, Spokane County is the largest jurisdiction. The system investigated by King County Elections, the MiBT

(Mail-in Ballot Tracker) has been used in over 70 elections in Washington State.

3.1 Current vendor

Diebold Elections Systems is the current vendor for outsourced outbound and inbound mail ballot processes. Diebold Elections Systems provides services for ballot printing; outbound ballot packet assembly; mail sorting and bulk mail entry; and inbound ballot sorting and data capture.

3.2 Selection process

Each of the vendors providing solutions for ballot envelope tracking and accountability in the elections industry were invited to present their solutions: Diebold Elections System, Cowart Gagnon, K&H Printing, Pitney Bowes, and VoteHere.

These vendors were sent a request for information and asked to provide pricing information based on the predetermined functional requirements. Vendors were provided three weeks to submit product information and clarify any questions. K&H Printing did not respond to the request for information or provide pricing information, and was not further considered.

The following functional ballot packet tracking points and associated business requirements were distributed to potential vendors to obtain possible hardware and software solutions and cost estimates.

BALLOT PACKET TRACKING POINTS	FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
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<p>1. Voter's ballot packet has been assembled and handed off to USPS</p>	<p>1. Insertion (bulk and daily insertion)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Bulk insertion for all election-qualified voters on file: confirm correct ballot materials assembled. B. Daily insertion for new registrations and re-issues: confirm correct ballot materials assembled. Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion. C. Over-the-counter insertion and issuance of ballots: confirm correct ballot materials assembled. Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion. D. Must have the capability for possible future addition of randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub. <p>2. Capture of data from outbound envelope and ballot that confirms correct ballot materials assembled.</p> <p>3. Ability to upload to and / or provide seamless election data information to Data Information Management System (DIMS) / voter registration system.</p> <p>4. Third party confirmation program for in-house Quality Assurance management.</p>
<p>2. King County confirms receipt of ballot packet</p>	<p>1. Data captured from inbound envelope to confirm King County Elections' receipt of ballot packets.</p> <p>2. Ability to upload data to and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS/voter registration system.</p>

<p>3. Signature on ballot packet has been verified or challenged</p>	<p>1. Automated signature verification that is compatible with DIMS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Ability to capture image of envelope for automated and manual signature verification and public information requests. B. Ability to capture data from envelope to confirm voter's signature was verified or challenged. C. Automation to maximize efficiency for signature verification process. D. Automation to maximize efficiency for exceptions handling and data management. Currently there are 19 challenge codes. E. Ability to upload data to and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / voter registration system.
<p>4. Ballot packet has been opened for ballot extraction</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capabilities for scale and dimension differentiation to pre-qualify ballot packets for opening. (These functions will be used to screen out packets with missing ballots or multiple ballots enclosed.) 2. Sort signature-verified ballot packets by legislative district or ballot code or other criterion as specified for recount purposes. 3. Automated slicing/opening of envelopes. 4. Batch in 200-400 per tray to prepare for extraction. 5. Ability to capture data from ballot envelope to confirm it was opened for extraction. 6. Ability to upload data captured to and/or provides seamless electronic data interface with DIMS/voter registration system. 7. Ability to capture unique identifier on ballot for exceptions handling and data management. (To preserve future functionality, if necessary.) 8. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data to and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS/voter registration system. (To preserve future functionality, if necessary.)

As mentioned above in section 1.14, King County initially asked vendors to submit proposed solutions for the outbound insertion and mailing of mail ballot packets. King County Elections recommends continuing to outsource this work. The risk, complexity and resources necessary to bring this function in-house would not be a wise investment for King County at this time.

In addition to the submitted responses, several site visits were embarked upon to see the proposed technologies in real-world applications. Three staff members traveled to Miami Dade County, Florida, to observe the Pitney Bowes insertion and inbound equipment in operation. Staff also observed the K&H solution in operation in Snohomish County, Washington. Diebold equipment was observed in operation in a test environment in Whatcom County, Washington and other proposed Diebold equipment was observed in use in another business application.

Interviews were conducted with several counties in Washington that use the VoteHere product. Cowart Gagnon equipment is currently in the early stage of implementation in Spokane County, and as a result, was not available for observation.

Information submitted by the vendors was extensive and complex, requiring a subgroup of members of the Transition Leadership Team to be established. This subgroup examined the information provided by the vendors to rate them on the previously established criteria outlined in section 3.3. These ratings and recommendations were brought back to the entire Transition Leadership Team and thoroughly reviewed, discussed and approved by the whole group. See, exhibit 9.

3.3 Selection criteria

1. Vendor's ability to meet the functional business requirements listed below. These include all essential outbound and inbound functional business requirements. They include:

1. Data capture to confirm receipt of returned ballot packets.
2. Ability to upload data with minimal manual intervention and/or facilitation.
3. Capture image of signature from the envelope.
4. Capture entire image of envelope with ability to parse out signature for verification.
5. Compare ballot envelope signature and reference signature in voter registration database with use of automated signature verification (ASR) software.
6. Upload results from automated signature verification and export signature images for viewing within DIMS.
7. Has weight and/or dimension differentiation function(s) to pre-qualify ballot packets for opening.

8. Ability to sort ballot packet envelopes by legislative district or by other specified criteria after signature is verified
9. Has sliced / open functionality for sealed ballot packet envelopes.
10. Be able to batch in 200-400 per tray to prepare for opening and extraction.
11. Data capture function to confirm envelope has been opened for extraction.
12. Has interface and tools for system integration and process management.

2. Ability to meet requirements set forth in the security plan.

Vendor solution must meet general requirements of Elections Security Plan. It must have the ability to secure (to the maximum extent possible) hardware, software, database and any data interface links from accidental and/or unauthorized modification and/or deletion and/or access. The system must provide the ability to maintain a chain of custody of ballots and envelopes throughout the entire process.

In addition, the system is expected to facilitate:

1. Maintenance of an open and transparent election environment for public observation.
2. Compliance with established legal and procedural security through established chain of custody, data validation, audit reports, transaction logs and two person integrity.
3. Compliance with established technical and system security through use of strong passwords.

3. Risk exposure. Minimize King County's risk exposure due to delays, complexities of solution and vendor's lack of knowledge and experience with elections and King County Elections' business procedures.

4. Accuracy. There should be quality control elements in place to verify the accuracy of data captured. Quality control measures include but are not limited to well defined procedures for data validation reports and audit of sample(s) at scheduled time intervals throughout the election processing cycle at each data capture point.

5. Capacity, scalability, flexibility and ease of use. System should have the ability to handle the necessary volume of inbound ballot mail pieces, able to meet new requirements, accommodate growth, and ability to handle various sized elections, easily configurable for different operations, and settings easily adjustable to address variable election administration needs.

6. Compatibility, open architecture, universal data format.

The data captured and generated for ballot packet tracking must be interchangeable electronically with the existing voter registration system and

Web application software in use. The electronic data interchange should be easy, seamless and as close to real time as possible. The interface developed and used for such interchange should be simple and as automated as possible with minimal manual intervention and facilitation.

7. Reliability, nature and frequency of maintenance.

The system is expected to function continuously without fail through an election processing cycle. The mean time between failures should equal a minimum of two million ballot packets / document pieces. There should be built-in redundancy without any single point of failure. Maintenance issues should be dealt with easily with minimal delay, so as not to affect ballot processing. If vendor's technical support is required on site, the response time and problem resolution must be at a level that addresses and meets King County Elections' deadline requirements. Easy access to component and replacement parts should be readily available for malfunction and failure resolution.

8. Space and weight. The layout and design of equipment and hardware should minimize space and weight requirements without sacrificing operational flow, efficiency and effectiveness, and without posing any risk associated with weight overload per square foot of floor space in the new Elections' facility in Renton. The weight and space established for the equipment is 125 pounds per square foot. With a maximum of two machines, each machine should not exceed 11 feet wide and 40 feet long.

9. Cost. Consistent with the previous business case, the cost of the equipment is evaluated against the amount of HAVA funds available \$2.7 million.

3.4 Vendor rating

Inbound process

Vendors were evaluated on functional requirements and established criteria using a six point scale from zero to five. Zero was equivalent to "Does not meet requirements / criterion" and five equaled "Exceeds all elements of requirements / criterion."

VoteHere stood separate from Diebold, Pitney Bowes and Cowart Gagnon as it offered a process management software application (MiBT) with minimal hardware. In terms of functional requirements, VoteHere's solution scored not applicable for ten of the 12 requirements, and obtained a rating on two: the ability to capture voter identifying data after the envelope was opened, and system integration and process management.

Of the 12 functional requirements, Diebold, Pitney Bowes and Cowart Gagnon scored similarly with their ability to capture signature information and batch in groups of 200 to 400 ballot packets per tray.

Both Pitney Bowes and Cowart Gagnon were able to offer hardware and/or software in 11 of the 12 functional requirements, and Diebold offered 10 of the 12. Pitney Bowes scored a total of 85 with Cowart Gagnon trailing at 82 and Diebold with 71.

Vendor's solutions were then scored on eight criteria: security; accuracy; capacity; scalability, flexibility and ease of use; compatibility; reliability and maintenance; space and weight; and cost. The total scores for criteria were very close, with Pitney Bowes at 25, followed by Cowart Gagnon at 24 and Diebold at 23.

Individual scoring of potential vendors can be found in exhibit 9. Section 3.6 also describes scores and justifications.

3.5 Vendor recommendation and justification

King County Elections recommends purchasing and implementing two Pitney Bowes' Olympus II Relia-Vote 32 Bin scanning and sortation systems and associated software and hardware configuration for ASR. King County also recommends purchasing and implementing VoteHere's MiBT ballot packet tracking software and solution.

The VoteHere MiBT ballot tracking software comes in two versions: envelope-only tracking (at a reduced cost), and full envelope and ballot tracking. At this time, KCE recommends the purchase of the envelope-only tracking version, with the option to upgrade to the full version if and when necessary.

Pitney Bowes' Olympus II Relia-Vote 32 Bin scanning and sortation system and associated software and hardware configuration for ASR will address the first three specific business objectives – 1) Perform ballot packet sorting, data capture and batching in-house, 2) Capture the signature image on the envelope and 3) Implement automatic signature recognition. Two systems are recommended for redundancy and to accommodate the volume associated with a jurisdiction the size of King County.

The Pitney Bowes' solution rated highest when evaluated for functional requirements and against the evaluation criteria. The Pitney Bowes system received a total weighted score of 85 for evaluation of functionalities and a 25 when evaluated against the criteria.

As detailed in exhibit 9, the Pitney Bowes equipment is the preferred equipment as it has the capabilities to:

- Capture ballot packet id, endorse with date/time and compare to the database for id validity.

- The Pitney Bowes equipment has ability to find ballot packet id anywhere on ballot envelope and differentiate based on weight and thickness of the ballot packet, allowing this to be done at first pass through vendor scan/sort equipment.
- Adjustable sorting schemes and expandable number of bins. Digital display of sorter bin contents. Capable of adding challenge code to outside of ballot packets after signatures were verified on second pass if desired.

Pitney Bowes is currently developing an interface to the Parascript technology. Pitney Bowes has extensive experience using Parascript technology in other industries and King County Elections will have the opportunity to work with Pitney Bowes on development of an interface that will directly meet organizational and voter's needs.

There are potential risks associated with the Pitney Bowes solution regarding integration with our current systems. However, these risks are mitigated through current implementation in Pierce County, Washington, and Solano County, California, as they use the same election management and voter registration systems as King County. King County expects to benefit from lessons learned in these implementations.

VoteHere's MiBT ballot packet tracking software offers the only true system integration and process management tool and will help us address the fourth and fifth specific business objectives – 4) Automate data capture for reconciliation with an emphasis on challenged ballots and ballots separated for duplication and 5) capture voter data after a ballot packet has been opened.

MiBT is specifically designed to take data captured at various points in the process and provide a near real-time look at where ballot packets are in the mail ballot process and show process area balances or imbalances. Processes can be fully automated by scanning barcodes on mail pieces at various points in the process.

VoteHere's MiBT ballot tracking software is in use and working effectively in several jurisdictions in Washington.

In order to fully realize the benefits of the Pitney Bowes and VoteHere solutions, King County Elections may need to supplement the system with additional scanners, or other equipment, at key processing points. For instance, in order to capture information at opening, we will need small desktop scanners (\$200 each) that attach to a personal computer (about \$1,500 each). These scanners can capture the ballot packet id at a rate of over 2,000 per hour. If deployed in a location without a PC, it would be necessary to purchase a PC in addition to the scanner. Other options include high speed scanners that process at a faster speed and would be used at high volume locations and range in cost from

\$15,000 to \$70,000. These solutions will be further explored during the process design efforts conducted with the selected vendors.

The additional tracking point locations for internal management and applicable equipment will be analyzed as part of the scope of work done by the vendor(s) selected to implement the ballot tracking and accountability solution.

The other vendors that offered solutions are not recommended for a variety of reasons.

The Cowart Gagnon equipment was not rated as high as Pitney Bowes. The information supplied by Cowart Gagnon was essentially a collection of equipment brochures, with no insight into improving processes or meeting business functions. Cowart Gagnon does propose using the Parascript technology mentioned above but did not provide interface specifications. Overall the Cowart Gagnon solution is seen as a risk because the vendor has not fully implemented in any election jurisdiction. Their elections experience is limited to one medium sized jurisdiction.

Diebold has an inherent advantage as the current vendor for the election management and voter registration systems and the recommended solution for the ballot tabulation equipment upgrade. Diebold currently has an interface for the Parascript technology described above, recently implementing it in Los Angeles County, California for automatic signature recognition of returned absentee ballots. However, overall the proposed solution lacks the flexibility and functionality sought by KCE. Some examples of this include: no demonstrated high speed ballot packet tracking and accountability equipment, no flexibility for sorting with the existing equipment, and no ballot packet size or weight differentiation function.

In summary, by combining the quality equipment and process management expertise from Pitney Bowes, the database and process management tools offered by VoteHere and the expertise of King County Elections, the citizens of King County will be well served with a ballot packet tracking and accountability system they can rely on.

In addition to meeting outlined criteria and the expectations of the public, Pitney Bowes has a worldwide reputation for service and quality in mail processing. The combination of Pitney Bowes, VoteHere and Diebold, the recommended tabulation vendor, will offer checks and balances for the overall tabulation system.

Attached Exhibits

Exhibit 1: Nine Major Processing Points

Exhibit 2: Ballot Tracking & Accountability: Study of Current Process

Exhibit 3: King County Elections Focus Groups

Exhibit 4: VBM: Ballot tracking with and without a unique identifier on the ballot

Exhibit 5: Diebold Elections Systems: Response to Questions

Exhibit 6: Pitney Bowes: Response to Questions

Exhibit 7: Cowart Gagnon: Response to Questions


Exhibit 8: VoteHere: Response to Questions

Exhibit 9: Evaluation of vendor proposed solution



**King County
Elections**

Nine major processing points



Current process

Exhibit 1



BALLOT TRACKING & ACCOUNTABILITY - STUDY OF CURRENT PROCESS

CURRENT PROCESS AND PROCEDURES - DESCRIPTION

The current ballot accountability process has a total of 8 major processing points. See, Current Process Flow Chart. The total count across processing points is reconciled down to the batch/tray level. A batch can consist of 200 to 400 ballot packets (signature envelope, security envelope and ballot). The current process and procedures was recognized nationally in 2006 as best practice by the National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks (NACRC). Below is a brief account of the various processing points. Please refer the numbered processing points with attached current process flow chart.

[1] Ballot packet production - outbound

The current ballot tracking and accountability process and procedures start off with generating a voter registration mailing flat file from DIMS (Data and Information Management System). On a pre-determined scheduled date, a voter registration report is run, and a flat file containing the necessary information of all election eligible and qualified mail ballot voters generated.

The DIMS flat file is then in turn sent to the print / insertion vendor along with the GEMS (Global Election Management System) ballot data file. A ballot order that specifies the total number of ballots that need to be printed for each ballot style / code accompanies the DIMS and GEMS files. Ballots are proofed for accuracy and format. The ballots are also quality checked by print / insertion vendor. The printed ballots are sorted in order by "PRECINCTS" within legislative districts and printed with ballot code and precinct information on them. The ballot stub contains the ballot "precinct" serial number.

Ballot envelopes printed with voter specific information in number, text and barcode display format [AVID (absentee voter ID), current election ID (EID), address, legislative district, precinct, ballot code, jobname and sequence order: number within the job] are produced and quality checked by print / insertion vendor. The envelopes are printed in order by "PRECINCTS" within legislative district, and are numbered sequentially against the total number of voters in the precinct. This is used for matching the precinct serial number of the ballot printed on the ballot stub.

The ballots and the envelopes for each precinct are placed on the same tray and marked with a job number. A quality check is conducted by King County staff at the print / insertion vendor facility to pull out ballots or envelopes with print defects. When the job is deemed ready for insertion, it is sent over to the insertion station.

The insertion equipment has up to six hoppers for holding up to six different inserts that might need to be inserted into the generic ballot outgoing window envelope. On average, there are 4 pieces: the ballot, the return envelope with voter specific information described printed, the security envelope and possibly an insert containing special information about the election. These are placed in separate hoppers, and they are inserted into the outgoing window envelope. At the end, the total number of ballots inserted and the number of leftover ballots will be verified against the first and last serial number of the job on the envelope. The remaining ballots (overage) are noted and documented. If there are discrepancies between the serial numbers, research is done to resolve and explain the discrepancies and to track and account for the ballots and envelopes.

The assembled outbound ballot packets are then packed on trays. One last quality check will be made to the assembled ballot packets on the trays. Packets damaged / mutilated after insertion or packets identified with print issues at this stage are pulled. The AVIDs of pulled packets are entered into Excel spreadsheet and notations are made as to the appropriate action that needs to be taken. A report is generated to monitor any follow-up work to ensure that the voter is sent a correct and properly assembled ballot packet.

Trays are in turn packed in metal gym-paks. These carts are loaded into the mail-house vendor (PSI) truck and transported to its mail processing facility.

For re-issues due to changes made to voter data after voter registration flat file was sent out to printer, for small quantities like several hundreds, the outbound ballot packets are assembled in-house by hand. The ballot pieces are hand inserted, and then sent out via the PSI to the USPS. The one exception to this are military and overseas voters. Their ballot packets are submitted directly to the USPS and a certificate of mailing is obtained.

[2] Scan, sort and bundle for non-profit bulk postage rate - outbound

Mail-house vendor PSI uses the postnet barcode on the envelopes to sort the outbound ballot packets. The sorted outbound ballot packets are bundled for non-profit postage bulk rate and submission to the USPS.

[3] Pick up by USPS

Once sorted and bundled, these outbound ballot packets are picked up by the United State Postal Service (USPS) for processing and delivery to King County voters.

[4] Ballot packets returned by voter - inbound process

Voters return the ballot packets in a number of ways: (1) via mail, (2) drop off ballot boxes at the election office and (3) at polling places. The returned ballot packets are counted and the count documented prior to being picked up by the mail ballot processing team.

1. Via Mail.

For large elections, King County arranges with the USPS to pick up ballots daily from the USPS Processing and Distribution Center in Tukwila.

2. Via Ballot drop boxes at election office

Elections office – Team(s) consisting of two member voter service staff will open the ballot drop box at the end of the day and empty the content from the box. The returned ballot packets are date stamped as soon as possible. The pieces are counted and the total noted and documented on the "Returned Voted Absentee Ballot Cover Sheet". They are transported into the vault, where team(s) consisting of two members of voter service staff count and verify the count again, and then sign-off for the receipt of the ballots.

3. Via ballot drop boxes at polling places

Polling places – When the polling places close at 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, poll workers will open the ballot box and empty the side-bin where the mail ballots are dropped into. These are counted and the count verified by another 2 poll workers. The ballot packets will then be placed into a blue bag. Once all mail ballot packets in the ballot box are in the blue bag, the blue bag is zipped and sealed with a King County numbered security seal. The security sealed blue bags containing all returned mail ballot packets from the polling places with the transmittal form documenting the total number of ballot packets and the number of the security seal will be dropped off by two poll workers (from two opposing political parties) at the depot.

[5] King County pick up or take delivery of returned ballot packets

Team(s) consisting of two mail ballot processing and delivery staff members and a truck go to the USPS Processing and Distributed Center in Tukwila for mail piece pick-up. At the time of pickup, the number of trays of returned ballot packets are noted and documented.

Election Office. A team consisting of a minimum of two members of mail ballot processing and delivery team and a vehicle, will pick up the ballot packets at the Elections office. The team will count and verify that the total number of returned ballot packets documented on the "Returned Voted Absentee Ballot Cover Sheet" is accurate, and sign-off for the receipt of the ballots. These returned ballot packets are immediately transported back to the mail ballot processing facility at the temporary election annex (TEA).

Polling place/depot. The sealed blue bags containing absentee ballots are transported to the mail ballot processing facility at TEA. The mail ballot processing team count and document the number of ballot packets received.

Scan AVIDs, capture data, sort and pack in trays

Once the receipt of the total count of ballot packets are confirmed by King County at the USPS Processing and Distribution Center, the ballot packets are immediately taken to the mail-house sort vendor (PSI) and sorted down to the legislative districts. The number of pieces that went through the sorter is noted and documented. During the sort the AVIDs on the return envelopes are also scanned, captured and stored in a database. Unreadable mail packets are outstacked to the reject bin. During this entire process at the vendor's location, two members of King County Elections remain with the ballots.

After election day, the number of ballot packets returned declines. When this occurs, ballot packets are not sent out to PSI for scan and sort. Instead, they are scanned and counted in-house. TEA staff uses a hand held scanner to scan/capture the AVID number from the return envelope of each item in the tray. If there is no bar code, the AVID # can be typed in by hand. Ballot packets are then placed in trays (not sorted by Legislative District). Each tray is given an in-house "batch" identifier number.

Batching

Just like the "unsorted" ballot packets which were assigned an in-house "batch" identifier number, the sorted return ballot packets are also organized into "batches" by the DIEBOLD ES staff on PSI site. Each ballot packet is assigned a batch number. The batching (vendor or in-house) process links the AVID to the registered voter and his/her the signature image in DIMS. The voter signatures in DIMS are pulled four-up in the order they are batched in the tray for signature verification. Diebold ES prepares a CD with a file for each batch of the sorted packets. Mail ballot processing staff uploads the batches into DIMS. After the upload, a "batch slip" for each batch is written up, and place in the batch to accompany each batch through tabulation.

For AVIDs that DIMS does not recognize, they are placed on a WANDA reject report. A WANDA reject report also accompanies the batch of ballot packets. When the batch is ready for signature verification, a green card indicating so is added to the front of the envelopes in the batch.

[6] Signature verification – inbound process

A signature verification staff member claims a tray and verifies the signatures on the return envelopes with the signatures on file in DIMS. A ballot packet where the signature mismatches against the one on file is pulled and flagged as challenged in the DIMS database. Currently, there are a total of 19 situations under which a returned ballot packet may be challenged. They range from signature mismatches, to no signature on file, to signature signed by person give the power of attorney, to less than two witness for the mark in lieu of signature etc.

The signature that mismatches against the one on file is flagged in the DIMS system. The verification process continues until all the signatures in the batch are verified, and any challenges flagged.

Any challenged ballot packets are then reviewed and quality checked by an experienced member of the signature verification reconciliation team. Challenges affirmed by the reconciliation team member are pulled and placed in one of 19 challenge buckets.

At the end of the day, the challenged ballot packets are manually counted and the count compared against the total that DIMS reports for each challenge code. If there are discrepancies, the affected tray(s) of "challenged ballot packets" are recounted and verified against the detail listing of daily challenges for those tray(s). The end of day (EOD) reports for each challenge category and the summary statistics are printed out and filed.

Daily, the challenged ballot packets are photo-copied and their AVID hand scanned. The copies are then forwarded to voter services. In turn, the "challenged voters" are notified via mail and phone calls by voter services staff according to RCW requirements.

For voters who update their signatures or respond to the challenge letter, their challenged ballot packets are reviewed. "Challenge resolved" ballot packets are "re-batched and sent" for opening and tabulation.

Adjustments and updates to the statistics are made to reflect the resolved challenges processed.

[7] Opening – inbound process

The returned ballot packets are opened, and the security envelopes containing the ballot are extracted from the outside signature envelope. To ensure ballot secrecy and voter privacy, it is only after the signature envelope is separated and removed that the ballot in the security envelope is extracted. Visual check of the extracted ballot is made to screen out ballots with signature or information that can identify voters. Ballots deemed problematic for tabulation, including but not limited to damaged ballots, ballot not marked properly per instructions, ballots with over votes, undervotes, and write-ins are pulled.

Adjustments and updates to the statistics are made to reflect the exceptions handling that took place. The number of pulled ballots are noted and documented. They are then in turn forwarded to the ballot duplication process.

[8] Ballot duplication – ballot pre-processing – inbound process

At this process point, ballots that are damaged, not marked properly, or where voter intent is unclear are adjudicated, resolved and duplicated for tabulation. If the ballot needs to be duplicated, stock ballots are pulled from inventories secured behind a locked cage. Once stock ballots are pulled, exact duplications are made of the original ballots ensuring voter intent is preserved. All duplications are made by teams of two member of the mail ballot processing team under the observation of political party observers.

Adjustments and updates to the statistics are made to reflect the exceptions handling that took place, and ballot with unresolved issues are pulled. The number of pulled "unresolved" ballots are noted and documented. These unresolved ballots are forwarded to King County Canvassing Board for ruling, and are processed per canvass board decisions. At that time, statistics are adjusted to reflect decisions made by canvass board.

[9] Tabulation – inbound process

On election day, ballots deemed fit for tabulation are forwarded for tabulation. Ballots that are unable to go through tabulation are in turn sent back to ballot duplication for resolution and/or referral to the King County Canvass Board for ruling on voter's intent.

The total number of ballots that went through tabulation are noted and documented. The votes captured for each race are also noted and documented. The information is stored in database and reports are generated for presentation to King County Canvassing Board for certification.



King County Elections Focus Groups
A Joint Venture: The Connections Group & Rockey Hill and Knowlton
Poll Voters Switching to All Mail-in Ballots
& Testing Ballot Tracking

OVERVIEW

The Connections Group Inc., along with our partner Rockey Hill & Knowlton, conducted five focus groups in early April with voters in different areas of King County. Following the March all mail-in special election in Seattle and the announced switch to vote by mail for the whole county, there were several important issues that King County Elections needed to explore with voters before moving forward with these changes:

1. Learn from the experience of Seattle poll voters returning mail-in ballots for the first time.
2. Examine the process of voting by mail – receiving a ballot, returning it, and what happens once your ballot arrives at King County Elections.
3. Explore the possibility of implementing a new ballot tracking system for voters.
4. Explore the issues unique to mail voters and explore what outreach and education strategies would best address the concerns of stakeholders and voters.

Seattle Focus Groups

Two focus groups were conducted with Seattle voters to discuss their experiences with the first all vote by mail election. Ballot tracking and ballot accountability were discussed, but were a smaller portion of the discussion than in other groups. All participants were traditional poll voters who voted by mail for the first time (or the first time in several years) during the March special election.

- Seattle Poll Voters #1 – April 4, 4-6pm
12 participants (6 males, 6 females) – Cathy Allen moderated
- Seattle Poll Voters #2 – April 4, 6:30-8:30pm
12 participants (7 males, 5 females) – Cathy Allen moderated

Regional Focus Groups

Three focus groups were conducted regionally with voters from North, South, and East King County. Participants were asked to describe their knowledge of the current voting process, including how and when ballots are handled once they are received by King County Elections. A PowerPoint presentation was given outlining the steps a ballot takes during the voting process. Various options for tracking these ballots were discussed and voters were asked at which points they would like to be able to check the status of their ballot. Participants were diverse in age, ethnicity, neighborhood (within each given region), and profession.

- South County Voters – April 3, 6:30-8:30pm

- 12 participants (5 males, 7 females) – Cathy Allen moderated
- Eastside Voters – April 5, 6:30-8:30pm
- 11 participants (7 males, 4 females) – Randy Pepple moderated
- North County Voters – April 9, 6:30-8:30pm
- 12 participants (6 males, 6 females) – Randy Pepple moderated

PRELIMINARY SUMMARY

General Issue Environment

- People are feeling the positive effects of the economy. They are optimistic, interested in building a better quality of life, especially while the economy holds strong. They are frustrated with the “Seattle process” of over-talking, over-studying and failing to make timely decisions. People want their elected officials to make more decisions. Transportation projects were the most high-profile, with the Viaduct the biggest case in point, but Monorail, Sound Transit and the 520 Bridge were all mentioned.

SILVERIO, Eastside: I think things are brighter now because I see things, is more money around. There's more opportunities that I see.

KEN, Seattle #2: We elect our city council members and legislators to study issues and make good decisions for us. And I don't like it when they refuse to do that and just push it back on the voters to take a vote.

DAVID, Eastside: I think the underlying problem is there's no decision-makers. They are weak politicians, there are weak executives that run this area and in the overall state area. And I'm not talking about just one party.

- Biggest problem: transportation, rising costs (housing and gas), and ineffective leadership.

MICHAEL, North County: If you've been through Bellevue in the last six months there are probably 40 cranes, the ones that haven't fallen down, are standing all over Bellevue. And if you've been to Belle Square on a Saturday two weeks before Christmas, that's what traffic feels like every single day in Bellevue. And when those buildings are done, because there's no way for the roads to get bigger but they are putting 30 more high-rises in. So people are going to come in to the city, but the roads are not going to accommodate all those people. Because the light rail thing is slowly developing, at best.

ALVIN, Eastside: The cost of living has increased. We have some layoffs. You think the mortgage business is busy but we have a few layoffs at work. It seems like a better economy, but there's layoffs and a lot of controversy over the viaduct and the bridge. Maybe last year was better.

TONY, Seattle #1: You know, I think that it's gotten a little expensive. Gas is up and rent is high, and it's hard on the working guys.

Elections: Better or Worse? How we doing?

- Focus group participants in Seattle and South King County thought elections procedures were improved, or at least not a concern of theirs. They did not cite the 2004 election problems, and, in fact, believed that an error rate of from 3% to 10% might be reasonable for us to expect. They mentioned nobody should expect perfection from such a large process.

MELISSA, Seattle #1: I have to put some faith in the system that they are going to get it right a high percent of the time, and there's going to be 2, 3, 4, 5 percent of the time where the ballot gets lost. It slips underneath a desk. And that's how those chips are going to fall. It's going to be an equal number from Democrats or Republicans or males or females or gays or straights. That's just going to be random, that small percentage of votes that don't make it to the counting office.

JORGE, South County: I think it's staying the same, but I think more people are aware with what's been going on. More people are turning out to vote and taking part in our local governments' voting...because you know, it's great to exercise your right to vote.

- In the Eastside and North County voter groups, participants were more critical of King County Elections and brought up the problems of the 2004 election. They said that they'd received very little information about changes and couldn't say whether processes were getting better or worse at King County Elections.

DAVE, Eastside: I like the front end process and I like the choices we do have. I go to the polls and I like that, my kids like the absentee ballots and that's fine. But what I'm not pleased about is the back end of things, the counting of the ballots and all the fiasco we [had] in gubernatorial election. That was ridiculous. I'm not very pleased about that.

DENNIS, North County: The gubernatorial election. That was a mess. And, of course, we weren't the only state that had that. But I do think that somebody, something has got to be improved there. But I wouldn't know because of I wasn't paying attention to early elections that they had probably problems, but when they are this close there is a problem.

- Time has passed, headlines have gone away lessening interest in elections, they said. Also, changes in King County Elections leadership and other legislative mandates (election date changes, challenged ballot rules, switch to all mail balloting, etc.) have eased concerns or turned their attention to other issues.

IRENE, North County: I don't necessarily think it's gotten worse but I can't see at all where it's gotten better...I think the closer scrutiny has brought it more to the front.

CAROL, Eastside: You don't hear a lot about good things [about the elections process]. Most of the news is bad. That's what you focus on, so it's hard to get balance.

- Not one person in the five focus groups mentioned any of the review panels or recommendations.
- Distrust of the United States Postal Service (USPS) or fear of getting mail stolen were concerns raised across all focus groups, which is why more people wanted the option of dropping off ballots at central locations.

CHRIS, Seattle #2: I've lost quite a few things in the mail actually in the last year or so. So I was a little worried that it may not get there... I would be more confident dropping it off than mailing it as well. I would be less likely to need tracking if I knew I was dropping it off.

MICHELLE, North County: I wondered, going back a few steps, about the mail. We have had a lot of mail theft in our neighborhood, and if I were voting by mail I would not put it in my home mail box. But it would be pretty easy for someone to drive around and look in mailboxes and look for ballots if they wanted to influence the election.

The Switch to All Vote By Mail

- These participants all knew all mail voting was on its way, many thinking it had already begun or was happening this year.

MEDYI, Seattle #2: I wasn't surprised because it was in the paper. It was kind of like announced, so I was just waiting for it.

- Reactions to the switch were fairly muted with few strongly opposed and most people in favor of the switch.

JENNY, South County: I now vote absentee, and I wouldn't have done it if somebody hadn't called me up on the phone and said, how would you like to vote absentee? And I used to like going down and voting. What I like about doing absentee is you sit there and you read the question, and then you can read the pros and cons right there. You've got all your information right there rather than going down and, oh, I forgot all about that.

- Most first time mail voters explained voting by mail was more convenient and allowed them more time to think about and research their ballot without the time pressures of being at the polls.

DOROTHY, Seattle #2: And I actually really liked the process and I'm glad that I did it. But I have to admit that I would have ignored it except I was strongly encouraged by my fiancée to do it. And now that I did it, now I'm a convert.

CAROL, Eastside: I like to sit in the comfort of my home and read over the material, have a cup of coffee. Think about it, maybe talk to my husband about it.

- However, even those who personally liked the new process of voting by mail said they thought everybody should not have to vote that way.

ASA, Seattle #1: I have to say I didn't care for it [the all mail ballot election]. I don't like the fact that there's not -- it didn't seem to me like this was an option for going to the polls, and I think that should be available. And I think for -- people that don't get it together to be able to mail the thing in, I think there should be some limited polling place open.

- A major criticism voiced in all the focus groups was the issue of needing a stamp to vote. Some believed on principal that it wasn't right to make people pay to vote and others mentioned the inconvenience of finding a stamp when many people have no need for them these days. People responded very positively to the option of having well-publicized drop boxes for ballots throughout the county.

AANYA, South County: Postage paid please. I do remember being a college student one day, and like I don't have a stamp. I pay for everything online. I was running -- dropping it off at the poll; luckily there was one on campus.

JEAN, Seattle #1: It's the idea, it's supposed to be free. It's our right to vote. Why should we pay? It's our right.

Seattle Poll Voters on Vote By Mail

- Participants from the Seattle focus groups reported very positive experiences voting by mail for the first time.

JUSTIN, Seattle #1: It was really easy. I have a lot of things to do because I'm going to high school and college and I have a job too, so I did it when I had the free time and then I went and I mailed it out.

- Election returns in Seattle were higher than traditional spring turnout. The ease of voting by mail meant many voters found it more convenient to vote, but far more were driven to vote by the Viaduct issue.

CHRIS, Seattle #2: I think it's a hot topic right now [the viaduct]. It's definitely in everybody's face. It's in the news, and it's on the news every day...So everybody I think has heard about it in some facet, and when a ballot shows up in your mailbox it's a lot more convenient. I think the ease of it.

- Nobody reported problems filling out their ballot or confusion with directions. Several people expected to vote by mail again and preferred being able to take their time to vote.

GRANT, Seattle #1: And as far as an all-mail election goes, when you vote by mail usually the ballot is much more complex and there are much more things. For me, especially when it comes to electing judges, I'm always at a loss because I don't really know who the judges are, so I really can't place a value on it. But this was a simple thing, so for people who are all of a sudden going all-mail, this was an easy introduction to voting by mail, so it was probably a good thing.

DIANE, Seattle #2: I was really pleased, I was really happy because it took away the pressure for me to hurry up and run over and vote. And so - - and I could read up about it and fill it out ahead of time, so I was really happy.

- Those who were personally sad to see the poll voting replaced by all mail balloting, voiced no strong objections; they acknowledged this was another valuable community experience being lost to an ever-more complicated and less personal society.

SHANNON, Seattle #2: The reason is I used to go to the polls with my grandparents when they would vote in every election, and so I have a really strong nostalgic feeling about going to vote. I do agree the civic duty aspect. And you physically go somewhere and speak your voice, and there's something powerful about that. But I think if more people vote by mail and it gets more voters out there, that's fine with me.

JUDY, Seattle #1: I'm split. I like to go to the poll, you know, but it's nice. But most times I think gee, I wish I'd planned ahead because it always seems to be a bad day. If I could get my act together to get signed up for doing it by mail, that would probably be a good thing.

Ballot Process

- Few people have any idea of the safeguards already in place in the ballot counting process. Indeed, the 16 steps in the process were astonishing to all our focus group participants.

The following conversation immediately followed the ballot process PowerPoint presentation on the Eastside:

PATTY: It looks like an expensive process.

IAN: Lots of steps.

CONNIE: I'm surprised that they verify those signatures. I'm just shocked.

- When we asked people to explain the process, nobody could identify more than half of the steps, with many only listing a handful of steps. When asked to write down the ballot process, many participants included more steps in the post office than at King County Elections. One participant in the North County focus group wrote, "When you place the envelope in the mailbox the mailman picks it up and delivers it to the post office where it gets sorted out by who knows how many people until it makes it to the proper post office to be delivered and counted."
- Almost universally, people felt positively about the ballot process after being shown the actual process during the PowerPoint presentation. The words 'secure', 'guarded', and 'supervision' were mentioned most. Confidence in KING COUNTY ELECTIONS increased after the presentation. "Wow, I had no idea," was the general summation.

CHRISTINA, South County: I didn't know that it's supervision, like hard core, like somebody's there on staff 24 hours. And that's good, that's a good feeling, especially with mailing it in and just knowing that and the trust issue, that's good. After it goes through all that process it's locked up, nobody gets to it, and it's supervision 24/7.

- Numerous people felt that this process should be publicized to all voters: voters' pamphlet, full-scale broadcast and cable TV, newspaper, and internet strategy should be used. Make it a flow chart, put some caricatures in it or make it like the old civics class rendition of how a bill becomes a law.

MICHELLE, North County: I guess what I would tell them is after the last couple elections where there have been problems, the onus is really on them to show us that the process is good...But I guess it would help, maybe something is like this [the ballot process chart] in the voter pamphlet so that people who are reading that would know what steps they are going through. And maybe particularly emphasize security and how your vote is secure.

CONNIE, Eastside: I think I said what they should do is advertise this, that this is the process that we're going through. Because I always thought I could sign Adolph Hitler on the things and nobody would know the difference.

Ballot Tracking

- Overwhelmingly, the stage people were most interested in checking was that their envelope had been received by King County Elections. Many people were happy to put their faith in King County and its process as long as they could verify that their ballot had been received. Faith in King County appears to be much greater than that in the USPS.

SUBHABRATA, Seattle #2: In this election, I actually went to the administration building and turned it in. But if I had just mailed it in, then I would definitely want to know if possible that it was actually received by someone, by the appropriate person.

- Common questions about signature verification included: who checks the signatures; what happens if it doesn't match, and how long does it take to remedy the situation. Explaining that everybody handling ballots or envelopes was a trained and paid King County Elections staff person did assuage many of their concerns.

LEE, South County: One thing that comes to mind is that during the course of having this processed, you can lose the ability to sign your own name, and your -- or when you do sign your own name, it just doesn't look like your past signature. So how long would it take for them to see that, to kick it out, to contact the person if they can?

- Another point of contention was the manual inspection of the ballot. People were not concerned about the human error involved in the check, but rather what happened to the ballots kicked out of the process. The Eastside focus group was particularly interested in and concerned by the idea of a canvassing board deciding voter intent.

DAVID, Eastside: I got to the part where the ballot is set aside, and then subjectively is selected to be counted or not. To me, if a person can't follow the directions unless it's a reason that they fed it through the machine and the machine wouldn't count it for whatever reason -- machines are like that -- and there's nothing wrong with the ballot but the person didn't press hard enough and you can still see the marks. But if they are going to set aside commentary, if you're going to set aside staples, and then they're going to subjectively look at those and say I'm going to count this vote because I think it should be counted, but I'm not going to count this guy's vote because he wrote an editorial on it...There's no standard.

DAVE, Eastside: I'm really uncomfortable about this whole voter intent thing. Having a three-person judge what intentions were of somebody? There's too much potential for fraud. We all heard about all the stories that happened the last gubernatorial election.

- A few isolated concerns were raised about the idea of a vendor sorting, scanning, and batching ballots, rather than King County Elections performing this task.

JENNA, North County: Accountability for the vendor, who the vendor is, the hanging chad garbage that was -- you know what I mean?

- Being able to track the ballot all the way to tabulation was important for many people, but the majority felt confident that if their ballot had been received and signature verified, it would be counted. Tabulation was not as high of a priority as these first two steps. One reason raised for these priorities was that the voter could still take action if a problem was found in earlier steps, but by the time the ballot got (or didn't get) to tabulation, they would have no remedy to the problem.

GORDIE, Seattle #2: Probably the signature part, if five or six percent aren't matching, that would be where I would want to know.

DJOMME, Seattle #1: What is the purpose of the barcode? Is it to make people feel better, make them feel like their vote counted? Or is it actually to make sure the vote gets counted?

- While participants were split on whether they would actually spend the time to check on their ballot if they could, most agreed that just having the option made them more confident. Several people expressed that they might do it once just to see how it works, but wouldn't regularly check.

DOT, South County: I would probably track my ballot. Since we don't really have to vote that often, I would probably track it every time it went through there.

TIMYKA, #2: I wouldn't go through the hassle to track it.

LINDA, Eastside: I just like the fact that if they would be willing to put the barcode there, then I would be willing to trust them more. I may or may not check.

Bar Codes

- On the issue of being able to track ballots through an individual bar coding process, the participants were mixed, with those over the age of 50 strongly insisting that their vote needs to be 100 percent private – no bar codes, please. As

we gauged the opinions of others, however, the younger the age, the less it mattered.

ALBERT, South County: We forget one major thing here -- it's a secret ballot. Once you start putting barcodes on things like that, it's no longer going to be secret...Maybe I'm too much on the conspiracy theories, but I don't trust big government or Big Brother.

- Indeed, young voters, people with greater familiarity with computers and technology, and those in more urban areas tended to think it was more important to be able to track the ballot every step of the way (“much like the Federal Express tracking”), than they were concerned about how the bar code might be misused.

DOT, South County: Sounds like certified mail, I think that would be great.

ASA, Seattle #1: I honestly -- I don't -- I wouldn't have any concerns about, you know, loss of my anonymity. But with the vote, I guess -- and I would probably check to see where my vote was just out of curiosity because it would be a new thing. But I don't have a lot of concern about the security.

- Additionally, women between the ages of 45 and 65 were not as concerned about the privacy of their ballot choices (“I cancel my husband’s vote out routinely and I want everyone to know it”) as they were concerned their names would get to partisan or private interests and place them on more lists for unsolicited mail or phone calls.

DIANE, Seattle #2: I would be more afraid, not so much about what other people would use from that data, but I wouldn't like other people using that to be able to send junk mail and identifying me and sending me things.

- Many people generally felt comfortable having a bar code on their ballot, but they were also not necessarily enthusiastic about adding it. Given that ballot reception and signature verification were the most important tracking points to participants, most focus groups came to a general agreement that a bar code or tracking system on the outer envelope was a much better option than having it on the ballot.

GARY, North County: When you went to the polling place, all you knew is that you put your vote in the machine. And from there you didn't know anything. Now, I think you can go online now after the signature has been verified or something so that actually tells you that your ballot has been received by the organization. It's like walking into the polling place.

Beyond that we haven't had the capability before; I don't see the need to have it now.

Fundamentally, how our constitution was built and our democracy the ability to have an anonymous vote is all of that, it's part of us. And if we start throwing a barcode on here whatever the reason is, to me it's one little more thing that Big Brother is stamping another number on us, and I'm not comfortable with that.

KEN, Seattle #2: It's a trade-off. I'm unsure. I think with mail ballots there's less -- it's more secret anyway, because nobody's going to see you in your house filling out your ballot. So there's not the opportunity for intimidation or any kind of funny things going on at the polls like have been used sometimes.

- A general distrust of government, particularly in the Eastside focus group, seemed to be the driving force behind fears of implementing a bar code system.

DAVID, Eastside: It's a real big concern having the bar code with your information on that ballot. The envelope is one thing -- I'd love to be able to look my ballot up and make sure it was counted, and I'd love to see it when it came down to ten votes and have my name -- my bar code printed in the paper and nobody knows it but me. But, there's just too much room for abuse because there may be somebody else that knows it's me.

SHANNON, Seattle #2: I think the secrecy is important just because I feel that way in light of, like the US attorneys scandal that's going on right now, I just think it's important that you can be confident that your vote was your vote. And if you want people to know about it you can tell them, and it's your choice, not the government's choice.



VBM: Ballot tracking with and without a unique identifier on the ballot

The public and election officials expect accurate, problem-free elections. Ballot tracking technology developed for the elections business over the past three years allows voters to do just that. They will be able to verify their ballot is processed and see improved ballot reconciliation as well. Ballot tracking technology will be a feature of King County's move to all-mail voting in 2008.

To track a voter's unique ballot to the point of tabulation would require a unique identifier, such as a bar code, on each ballot. This unique identifier would allow voters to verify their individual ballot is counted using the Internet. Technology exists to track ballots from receipt to tabulation. King County held a series of focus groups in early April to assess how voters want to track their ballots. Do voters want to know their ballot was counted? Or, do voters just want reassurance their mail ballot was received by King County Elections?

Feedback from Focus Groups Conducted in April

Overwhelmingly, voters were most interested in confirming their envelope had been received by King County. Being able to track the ballot all the way to tabulation was important for some people, but the majority felt confident that if their ballot had been received and their signature verified, their vote would be counted.

While participants were split on whether they would actually spend the time to check on their ballot if they could, most agreed that just having the option made them more confident. Several people said they might do it once just to see how it works, but wouldn't regularly check.

On the issue of being able to track ballots through a unique bar coding process, the participants were mixed. Those voters over the age of 50 felt strongly that their vote needs to be 100 percent private – no bar codes. As we gauged the opinions of others, however, the younger the age, the less it mattered.

Asa, 29, cabinet maker – Seattle: "I honestly -- I don't -- I wouldn't have any concerns about, you know, loss of my anonymity. But with the vote, I guess -- and I would probably check to see where my vote was just out of curiosity because it would be a new thing. But I don't have a lot of concern about the security."

Albert, 63, retired – South County: "We forget one major thing here -- it's a secret ballot. Once you start putting barcodes on things like that, it's no longer going to be secret...Maybe I'm too much on the conspiracy theories, but I don't trust big government or Big Brother."

Additionally, women between the ages of 45 and 65 were not as concerned about the privacy of their ballot choices as they were that their names would be



VBM: Ballot tracking with and without a unique identifier on the ballot

given to or used by political parties or private interests and that they would be “placed on more lists for unsolicited mail or phone calls.”

Many people generally felt comfortable having a barcode on their ballot, but they were also not necessarily enthusiastic about adding it. Given that ballot reception and signature verification were the most important tracking points to participants, most focus groups came to a general agreement that a bar code or tracking system on the outer envelope was a much better option than having it on the ballot.

King County Elections' recommendation

King County Elections recommends King County invest in technology that allows voters to confirm:

- Their ballot packet has been assembled for mailing
- Their voted ballot packet has been received by King County Elections
- Their signature on the outer envelope has been verified; and
- Their ballot envelope has been opened and prepared for tabulation.

The ability to track and account for each ballot is essential to open and transparent elections. However, tying the voter back to his or her ballot may pose legal concerns and has several unknown risks that must be addressed carefully before King County considers ballot tracking through tabulation.

King County Elections is confident that ballot accountability can be maintained with this technology without sacrificing the secrecy of the ballot. Continuing to use the tracking system already in place, a bar code on the **ballot envelope and other data collection tools**, will improve ballot tracking and reconciliation, and give voters ultimately what they want: the ability to verify their ballot was received by King County and their signatures were verified.

The main concerns of placing unique identifiers on the ballot revolve around three aspects: political, legal, and preserving the secrecy of the voter's ballot.

1. Political Concerns

The State of California has prohibited the use of a unique identifier on the ballot and Washington State may not be far behind. While an amendment was introduced but not adopted in the latest Legislative session, this issue is far from resolved and will likely be discussed in the future.

2. Ongoing Legal Issues

Four counties in Washington State offer voters a Web interface to track their ballot through tabulation. San Juan County is one of these counties and has been named in a lawsuit to remove this feature. The outcome of the court case



VBM: Ballot tracking with and without a unique identifier on the ballot

is not yet decided and will likely set precedent regarding voter secrecy and ballot tracking in Washington.

3. Maintaining the secret ballot

The use of a unique identifier on a ballot for the purpose of tracking voted ballots is viewed by some as compromising the voter's right to a secret ballot. While the encryption technology available is compelling, King County Elections does not want to compromise the spirit or legal definition of the secret ballot. Sufficient accountability can be attained with tracking to the signature envelope level, not to the ballot.

Next Steps

As requested by the County Council in their ordinance to move to all-mail voting, King County Elections' ballot tracking and accountability business case lays out a plan that includes the use of a bar code on the ballot envelope to track ballots. This will give voters the ability to verify their mail ballot packet was mailed to them; their voted mail ballot was received by King County; their signature verified and that their ballot packet was opened and sent tabulation. It is our recommendation that a unique bar code on the ballot not be implemented at this time.

King County Elections' recommends further discussion and study of enhanced ballot tracking using a unique identifier on the ballot when and if legal issues in San Juan County are resolved and acceptance of such technology is studied. Until then, we believe the public is best served by tracking ballots by the outer envelope and not using bar codes.

KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON

Business Process Response Ballot Tracking Ballot Accountability

Atten: Bill Huennekens
King County Records, Elections & Licensing Services Division,
King County Administration Building, #553
500 Fourth Ave.
Seattle, WA 98104

Response to Questions, April 18, 2007

DIEBOLD[®]

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Seattle, WA. 98104

Re: Business Process Needs for a Ballot Tracking and Accountability Solution

Dear Mr. Huennekens,

Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI) and VoteHere are responding to the King County Request for Information providing a cooperative vendor relationship. Based on levels of envelope and ballot tracking desired by King County, DESI's VoteRemote™ solution will stand as the foundation for envelope tracking. As the County chooses to implement stages of ballot tracking (bar codes on ballots), VoteHere will provide solutions that integrate with DESI's VoteRemote™ system. In effect, as the County chooses to add ballot tracking versus core envelope tracking capabilities, the VoteHere solution will be enhanced.

We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your questions related to absentee envelope and ballot processing and tracking. Please consider the attached information as a supplement to our meeting on February 15, 2007 with the Transition Leadership Team.

As you know, DESI has been providing ballot printing and absentee processing services to King County for many years. During that time, we have made consistent investments in staff time, ballot printing and envelope processing infrastructure. We have developed many software programs and interfaces to support the King County business process and have provided the voters and staff of King County with an absentee system that works as an "end-to-end" system. We have invested strongly in software, staff, equipment and security. We have a strong track record of success in this area with King County.

VoteHere, founded in 1998, is a division of Bellevue based Dategrity Corp., and is the industry leader in ballot audit and tracking technology. VoteHere's Mail-in Ballot Tracker system (MiBT) has been successfully used in over 70 elections in Washington State since 2005. As a King County based company exclusively dedicated to the issue of mail ballot tracking and accountability, VoteHere is uniquely positioned to serve the staff and voters in our home County.

This proposal provides a foundation for the all-mail transition that is now underway in King County. This response provides information by addressing the specific business need areas described in the County RFI document.

The DESI / VoteHere relationship provides integration of data sharing and offers King County two vendors who intend to fully cooperate to provide the County envelope and ballot accountability needs as required.

DESI and VoteHere cooperated in Marin County, CA for the November '06 General election. The two companies can provide a convenient data exchange between the County's voter registration system and MiBT. As currently architected, DESI would deliver certain voter related data into MiBT. MiBT would aggregate the voter data into MiBT's Envelope Tracking reports and combine with "Ballot" tracking reports for comprehensive end-end envelope and ballot accountability.

DESI long and successful experience managing and tracking King County mail "envelopes" combines with VoteHere's successful and proven history of "ballot" tracking and accountability.

This vendor team is committed to working with King County to provide you the most comprehensive array of ballot tracking and accountability choices. As you deliberate the best methods to successfully transition King County to all-mail elections it will be important to have multiple options and a system that can grow with the dynamic needs of King County.

To avoid any confusion, and notwithstanding various provisions regarding legally binding undertakings, DESI does not intend this proposal to be a contract in itself, and does not intend this proposal to be integrated into a future contract. DESI assumes that the details of the definitive agreement with King County will be negotiated and embodied in a separately signed contract.

DESI thanks you for this opportunity to serve you and looks forward to presenting the details of this proposal during oral presentations. Please call me at 800-433-8683 if you have any questions or require further information.

Sincerely Yours,



Barry Herron
Director of Sales

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INSERTION PROCESS

1. VOTER'S BALLOT PACKET HAS BEEN HANDED OFF TO USPS.

This response section provides information regarding DESI's enhancements to the existing ballot printing and automated insertion process that is now part of the outgoing VoteRemote™ suite of services being provided to King County.

During 2006, DESI has invested in five (5) new digital ballot printing presses to ensure that King County has the ballot printing capacity to move to the all-mail absentee environment. This investment includes peripheral equipment for folding and preparing ballots for mailing.

Additionally, DESI has installed, tested, and implemented new insertion machines to provide King County with a system of ballot / envelope insertion that will ensure that the correct ballot type is being inserted into each voter's envelope. These insertion units have cameras that will check the ballot type against the voter precinct to ensure that correct ballots are inserted.


This process requires interfaces with the DIMS voter registration system that are completed and working with the VoteRemote™ outgoing process today. Taking raw voter extracts from the voter registration system and converting the records into qualified USPS address that have been optimized and grouped for automated insertion can be a difficult task. DESI makes this aspect of the process easy through the use of VoteRemoteSuite.com.

VoteRemoteSuite.com data processing software is designed to work with the DIMS Voter Registration voter file extracts, with special processing rules that were put into place to assist with the unique needs of King County. It is web accessible using secure SSL technology and will analyze precinct/ballot code combinations for election and compare against uploads. King County successfully utilizes this web based capability now to ensure accuracy of the voter files for envelope printing and sorting.

VoteRemote is designed to prepare King County's voter records to take advantage of bulk mail rates. The process includes USPS CASS certification, which is currently being upgraded to handle newly formed USPS requirements such as Four-State barcode creation and Delivery Point Validation.

Relatively new to VoteRemoteSuite.com is the "live" outbound USPS mail tracking, called "Confirm". This allows King County to track mail to the carrier responsible for delivering the mail to the voter. This exciting new tool will enable King County to type a voter by name and check to see if that one particular envelope made it through the USPS system. Although most uses of Confirm cannot differentiate multiple voters that are going to the same address, our system has been specially designed for 'to-the-voter' tracking.

VoteRemoteSuite.com can be securely accessed 24 hours a day 7 days a week, giving King County the flexibility to process voter files at their convenience. Voter files are processed in either a production inkjet format or PDF files to provide easy counter top printing with envelope layout that matches the automated runs for local printing and stuffing of envelopes. However, with the transition to all mail ballots, the requirements for “daily” runs should be greatly reduced.



Uploading data using VoteRemoteSuite.com

VoteRemoteSuite.com Features:


- Secure SSL Technology
- Works with the existing DIMS-Net
- Analyze precinct/ballot-code combinations for election and compare against uploads
- USPS mail address correction including PostNet barcode creation
- Prepares envelopes to take advantage of Postage Savings
- Special King County processing rules already in place
- Generate USPS CASS, roadmaps and auditing reports
- Custom separations by category, language, party and HAVA
- (NEW) USPS Confirm barcode creation, mail tracking and reporting (optional)
- Quick processing and turn-around
- Interactive drag and drop customized envelope layout

1. Insertion – bulk and daily insertion

A. Bulk insertion for all election-qualified voters on file – confirm correct ballot materials assembled.

DESI uses proven technology to automate the processing, printing and mailing aspects of the absentee process. DESI's in-house state of the art machinery inserts ballots at a rate of 4000+ envelopes per hour. Our process eliminates costly hours of manual labor with inline barcode or OCR matching between a barcode on the stub of a ballot and a barcode on the envelope.

We have purchased Phillipsburg Mark II insertion machines with both gold and platinum levels of the Jet-Vision camera systems which provide 4 camera stations per machine. This not only allows for the 1 to 1 inline matching of ballots and envelopes, but also is flexible enough to handle a two ballot to envelope election should that need arise. A final digital inspection of each envelope and the mailing address as the assembled packet leaves the inserter is also done to ensure that addresses, sequences and indicia are also applied.



Features/Benefits of Outgoing Process

- Postal Standards Verification
- Piece and job tracking
- Sequence verification
- Address verification
- Format verification
- Postage verification
- Up to three pieces matched inline


- USPS mail tracking to the individual voter

*B. Daily insertion for new registrants and re-issues – confirm correct ballot materials assembled.
Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion.*

Daily Insertion – Option 1

Option one is a totally in-county solution. The data processing power of VoteRemoteSuite.com provides the county with a scaled down version of the same automated functionality as the bulk run.

With Option 1, King County will process daily voter files through VoteRemoteSuite.com. Envelopes are inkjetted using a Seacap 26K envelope printer. A single Phillipsburg Mark II insertion machine with both the gold and platinum levels of the Jet-Vision camera system would then be able to handle the actual insertion. Our close proximity would allow us to be available to assist with technical difficulties that might occur.



Daily Insertion – Option 2

With Option 2, DESI processes the daily extract each day and creates an add-on ballot print run that matches that day's voter file. Once that day's ballots are printed, cut and folded, ballots are inserted and put into the mail stream. Reports for each day's mailing are available online at VoteremoteSuite.com or emailed to the county.

*C. Over-the-counter insertion and issuance of ballots – confirm correct ballot materials assembled.
Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion.*

The "one at a time" absentee envelope printing and issuance of ballots will be done using the same VoteRemote™ suite software and the existing "ballot-on-

demand" software now used in King County with the DIMS system. Larger runs of "dailies" can be done using Option 1 above. DESI's solution also provides a Bryce envelope printer for the small job runs for envelope printing. Manual insertion can be used for these "one at a time" absentees. These could be combined with verification software from VoteHere to verify that the envelope and ballot type are aligned. However, this will require further discussion with VoteHere.

D. Must have capability for possible future addition of randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub.

DESI is prepared for this capability. The Central Tally Software is being developed and under review at the federal level, will have the capability to scan the ballot and capture the bar code data.

The printing of the bar code in the future is possible on a digital press. King will be required to provide DESI with enough time, from the time King determines this is desirable to implement the bar code system.

Additionally, the function of the bar code must be determined. Does King want to print the bar code to track quantities of ballots after they have been extracted from the absentee envelope (accountability of ballots) or does King want to provide voters with an inquiry capability to determine whether a specific ballot, tied to the voter (with VoteHere encryption methodology for voter privacy), has been tabulated?

In the first case, the bar code can be sprayed on the ballot once it is extracted from the envelope. In the latter case, the ballot must have the bar code linked to the encrypted voter information at the time of ballot printing and insertion.

Both options are doable, but have varying timeframes for implementation and testing. Timeframes are affected by decisions relative to setting up "reserve" areas of the ballot for the bar code, testing of presses for bar coding the ballot, interfaces to VoteHere encryption software should the county wish to tie encrypted data to the ballot, etc.

2. Capture of data from outbound envelope and ballot that confirms correct ballot materials assembled and provide reconciliation report against election qualified voter list.

The DESI solution incorporates, via the insertion unit cameras, verification of the ballot type with the envelope bar code during the assembly process. This ensures that there is a 100% match of intended ballot type with the voter envelope. The insertion process will be stopped automatically if the ballot type does not match the bar code type on the envelope.

3. Ability to upload to and / or provide seamless election data interface to DIMS / voter registration system.

This interface has been developed and is now in use by the County. That is, the County now captures events as they occur to the voter envelope. This information includes that it was requested, mailed, returned, etc.

Future capabilities include the addition of a bar code to the ballot to track quantities or specific ballots tied to encrypted voter information.

4. Ability to provide third party confirmation regarding ballot delivery to voter

DESI's outgoing VoteRemote™ process presently interfaces with the USPS Confirm system allowing specific absentee envelopes to be tracked during the outgoing delivery phase for Quality Assurance purposes.

DESI's program has enhanced the USPS raw "data" program by providing reports for the County as well as capabilities to track multiple voters at a single address.

RETURNED BALLOT PROCESS

2. KING COUNTY CONFIRMS RECEIPT OF BALLOT ENVELOPE.

1. Data capture from inbound envelope to confirm KCE receipt of ballots.

During a major vote by mail election, King County (County) may process 900,000 incoming absentee ballots. The influx of envelopes and paper to the County within a short period of time can be burdensome, overwhelming, and at times, unmanageable.

A typical absentee ballot processing cycle involves

1. off-site automated sorting to Legislative district of the incoming mail
2. capturing voter information via the off-site sort or via using a hand wand device,
3. conducting manual signature verification using the DIMSNet system by verifying the accuracy of the voter's envelope signature to the voter's registration, and
4. tabulating the voted results.

The processing of incoming absentee ballots and envelopes involves the procurement of temporary employees to handle and process the absentee ballots and envelopes, which, depending on the election, could result in a significant cost to the county.

The incoming absentee process is an integral and critical part of the voter tabulation process. Without an effective and efficient incoming absentee process, the absentee ballot verification and processing can become timely, slow and error-prone. Additionally, it could potentially result in delays in the processing of absentee ballots by Election Day. DESI describes two options below. The first option entails use of stand-alone sorting capabilities, along with multiple DESI designed AccuVote-ES scanners, used throughout the U.S. today to capture voter signatures and pre-prepare for the automated comparison of signatures. The second option combines the sorting and scanning of envelopes into a single step, both sorting and capturing signature data for automated signature recognition or manual signature comparison.

Incoming Envelope Processing – Option 1 using AccuVote-ES

To resolve inefficiencies in the incoming absentee ballot processing, DESI has developed the AccuVote Envelope Scanner or AccuVote-ES, giving jurisdictions the ability to process and capture voter signatures on incoming absentee ballot envelopes. The AccuVote-ES is scalable, as well as reliable. For example, Los Angeles County processes and captures all absentee envelopes using four (4) AccuVote-ES units. These units capture the signature and prepare

the electronic signature for the Automatic Signature Recognition software which is used in Los Angeles and proposed here for King County.


With the AccuVote-ES, incoming absentee ballot envelopes are processed by capturing the bar code and the voter's signature and manually conducting a side-by-side signature verification through DIMS, King County's voter registration system. Data is updated the voter's history file in DIMS.

The AccuVote-ES also embosses the absentee ballot envelope with the specific tray number, sequence number of the batch and the voter's bar code number. This allows the county to identify an envelope through the AccuVote-ES system, retrieve the envelope from the specific tray, and verify any discrepancies should the need arise. Reports are generated indicating any duplicate envelopes, quantities of envelopes processed, as well as other administrative reports.

Additionally, the county has the option of using automated signature recognition (ASR) verification process for the AccuVote-ES. This process was initially implemented in Los Angeles County for the November 2005 election. Los Angeles County processed approximately 600,000 absentee ballot envelopes using the ASR verification process. Additionally, in the June 2006 primary election, Butte and El Dorado Counties used the AccuVote-ES with the ASR verification with Butte County processing approximately 50,000 absentee ballots using ASR.


ASR verification allows a county to establish a pre-defined level of acceptance for the voter's signature when compared with the voter's signature on the voter's registration. The ASR pricing is included in the pricing proposal.

King County also has a need to sort returning envelopes to the originating legislative district. We recommend a two stage approach using a stand alone sorter prior to the signature capture/verification process. We have identified a sorter that is a fraction of the cost of other models and is portable so that it can be rolled out of the way when not needed. This sorter from NPI has a smaller footprint and meets the sorting requirements specified by King County.



Incoming Envelope Processing - Option 2

In option two, our preferred approach, we merge both the sorting and the scanning into one continuous flow. This reduces the footprint of the incoming process. Envelopes would still be sorted by legislative districts but during this process each envelope is endorsed by tray number and by sequence number within the tray guaranteeing batch integrity. Batch size is adjustable and controllable by the County, based on envelope thickness and desired tray sizes. As a bin for a district reaches the desired quantity the machine pauses, allowing for the easy placement of that batch into a tray. As each tray completes ASR processing, each batch is available for export using the VoteRemote/DIM-NeT Direct-Connect solution.



2. Ability to upload to and / or provide seamless election data interface with DIMS / voter registration system.

This interface has already been developed and is now in use counties in multiple states. Referred to as the VoteRemote/DIMS-NeT "Direct-Connect" system, it allows for the seamless upload of batch, sequence, date/time and signature verification status directly into Dims from VoteRemote.

As this project moves forward, and as items are identified which need to be tracked, the DIMS-Net system is the logical place to store this information, given that the County would benefit from a single data location for storage and inquiry.

Future capabilities include the possible addition of a bar code to the ballot to track ballot quantities for tabulation or even specific ballots tied to encrypted

voter information, which would be tracked by a 3rd party encrypted voter query system from VoteHere.

As these capabilities are considered, and the County moves forward with specifics of the all-mail transition, it is possible that further DIM-SNet or interface development may be necessary. Therefore, this proposal does not incorporate future DIMS-Net interface development costs. Presently, depending on the data capture points finally decided upon by the County, DIMS-Net may need small modifications to the database to incorporate new quality assurance points that are developed. However, the large majority of such development has already been accomplished, tested, and is in use.

3. BALLOT ENVELOPE HAS BEEN SIGNATURE VERIFIED OR CHALLENGED

1. Automated signature verification that is compatible with DIMS.

A. *Ability to capture image of envelope for automated and manual signature verification and public information request.*

Presently, the AccuVote-ES scanner captures the voter signature area. DESI's option 2, using the NPI sorter/scanner has the ability to capture the entire envelope; however, we are not presently planning on capturing the entire envelope unless requested to do so by the county. DESI's proposal does, however, capture the bar code information and store the signature clip for either manual DIMS-NeT signature comparison and/or the Automatic Signature Recognition system.

B. *Ability to capture data from envelope to confirm voter's signature was verified or challenged.*

DESI's proposal (both Option 1 and Option 2) provide the ability to capture data from the envelope so that the voter's signature can be verified or challenged using either the manual DIMS-NeT side by side comparison or the Automated Signature Recognition (ASR) system. Those envelopes that are challenged will be manually reviewed using on-screen side by side technology currently available now within DIMS-NeT. In fact, any signature can be manually checked, whether it has been verified automatically or not. The ASR system simply ascertains whether a signature has met or exceeded a confidence threshold, but does not take away the ability of the County to manually review the envelope signature.

C. *Automation to maximize efficiency for signature verification process.*

DESI has been providing the Automatic Signature Verification for several years. In 2006, five (5) California counties used this capability in the November 2006 election cycle.

DESI's solution provides automation to several key areas of envelope processing for the County:

1. automation of the incoming sorting of envelopes to the 17 legislative districts
2. automation of the interface of the voter information on the envelope bar code, to the sort by tray, so that manual review of signatures can occur (no ASR) by order of envelopes in the tray
3. endorsing of the envelope so that batch number, sequences within the batch along with date/time stamps of envelopes become part of the quality assurance process
4. uploading of captured envelope signature for automating signature comparison
5. tracking of the envelopes through out the outgoing and incoming process
6. key data points that the County may wish to implement by adding scan points within the envelope processing.

It is important that the County understands that there is still further definition regarding how many envelope capture points will be part of the system. DESI will work with the County to finalize the process and update our cost proposal as this definition is finalized.

D. Automation to maximize efficiency for exceptions handling and data management.

The DIMS-NeT, sorting, scanning, and ASR systems are all designed to maximize efficiency and to handle exceptions as they occur, as well as to track these exceptions. The combination of the VoteHere tracking software, VoteRemote™ suite software, and the Automatic Signature Recognition system, combine to provide the County with a complete tracking system to handle all conditions of the envelope process. The County may wish to add layers of ballot tracking, and these systems are capable of this tracking as well.

E. Ability to upload and / or provide seamless election data information to DIMS / election management and voter registration system.

Again, DESI has 17 computer interfaces presently running, that support the existing ballot printing, envelope tracking, signature capture, and tracking by DIMS-NeT. Among these is the previously mentioned Direct-Connect system which seamlessly feeds envelope and signature data from VoteRemote into DIMS-NeT.

Use of DESI's solution will avoid necessary development of new interfaces, development time, and costs associated with these interfaces.

The following interfaces are in place and being used today for ballot printing and election setup. There are further interfaces in place for envelope sorting and queuing of envelope data for signature comparisons, as well as automated signature recognition interfaces with DIMSNet:

Election Setup:		
1	DIMS to GEMS Election Data Download for Ballot Layout	Ensures data consistency of precinct, districts, voter registration totals, etc. between DIMS Voter Registration and GEMS ballot layout / tabulation system. This creates a consistent data environment for other interfaces required for the automation and synchronization of the election process such as: 1) ballot order automation driving print jobs 2) creation of print job "roadmaps" 3) early voting interfaces for touch screen voting with Voter Registration, and 4) VoteRemote processes for matching envelopes and ballots and updating voter histories.
2	GEMS to DIMS ballot code interface, ensuring consistency of ballot types for ballot order	Once GEMS ballots are laid out, DIMS interface extracts GEMS ballot codes for ballot order, ensuring automated synchronization for ballot order and printing.
3	DIMS to DESI Ballot Printing Interface to automate the print job queue.	Provides data for automated interface for DESI printing, provides quantity and ballot typing by precinct and party to DESI automated print job stream
4	DIMS to GEMS Voter Registration Totals Interface, avoiding data entry of registrations by party	Provides automated interface for GEMS election night reporting of voter totals per precinct / party
5	GEMS to DIMS interface of data for Ballot on Demand capability	Creates Data Stream of Precinct, Party, and ballot style index for postscript files related to voter's ballot style for ballot front and backs
6	Use of DIMS data download for single integrated database for <u>op scan and touch screen ballots</u>	GEMS creates ballot data (postscript and electronic ballots) using a single database, creating not only efficiency, but providing single database synchronization
7	GEMS to DESI print facility automated interface accepts GBF to manage <u>ballot styles</u> , rather than thousands of individual Postscript front and back postscript files, to minimize file sizes for transfer	Increases efficiency for King Co. by decreasing the quantity of data files that need to be managed for postscript print files.
Ballot Order:		
8	DIMS extraction of GEMS ballot information, and combining all key data automatically used for printing roadmap	Increases King efficiency in managing DIMS ballot information with tabulation ballot styles.

9	DESI Everett automates merge of DIMS ballot order with GEMS database for complete automation of printing process	Increases efficiency for King Co. by not having to manage postscript print files with printer or manage the DIMS ballot order with another vendor ballot layout output of ballot print files.
10	Only authorized printer to extract artwork directly from GBF.	DESI is only vendor to manage Voter Registration ballot order data, tabulation printer artwork, and print facility job queues as an integrated system.
11	Print Services automates merging of GEMS database key data with DIMS Ballot orders ensuring 100% correlation between sources.	DESI print facility automation ensures matching of DIMS and tabulation system.

The VoteRemote interfaces to DIMS-NeT that already exist include:

1. VoteRemote™ suite interface for inkjetting
2. USPS Confirm interfaces
3. Envelope sort interfaces to DIMS-NeT for signature comparison
4. ASR interfaces to DIMS-NeT
5. Voter History interfaces for envelope tracking

In essence, the system today is a highly integrated solution already. It is a single integrated system that will need some modifications, but is largely developed and existing. It does not require wholesale re-development or replacement to accomplish the all-mail transition goals of the County.

4. BALLOT ENVELOPE HAS BEEN OPENED.

Please note that the following business process needs in a recommended solution do not have to be accomplished in order specified below:

1. Has scale and dimension differentiation function to pre-qualify ballot packets for opening.

These functions will be used to screen out packets with missing ballot / multiple ballots enclosed.

This functionality is accomplished not by differentiating between envelope thickness or weight, but rather opening the envelopes and scanning them via an “empty” scanning station or a “double ballot” scanning station, based on a drop down menu at the scanning station. Voters can place other paperwork inside their ballot envelopes besides a ballot. What is important is that the quantities of ballots are accurately tracked. This can be accomplished via the VoteHere workstation with a variable menu that allows the person scanning the envelope to specify that the ballot is empty or has a double ballot in the envelope. This is just as fast and less expensive than automating this process with a scale and dimension reader.

We believe that an “empty” envelope or “duplicate ballot” envelope tracking point can be set up at the point of ballot extraction from the envelope using variable coding input. An “empty” envelope can be scanned and the voter can be informed that the envelope contained no ballot, should the county wish to contact the voter. In a case where two ballots, or more, are in an envelope, it is only significant from an accountability standpoint to note that the baseline quantity of ballots has increased from the envelope count. If the county is tracking this, then bar coding of the ballot will be required to track this to and through the point of tabulation anyway, and will be picked up at the extraction point.

2. Sort ballot packets by Legislative District or ballot code

or other criteria as specified for recount purposes.

The ability to sort by legislative district is included in DESI’s sorting unit using the NPI sorting machine. For smaller elections, this same sorting capability can be used for ballot codes to separate out “school districts” or “fire districts”. However, the limited number of bins will not allow full ballot code separation in a single pass of envelopes in a full countywide election such as an election with precinct level ballot codes. The ability to sort by ballot code, given the number of ballot styles in use by King County would require discussion regarding how many passes of envelopes would be required and the number of sort bins to be used. The NPI sorting unit will handle the Legislative District and a small number of ballot codes.

3. Slice / open envelopes.

This item needs to be distinguished from the process of removing the envelope secrecy flap. Any solution for King County will require a flap removal process prior to running envelopes through the scanner/sorting process (DESI Option 2). Presently, DESI is developing a flap removal device. This would occur prior to running the envelope through the sorting / scanning unit.

Only after the envelope has been through the signature scanning/sorting machine would a “slice/open” unit be used. That is due to the fact that the signatures need to be checked, either manually or with Automated signature verification prior to opening the envelopes.

Any slicing/opening unit that the County wishes to utilize is fine and will work with the DESI solution. There are a number of units on the market and DESI has no particular preference. We would recommend that the County acquire the “slicing” unit of their preference. There are no data interfaces required and therefore this item can be handled independently.

4. Batch in 200-400 on tray to prepare for extraction.

- The NPI scanner / sorting unit proposed with Option 2 (see item 1), will batch in the above specified unit quantities. A slitting station will be required as part of the preparation for extraction. See item 3 above.

5. Ability to capture data from envelopes

to confirm voters' envelopes were opened for extraction.

DESI's proposal, both Option 1 with the AccuVote-ES scanner and Option 2 with the NPI scanner will capture bar code information from the envelope and clip the signature from the envelope to prepare for the manual or automated signature verification process.,

Additionally, the VoteHere data capture and reporting solution will provide flexible data gathering points at the desired process station to capture the envelope or ballot data as the item to be tracked moves through the process.

6. Ability to upload envelope data to and/or provide seamless electronic data interface

with DIMS/election management and voter registration system.

As stated above, there are two primary reasons for putting a unique identifier on the ballot itself.

The first is to capture and use strong encryption of voter data and link that data to the envelope at the time of insertion. This will allow a 3rd party, VoteHere in this case, to track the encrypted data so that a voter inquiry can be done on the ballot itself to determine if their ballot was:

- Inserted
- In the USPS System
- Out for delivery
- Received by King County elections
- Scanned and Sorted
- Signature Verified
- Signature Challenged
- Ballot Extracted from envelope
- Ballot prepped for tabulation (optional)
- Ballot tabulated (optional)

7. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier on ballot


for exceptions handling and data information if desired at a later date.

DESI's teaming arrangement with VoteHere offers King County a seamless and proven Ballot Accountability system that captures both envelopes and ballots for a comprehensive, automated end-end accountability solution.

VoteHere's Mail-in Ballot Tracker system (MiBT) has been successfully used in over 70 elections in Washington State since 2005. MiBT has helped keep track of nearly 2 million ballots since the system was first deployed in Washington's September 2005 election.

The DIMS system will feed MiBT envelope data, which is combined with MiBT's ballot tracking data to create comprehensive automated and real-time reports. Much like a FedEx shipment, MiBT uses barcodes to track mail ballot envelopes and/or ballots issued during election. These barcodes are scanned at various "tracking points" at each stage of processing.

Figure 1: MiBT aggregates both envelope and ballot tracking points.




Post-Extraction Barcode Applicator Option (Seamless integration with DIMS, Cowart-Gagnon, or other hardware vendor)

If it is determined that a bar code shall be sprayed on each ballot pre-assembly MiBT is designed to easily capture the bar codes for real-time reporting into MiBT.

In the diagram below, we assume that no barcode is applied to the ballots before mailing, but the County still desires the ability to track each ballot after extraction from the security envelope.

With this approach, election managers have the tools needed to account for every returned ballot envelope, and envelope batch. Additionally, this approach makes it possible to reconcile ballots extracted v. signatures approved, and subsequently account for each ballot, and each ballot batch, all the way through tabulation.

System Diagram



Operational Process Proposed

1. Returned Envelopes are taken from USPS for envelope “flap” removal.
2. Envelopes are run through (Option 2) sorter, scanner, endorser
3. Data is queued for signature verification

4. Envelope tracking data (envelopes returned, envelopes challenged, and envelopes approved) are tracked using the VR System.
5. Data from the VR System is shared with MiBT to provide an opening balance of envelopes received and processed.
6. Envelope batches are received in the MiBT System to ensure that all ballot envelopes can be accounted for before commencing ballot processing.
7. Ballot envelopes are opened by batch with potential for tracking points and ballot bar coding
8. Ballots are processed by batch through the Ballot Barcode Printer / Scanner.
9. MiBT reconciles the number of ballots extracted, versus the number of signatures approved for each batch to ensure that all ballots have been accounted for.
10. MiBT tracks ballots through subsequent operational steps, including duplication, canvassing, other exceptions, and finally tabulation.
11. MiBT reports can be used throughout the process to account for all envelopes and ballots, and identify any issues with reconciliation in real time.

Feature 8. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data

and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.

MiBT Integration with DIMS

VoteHere's MiBT System is designed to work with County operational Processes, and inter-operate with existing Voter Registration and Tabulation Systems.

For King County, the system would be configured to share appropriate data with the DIMS VR system to enable elections staff to monitor their entire envelope and ballot processing using MiBT's reporting and process enforcement features. Modifications to DIMS will be required for additional data capture points. While not significant development, these data points will need to be defined and time allotted for development within DIMS. As these decisions have not been made by the County as yet, this proposal does not address modifications to the DIMS system, although they are available and can be made.

From this integrated approach, MiBT will receive updates from DIMS regarding processing of returned envelopes, by batch, including challenges and signature approvals. After the envelope process is complete, MiBT will be used to manage the ballot process as well.

Figure 3. Envelope/Ballot Report – This report gives you a high level report on the status of envelope and ballot processing during a specified time period.

DEMO ELECTION - JUNE 14, 2006

Summary Report: June 9, 2006 09:31:02-June 9, 2006 15:59:31

(as of Apr 14, 2007 17:07:01 PST)

	ENVELOPES TO OPEN			BALLOTS TO EXTRACT			BALLOTS TO COUNT	
	Received	Approved	Pending	Expected	Extracted	Pending	Expected	Counted
Total	19,283	17,977	1,306	17,977	17,977	0	17,977	19,977

This integrated approach will enable King County election managers and operational personnel ensure that:

1. All returned envelopes can be accounted for, through their complete process, with convenient and comprehensive reports.
2. All Ballots can be accounted for, through their complete process, with convenient and comprehensive reports.
3. The existing Batch Process used by King County will be supported and enforced across Envelope and Ballot processes.
4. The system will enable comprehensive reconciliation, for all batches, and individual envelope and ballot documents, enabling complete accountability, and simplification of the reconciliation process.

Figure 4. Envelope Ballot Status (Scan envelope or ballot bar code to get envelope status)

Scan Item History			
Scan for item history	Scan Time	Station	User Name
0000102474	8/10/2006 10:45:5...	Initial-Ballot	David Doyle
<i>Assembled Ballot ID</i>	8/24/2006 11:13:1...	Rec-Mail	Marilyn Strauss

MIBT Main Console (User: Bryan Finney)

File Administrator Authority Tracking

Election: Demo Election

Scan Item History			
Scan for item history	Scan Time	Station	User Name
276309	6/13/2006 7:08:30 ...	Initial-Ballot	Scott Axworthy
<i>Assembled Ballot ID</i>	3/19/2007 4:15:37 ...	Extracted	Bryan Finney

Get Scans By User/Station/Precinct/Time

Select One

Scan Items Details Scan Count Only

Select Parameters

Users	Stations	Precincts	Ballotstyles
All	All	All	All
Start Date	Start Time	End Date	End Time
4/16/2007	8:00 AM	4/16/2007	8:00 PM

MiBT Features & Benefits:

	Aggregates Envelope and Ballot Data	Works with any sorter/scanner hardware	58 tracking stations and reports	Customizable envelope and ballot tracking reports	Automated ballot and envelope reconciliation	Confirm each ballot was counted
Mail-in Ballot Tracker	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Features available in latest versions of MiBT (1.51 and 2.0):

1. 32 Built-in Ballot and Envelope Tracking Stations
2. 27 Built-in Report Modules
3. Customized Reports
4. Direct access to database
5. Hardware Agnostic
6. Automated Ballot Exception tracking
7. Automated envelope-ballot reconciliation
8. Voter Look-Up, including proof ballot was tabulated
9. Enforces proper processes
10. Guarantees correct ballot goes in correct envelope (Manual dailies)
11. Envelope and Ballot Status (checks the status of random envelopes/ballots)
12. Tabulation confirmation - all ballots were tabulated
13. Supports multiple elections
14. DIMS Integration
15. Post-extraction bar code scan tracking
16. Home County vendor available on-demand, on-site 365 days a year

Note: Some features above require custom consultation w/County.

Benefits:

1. Provides comprehensive reports that enable election managers to measure their operations from insertion to envelope processing, to ballot tabulation.
2. Enforces process to ensure that no voter gets the wrong material, and that every returned envelope and every approved ballot can be accounted for.
3. Reduces time spent reconciling returned envelopes and processed ballots.
4. Enforces Ballot Assembly process to ensure that Voters get the right ballot. (Optional)
5. Enables election managers to share status of documents through a web interface. (Optional)
6. Integrates with existing VR systems and procedures.

7. Integrates with existing ballot handling processes.
8. Tracks exceptions for returned envelopes and ballots to ensure that all documents can be accounted for.
9. Saves time by reducing the number of times that people have to hand count documents.
10. Reduces stress on election workers and managers by catching errors early, and resolving issues.

5. BALLOT HAS BEEN TABULATED.

1. Capability to capture unique identifier

on ballot at time of tabulation for ballot tracking and accountability if desired at a later date.

Voter Look-Up Options (Ballot Status):

The decision on which ballot status tracking points to make public may change depending on external and internal County circumstances. Therefore, MiBT offers King County the most flexible array of voter look-up options for voters to track the status of their ballot. VoteHere has been working with DIMS to offer the following range of options:

1. Envelope Status - Automated uploading of selected VR data points)
2. Envelope and Ballot Status - Tracks Envelopes and Ballots (by batch).
3. Envelope and Ballots Status, including voter's ballot was *tabulated*

Figure 1. Voter Look-Up, with ballot tabulated option. The County in the below figure selected to make available multiple tracking stations to the voters. King County may decide to include more or fewer tracking stations.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a toolbar at the top. The page title is "County Elections Department" and the main heading is "Ballot Status Look-up". On the left is a navigation menu with categories like "County Administration", "Elections & Voter Registration", "Law & Justice", "Permits & Licenses", "Planning & Resource Mgmt", "Public Health", "Recreation & Leisure", "Roads & Infrastructure", "Taxes & Financial Services", and "Maps & Publications". The "Elections & Voter Registration" category is selected. The main content area displays "Your ballot status information" for a "May 16 2006 Special Election" on "5/16/2006". The voter's name is "Marian R Bowman" with registration number "14941". A table lists various stages of the ballot process with their corresponding dates and times.

Your ballot status information	
Election	May 16 2006 Special Election 5/16/2006
Name	Marian R Bowman
Registration No.	14941
Prepared for mailing	Friday, April 21, 2006 3:03:13 PM
Received from voter by mail	Monday, May 08, 2006 9:26:37 AM
Suspended for no signature	Tuesday, May 09, 2006 3:19:57 PM
Rejection resolved	Monday, May 15, 2006 2:20:00 PM
Signature Approved	Tuesday, May 16, 2006 11:48:02 AM
Scanned for Tabulation	Friday, May 19, 2006 12:15:11 PM

Ballot Status Lookup – Option 1) Proof Ballot was tabulated

VoteHere Mail-in Ballot Tracker™ (MiBT) is the first ballot tracking system that tracks each ballot through the entire Mail-in process, including proof that all were counted. MiBT does this while maintaining voter privacy throughout the process. MiBT solves the voter privacy requirement with VoteHere's groundbreaking, patented Intermix technology (US Patent # 6,950,948).

MiBT utilizes barcodes to track mailing envelopes and ballots so they can be effectively audited. The following list describes the MiBT functions:

1. Before mailing, barcodes are added to ballots and scanned as part of the insertion and mailing process. MiBT can use existing ballot barcodes, if available.
2. Election Administrator and Election Authorities perform election set-up functions.
3. Ballots are mailed to voters.
4. Voters return voted ballots.
5. At any inbound processing station, envelope barcodes and ballot barcodes are scanned. Only the ballot is tracked, not how a ballot is voted.
6. Periodically during ballot processing, and for any processing station, the Intermix Authorities (typically the county Canvassing Board) act in concert to generate lists of voters from batches of ballot barcodes.
7. Voter lists whose ballots have completed processing are published, and can be made available by web or by phone.

It is important to note that voter privacy is maintained because ballot barcodes are mixed (i.e., randomized) and separated from voter identification information.

Privacy Model

As is typical with mail ballot processing, ballots are processed in batches for accuracy and voter privacy protection. MiBT verifies that a voter's ballot is in a particular batch and that the batch was processed and counted. It's like tracking an express package as it makes its way step-by-step to its final destination.

There are three levels of privacy protection:

1. Current ballot handling process stays the same, with multiple envelopes and steps to ensure no one can see the voter's name and ballot at the same time.
2. MiBT only tracks ballots (the piece of paper), not how voters vote. Votes are never recorded in MiBT, which is completely separate from the vote tabulation system.
3. Voter identification information and ballot barcodes are permanently separated. An audit trail is produced to independently verify that every voter's privacy was protected throughout and that all ballots were processed properly and counted.

In typical mail ballot process, ballots are stored in two envelopes: (1) a blank inner envelope that stores the voted ballot and (2) a voter identifying outer envelope that stores the inner envelope. To summarize typical ballot processing:

1. Voter identity information on the outer envelope is used to determine voter election eligibility;
2. Once eligibility is established, inner envelopes are extracted;
3. Ballots are extracted from inner envelopes; and
4. Ballots are tabulated.

Steps 2 and 3 effectively mix the ballots so that outer envelopes cannot be matched to ballots.

MiBT mirrors this processing but delays the mixing until later in ballot processing so that ballots can be effectively audited. To accomplish this audit, MiBT adds a barcode to the ballot, which can be used to generate voter lists only after the ballot barcodes are mixed by a group of Election Authorities.

These authorities, designated *Intermix Authorities* by MiBT, are typically public officials, such as members of the county Canvassing Board and defined before the election. As is common, election integrity and voter privacy is vested in such boards when acting as a whole. MiBT leverages this separation of powers.

Specific to MiBT, each Intermix Authority holds a piece of key, which is useless on its own. However, when used in concert with the other Intermix Authorities, these keys are used to mix batches of ballot barcodes to generate voter lists. These voter lists provide proof that a voter's ballot was counted.

Ballot Status Look-up – Option 2) Tracking Ballots in Batch – No Intermix required: This option goes further than simply stating a voter's envelope was received and approved. Additionally, this option does not require MiBT's encrypted Intermix protocol.

This version of ballot tracking associates a batch of ballots with their corresponding batch of envelopes.

1. Envelopes are tracked in batches.
2. The list of voters whose envelopes are the batch is maintained.
3. When the ballots are extracted from the envelopes, the ballots are put in the same batches.
4. When a batch of ballots is counted, the list of voters associated with that batch is credited with having their ballot counted.

The drawback of this solution is the County will have to say that a voter's ballot has been tabulated, *within +/- 5%*. (Due to exceptions within a batch where a ballot is rejected.)

2. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data

and /or provide seamless election data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.

MiBT reports are designed to provide real time data on the status of your envelope and ballot processing. MiBT reports provide both a macro and micro-level of envelope and ballot accountability. Figures 6 shows a sample of the type of reports available through MiBT.

Importantly, the raw data can also be directly accessed to allow for customized reporting. The reports themselves are highly configurable by terminology and data analyzed.

- Ballot Activity by Batch
- Ballot Activity by Ballot Style
- Ballot Activity by Date
- Ballot Activity by User
- Ballot Summary by Batch
- Ballot Summary by Date
- Ballot Summary by Ballot Style
- Ballot Summary by User
- Ballot Summary
- Ballot Tracks
- Custom Database Query
- Envelope Activity by Batch
- Envelope Activity by Date
- Envelope Activity by Precinct
- Envelope Activity by User
- Envelope Summary by Batch
- Envelope Summary by Date
- Envelope Summary by Precinct
- Envelope Summary by User
- Envelope Summary
- Envelope Tracks
- Exceptions
- History Log
- Summary
- Unassembled Voters
- Voter Website

PRICING

Insertion

Election Setup	
Platinum Service Setup	\$700.00
In-County Service Setup	\$700.00
Both Platinum and In-County	\$1200.00

USPS Outgoing Mail Tracking	
Per Election Setup	\$250.00
Data Processing Software (per envelope)	\$0.02

Bulk

Platinum Service (Bulk Insertion)	
Data Processing Software (per envelope)	\$0.30
Inkjetting on Envelopes	Incl.
Address Standardization, CASS Report	Incl.
Automated Inserting	Incl.
Project Management	Incl.
Mail Preparation	Incl.
Additional Inserting beyond 3 items (optional)	\$0.01

Daily Option 1 – In county

In-County Service (online processing only)	
Data Processing Software (per envelope)	\$0.15
Envelope PDF Creation	Incl.
Address Standardization, CASS Report	Incl.

In County Hardware	
Bryce 26K	\$13,999.00
Enhanced Phillipsburg Mark II with Jet Vision	\$148,500.00

Daily Option 2 – DESI

Ballot Printing	
Setup	\$250.00
Per ballot	\$0.37
Platinum Service (Daily Insertion)	
Data Processing Software (per envelope)	\$0.35
Inkjetting on Envelopes	Incl.
Address Standardization, CASS Report	Incl.
Automated Inserting	Incl.
Project Management	Incl.

Mail Preparation	Incl.
Additional Inserting beyond 3 items (optional)	\$0.01

Incoming Process Option 1

Incoming Option 1 – Envelope Scanner

Hardware (one time purchase)	
AccuScan ES version 2.0 (6@\$11,999.00)	\$71,994.00
AccuScan Server with monitor	\$2,600.00
AccuScan Setup and training	waived
ASR Onetime Setup (per CPU)	\$6,000.00
NPI 20 bin sorting machine	\$135,000.00
Incoming Processing	
Signature Capture Setup (per election)	\$250.00
ASR Setup (per election)	\$250.00
Signature Capture (per envelope)**	\$0.20
ASR Verification (per envelope)	\$0.10

**Includes all data storage and use of Direct-Connect

Incoming Option 2 – Combined System

Hardware (one time purchase)	
VoteRemote Sorter/Scanner	\$222,900.00
AccuScan Server with monitor	\$2,600.00
AccuScan Setup and training	\$2,600.00
ASR Onetime Setup (per CPU)	\$6,000.00
Incoming Processing	
Signature Capture Setup (per election)	\$250.00
ASR Setup (per election)	\$250.00
Signature Capture (per envelope)**	\$0.05
ASR Verification (per envelope)	\$0.10

**Includes all data storage and use of Direct-Connect

VoteHere Integration

One time	
MiBT One time voter setup	\$0.75 per voter
VoteHere Server + Scanners	\$10,500
Envelope-Only Tracking (no bar codes on ballots)	.30 per voter
Recommended	
MiBT 2.0 – Latest version release	\$0.25

From: Wagoner, Jerald [mailto:JWagoner@dieboldes.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 22, 2007 2:40 PM
To: Kwan, Colleen; Fell, Garth; Huennekens, Bill; Hunt, James
Cc: Knecht, Steve; Lindroos, Michael; Rockenstein, Michael; Page, Sue
Subject: RE: proposed solution's capacity minimums

Hello Colleen,

Here are my responses to the questions that I have immediate answers to. Ballot tracking and opening is something I'll need to defer to others on. Also can you provide me some clarification on the last item?

Bulk Insertion - 1 million insertions within 7 days

We believe that with the speed of the new insertion machines and the possible use of a second shift that we should be able to exceed 200,000 packets per day. Both ballot printing as well as envelope inkjetting will need to begin several days prior to the beginning of insertion.

Daily Insertion - 11,000 over a 16 hour period

Both options one and two would far exceed this expectation.

Over the Counter Insertion - 700 / day

The data processing and in-county envelope printing should take less than an hour to accommodate this number. I assume though that this number would be spread out over the entire business day which still would not be an issue.

Outbound Data Capture - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion

Our goal would be 200,000 packets per day which would equate to 1.4 million over a seven day period.

Outbound Sort - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion

We want to be doing this concurrently with the insertion process.

Inbound Data Capture - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Immediate release of some of the batches would not be an issue as this is a single pass batching and sorting solution.

We may want to consider work days longer than 8 hours if daily volumes exceed 150,000.

Inbound Sort - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Same as above

Automated Signature Verification - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Same as above. This piece also has the ability to run unattended should there be any reason to let it process through the night.

Opening Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Tabulation Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

System Integration / Process Management Tool - 1 million ballot packets tracked at any given time with a discrepancy of no-more than 3.4

Thanks,
Jerry Wagoner

Diebold Election Systems
425-249-0434 (direct)
425-231-1802 (cell)

From: Kwan, Colleen [mailto:Colleen.Kwan@METROKC.GOV]
Sent: Friday, April 20, 2007 11:27 AM
To: Page, Sue; Knecht, Steve
Cc: Hunt, James; Huennekens, Bill; Fell, Garth
Subject: Re: proposed solution's capacity minimums

Dear Sue / Steve:

The Leadership Team has developed the following capacity minimum for each of the functions listed:

Bulk Insertion - 1 million insertions within 7 days
Daily Insertion - 11,000 over a 16 hour period
Over the Counter Insertion - 700 / day
Outbound Data Capture - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion
Outbound Sort - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion
Inbound Data Capture - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)
Inbound Sort - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)
Automated Signature Verification - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)
Opening Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)
Tabulation Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)
System Integration / Process Management Tool - 1 million ballot packets tracked at any given time with a discrepancy of no-more than 3.4

Please let us know if your solution meet these function capacity minimums. If your solution has the capacity that exceeds those minimums, please specify.

If the information submitted does not offer solution for those functions, please state so with "Not applicable".

Your prompt response is most appreciated. If you have questions or need clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you for your attention.

colleen


Colleen Kwan
Ballot Accountability Analyst
Vote by Mail Transition Team
King County Elections
Tel: 206-296-1565
Tel: 206-296-1544 (Chinese)
Fax: 206-296-0108
Email: colleen.kwan@metrokc.gov

KING COUNTY ELECTIONS

Ballot Tracking and Accountability Solution

April 18, 2007

Submitted by:
PAUL HARRINGTON
Account Manager, Relia-Vote™ Solutions
Pitney Bowes Document Messaging Technologies



April 18, 2007

King County Elections
500 Fourth Ave, Room 553
Seattle, WA 98104-2337

Ballot Tracking and Accountability Solution

Pitney Bowes is pleased to present the Relia-Vote™ Mail Balloting solution in response to King County Elections' request for information pertaining to The Business Process Needs for a Ballot Tracking and Accountability Solution.

Pitney Bowes' 85 years of mailing experience positions us in the forefront of the mailing industry. In applying this vast knowledge to elections mailings, Pitney Bowes has established itself as the innovation and technology leader in mail balloting. This comes at a time when many Counties are transitioning to No Fault Absentee and all Vote by Mail elections. During the 2006 election, nine Counties in Florida, Arizona and California used the Pitney Bowes Relia-Vote™ Solution to process millions of ballots resulting in significant savings with an increase in audit ability.

Through the development of the Relia-Vote™ solution, we have determined that there are certain key components that are critical in providing a successful application to our election customers. Our experience has shown that as Counties move from a manual process to automation, there has been a greater than expected need for professional services, training and on-site coverage. Additionally, we have implemented enhanced mission critical servers to further minimize risk, ensuring production, data integrity and availability. This additional support and data protection will help to ensure a more seamless transition for King County as you incorporate the Relia-Vote™ solution.


After reviewing your request, we feel that the majority of your requirements would be handled by our technology as described in the responses to each line item. As an overview, the Relia-Vote™ Solution starts with a file preparation module, outgoing Auto Ballot Mailer for assembly of the ballot packages, OnRoute for ballot envelope tracking, and an outgoing and incoming Image Link system for completing the loop. Optional components include Final Scan station, integrated postage meter, additional feeder scanners for job to enclosure match and in-line precinct printers. The items that are not part of the quote at this point are scanning the unique piece identifier on the ballot page and partnering with any other vendor for that functionality. The process for confirming correct ballot materials are assembled remains a manual process and therefore not part of our solution. This would require a work station with hand scanners, as well as the printing of unique barcodes on each enclosed piece for package assembly.

Pitney Bowes looks forward to meeting at a requirements session to discuss the final configuration, the phased implementation plan and future product features available later this year. Upon finalization of the configuration, final pricing will be determined.

We have included a write up on the Print on Demand technology that generates additional efficiencies and level of integrity in the outbound process for your review.

Thank you for allowing Pitney Bowes this opportunity to share our knowledge, technology and vision with King County Elections. As always, if you have any questions, please contact me at 520-744-4156. I look forward to our next conversation.

Sincerely,



Paul S. Harrington
(520) 744-4156
paul.harrington@pb.com

NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY

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ATTACHMENT A – SAMPLE STATEMENT OF WORK

ATTACHMENT B – SAMPLE FILE PREP STATEMENT OF WORK

1.0 – REQUIREMENTS

Business Process Needs for a Ballot Tracking and Accountability Solution

King County Elections is seeking a ballot tracking and accountability solution to provide voters the ability to track their ballot as it moves through various points in the business process as it is prepared for tabulation. In adopting the policy to transition to vote by mail, the council directed the Elections Office to establish an electronic tracking system for tracking ballots so that voters can, through use of the Internet, follow the movement of their ballots as they move from King County to the voter and back to King County for counting and crediting the voter for voting. (Section 3, King County Ordinance 2006-15523)

Further, King County Elections is seeking automation and efficiency to manage the higher volume of ballots anticipated in a vote by mail environment in a secure, transparent and accountable manner.

Vendors are requested to present solutions and price quotes for all or portions of the business process needs outlined below. These business process needs will support the ability of King County to allow the public to track their ballot at the following points:

1. Mail ballot packet has been assembled and is ready to be delivered to the USPS
2. The mail ballot packet has been received by King County Elections
3. The voter's signature on the return envelope has been verified
4. The voter's return envelope has been opened
(King County would like a system with the potential to track the ballot to the point of tabulation)
5. The ballot has been tabulated

The best solutions will enhance the security of elections in King County and not have a single point of failure. Security of elections in King County is protected by multiple layers including: an open and transparent environment, physical and personnel security, legal and procedural security, and technical and systems security.

Solutions will need to have the capacity to manage what is expected to be over 900,000 mail in ballots for the 2008 presidential election and what could be over a million ballot for the 2012 presidential election.

Finally, it is critical that any solution provide for the ability to efficiently and accurately account for all ballots as they move from one business process to another. For example we must be able to balance the number of ballot envelope packets that had a verified signature with the number of ballots opened and prepared for tabulation.

Insertion Process

BALLOT TRACKING POINTS FOR INDIVIDUAL VOTERS	BUSINESS PROCESS NEEDS
<p>Voter's ballot packet has been handed off to USPS.</p>	<p>1. Insertion – bulk and daily insertion</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Relia-Vote™ Auto Ballot Mailer Overview</u></p> <div style="text-align: center;"> </div> <div style="margin-top: 10px;"> <p>EX Machine Power Requirements: NEMA 15-50P Plug 208/220V, 50Hz, 50 Amp, 250V 2-pole, 4-wire delta Three Phase (Dedicated line) Heat Dissipation: Approx 25,000 BTUs Compressed Air: ■ scfm @ 70 psi</p> <p>Inkjet Printer Power Requirements: 120VAC, 50/60HZ, 20AMPS, Duplex Receptacle</p> </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For each election, ballots are picked by batches and brought to the Mailer. • The corresponding mode (job) and processing file (MRDF) is selected at the machine console. The ballots are loaded into the feeder station(s) equipped with a scanner. • The signature envelope and inserts are loaded into the downstream feeder stations. (a third scanner is included to allow verification of the signature envelope) • The system feeds each ballot sheet, scans the barcode for ballot type, and accesses the MRDF to locate the next record (voter) that requires that ballot type. • The system then pulls the signature envelope and inserts as required for that voter. • After the Ballot pack is inserted, the Mailer verifies the pack by weight, and prints the voter address on the outside envelope and the Voter ID through a window on the signature envelope. The printed barcode is verified by a camera at the output of the printer. • The output of the Mailer includes Divert Bins for outsourcing suspected errors, quality diverts, etc. • Each Ballot pack processed by the Mailer is identified, verified, and reported with correct contents utilizing Direct Connect File-based Software.

Voter's ballot packet has been handed off to USPS.
(cont)

A. Bulk insertion for all election-qualified voters on file – confirm correct ballot materials assembled.

- Bulk mailings would be processed as described in the Auto Ballot Mailer overview.
- Comprehensive capacity modeling will be accomplished during the requirements session to determine the quantity of Mailers needed to process actual volumes within available time frames. (e.g. Using an estimated bulk mailing of 900,000 ballots within an available 7-9 days, 6 hours per shift, and a performance of 3,500 ballots per hour, 3 shifts and 2 ballot Mailers would be required) Batch sizes, operating flow, and system efficiency are examples of other factors.

B. Daily insertion for new registrants and re-issues – confirm correct ballot materials assembled. Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion.

- Daily batches would be processed as described in the Auto Ballot Mailer overview. Capacity of the Mailer will be verified for Daily volumes along with the Bulk volumes.

C. Over-the-counter insertion and issuance of ballots – confirm correct ballot materials assembled. Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion.

- Over-the-counter ballot assembly would remain a manual process based on preset assembly criteria. The Relia-Vote™ solution enhances the OTC process;
- A label would be printed to place on the signature envelope. This label includes the Voter ID and voter information.
- Completed over-the-counter envelopes are then processed through the same Inbound process as bulk inserted mailings.

D. Must have capability for possible future addition of randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub.

- The system is capable of handling a randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub. We will define the requirements and 3rd party interfaces as the additional functionality develops.

2. Capture of data from outbound envelope and ballot that confirms correct ballot materials assembled.

- Data is tracked for each Ballot pack and scanned by the exit camera verifying the Voter ID and attached to the record of each outbound mail piece being processed on the Auto Ballot Mailer.

3. Ability to upload to and / or provide seamless election data information to DIMS / voter registration system.

- All mail ballot data in the Relia-Vote™ database will be made available to the DIMS database through an Electronic Data Interchange process.
- This data interchange will allow the DIMS system initiate requests to get/put any required data to/from the database. This style of interface will ensure that the DIMS system controls the integrity of the voter registration database. The database will not directly modify data within the DIMS database.

4. Third party confirmation program for in-house Quality Assurance management.

- The file prep module creates a planet code and POSTNET barcode for each piece in the mailing. The Auto Ballot Mailer applies both codes as part of the address with the data being sent to the USPS as part of the ASN. OnRoute provides ballot status from the USPS for Piece Level Postal Tracking.

Returned Ballot Process

<p>2. King County confirms receipt of ballot envelope.</p>	<p>1. Data capture from inbound envelope to confirm KCE receipt of ballots.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Incoming Pass on Image Link provides the receipt and image data to the VR system as well as records and prints the Date and Time the mailpiece was scanned. <p>2. Ability to upload to and / or provide seamless election data information to DIMS / voter registration system.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Inbound data will be processed in the same manner as described in the Outbound Section Item 3.
<p>3. Ballot envelope has been signature verified or challenged</p>	<p>1. Automated signature verification that is compatible with DIMS.</p> <p>A. Ability to capture image of envelope for automated and manual signature verification and public information request.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Images of all envelopes that can be read with a valid Voter ID are captured during the Incoming Pass on the Image Link system. All envelopes that have unreadable barcodes are repaired and processed normally. <p>B. Ability to capture data from envelope to confirm voter's signature was verified or challenged.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refer to 'Incoming Mail Ballot Sortation Process Flow' document <p>C. Automation to maximize efficiency for signature verification process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pitney Bowes automated signature verification is currently in development and will be deployed once Secretary of State Certification has been achieved. The Relia-Vote™ normal process of using electronic signature verification of images captured on the Image Link with those in the VR system reduces the processing time by up to 75%. If King County wishes to implement this technology prior to the 2008 election cycle our recommendation would be to use the Diebold Automatic Signature Verification Solution as it is compatible with the Pitney Bowes interface. <p>D. Automation to maximize efficiency for exceptions handling and data management.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Relia-Vote™ process is the only complete solution to automate all steps including exceptions handling and data management. Refer to Inbound and Outbound Flow Diagrams. <p>E. Ability to upload and / or provide seamless election data information to DIMS / election management and voter registration system.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Inbound data will be processed in the same manner as described in the Outbound Section Item 3.

4. Ballot envelope has been opened.

Please note that the following business process needs in a recommended solution do not have to be accomplished in order specified below:

1. Has scale and dimension differentiation function to pre-qualify ballot packets for opening. These functions will be used to screen out packets with missing ballot / multiple ballots enclosed.
 - The Image Link system incorporates a Mail Piece Size Verification & Thickness-based Double Document Detection System which will out sort those envelopes that are deemed to be too thin and place in a pocket identified as such and will out sort those envelopes that are deemed too thick and place in a pocket identified as such
2. Sort ballot packets by Legislative District or ballot code or other criteria as specified for recount purposes.
 - The Image Link System will consist of 32 pockets which will allow the sorting of all exceptions and 17 legislative districts on scan pass. (See attached diagram for example of recommended pocket assignments) This system can be upgraded after installation at King County with up to 160 total pockets to sort out further if necessary.
3. Slice / open envelopes.
 - This system will include a selective opener to open envelopes on sort/audit pass to expedite the processing of ballots
4. Batch in 200-400 on tray to prepare for extraction.
 - The system has the ability (operator or application specified) to sort into batches of any size. This can be adjusted per election as the size of the ballot page increases the thickness of the envelope increases resulting in mail trays not being able to handle 400 per tray but 250 as an example.
5. Ability to capture data from envelopes to confirm voters' envelopes were opened for extraction.
 - During the sort/audit pass all data is captured and a manifest of the voter AV/ID's can be created per tray. This occurs during the slice / open pass.
6. Ability to capture unique identifier on ballot for exceptions handling and data management if desired at a later date.
 - The system is capable of handling a randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub. We will define the requirements and 3rd party interfaces as the additional functionality develops.
7. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data and/or provide seamless election data information to DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.
 - The system is capable of handling a randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub. We will define the requirements and 3rd party interfaces (such as Vote Here) as the additional functionality develops.

<p>5. Ballot has been tabulated.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Capability to capture unique identifier on ballot at time of tabulation for ballot tracking and accountability if desired at a later date.<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A stand alone scan station was provided in the proposal that would scan the envelope in the opening area prior to extraction. This would provide you with tracking and audit capability up to the point of extraction. Actual ballot scanning and tracking would be supplied by a 3rd party vendor such as Vote Here. 2. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data and /or provide seamless election data information to DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The system is capable of handling a randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub. We will define the requirements and 3rd party interfaces as the additional functionality develops.
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
2.0 – PRICING OVERVIEW

King County Vote by Mail Pricing				
		Qty	Government Price	Ext Price
Relia-Vote Processing Hardware - Outbound and Inbound				
Sortation	Olympus II Relia-Vote 32 Bin System Selective Opener Option Double Detection Option Image Date/Time Stamp Printer Precinct Sort, Relia-Vote Mail Piece Size Verification & Thickness-based Double Document Detection Ballot Data Capture and Image Archiving Relia-Vote Reporting Package	2	\$ 435,781 inc inc inc inc inc	\$ 871,562
Mailing Inserter	FPS Relia-Vote 9 Station Inserter 2 Station ballot scanners 1 Station signature envelope scanner MCS In-Line Inkjet printer with camera verification Weigh-on-the-Fly output scale 5 Output Divert Bins Direct Connect and File Audit Control	1	\$ 527,195 inc inc inc inc inc	\$ 527,195
Relia-Vote Processing Hardware - Accessory Items				
		Qty	Government Price	Ext Price
Final Scan Station	Envelope Scanning Station for tabulation room (pre-extraction)	1	\$ 56,147	\$ 56,147
Sortation Options	Pitney Bowes Auto-Signature Verification Hidden Signature Solution	1	TBD \$ 65,263	\$ 65,263
Inserter Options	Four (4) additional station scanners for insert verification DM Infinity Metering Machine with stand In-line Precinct Ballot Printers (2) Print on Demand	0 0 0 0	\$ 17,200 \$ 16,360 \$ 98,236 \$ 175,000	\$ - \$ - \$ - \$ -
Relia-Vote Software Processing Modules				
		Qty	Government Price	Ext Price
Network & Servers	Mission Critical Site Server - Sorter DC Network Server and Cold Spare Backup Server - Inserter DC Workstation File Based Processing Software	1	\$ 159,258 inc inc inc	\$ 159,258
File Preparation Module	CASS Certification, Move update Planet Code generation, Mail Run Data File Creation	1	\$ 50,000	\$ 50,000
OnRoute	OnRoute Setup (Track and Trace using USPS Planet Codes)	1	\$ 10,000	\$ 10,000
Relia-Vote Implementation Services				
		Qty	Government Price	Ext Price
Implementation	Room Layout and Workflow Diagrams On-Site Project Management Professional Services (system integration) DIMS EDInterface Phased in Implementation, Installation, and First Election Set-up	1 1 1	\$ 25,000 \$ 75,000 \$ 75,000 inc inc	\$ 25,000 \$ 75,000 \$ 75,000
Training	Operator Training and Certification	1	\$ 40,000	\$ 40,000
Equipment Subtotal				\$ 1,954,425


Annual License Fees		Qty	Government Price	Ext Price
	Annual License Fee, Relia-Vote with Outgoing WABCR	2	\$ 24,000	\$ 48,000
	OnRoute Subscription (includes 1,000,000 pieces) * OnRoute click charges @ \$10 per 1,000 mailpieces	1	\$ 10,000	\$ 10,000
Annual Service Fees		Qty	Unit Price	Ext Price
On-Site	On-Site Election Readiness Coverage	1	\$ 204,000	\$ 204,000
Labor	Relia-Vote Elections coverage (50 hours of on-call service) after hours (2 day min notice)	1	\$ 10,000	\$ 10,000
Total Order Value (Does not include applicable taxes)				\$ 2,226,425

3.0 – RELIA-VOTE™ SOLUTION FLOW CHARTS

Relia-Vote™
Outbound Ballot Processing
Context Diagram - Overview




Revision 4.0
11/15/2006




Revision 4.0
 11/15/2006

Relia-Vote™ File Preparation Process Context Diagram




Relia-Vote™ OnRoute Process Context Diagram




Pitney Bowes - Confidential

Revision 4.0
09/07/2006

Relia-Vote™ Solution Components




FPS Inserter



File Prep Module



Workstation (Optional)



Relia-Vote™ Server Rack



Network Printer




Sorter

4.0 – PIECE LEVEL TRACKING

Individual Piece Level Tracking

- Provides tracking on all movements through the USPS distribution process
- Tracks movement of both outbound and inbound mail



The screenshot shows a USPS tracking interface. At the top, there are buttons for "View Letters" and "Tracking Details". Below this, a message states: "Tracking events logged against your piece of mail are shown below". A red oval highlights the "Tracking Details" section, which contains the following events:

- Mail was scanned and metered at the USPS post office in Blaine, WA on November 2, 2004 at 2:15PM
- Mail was rough sorted at the USPS sort center in Blaine, WA on November 2, 2004 at 5:33PM
- Mail was transported from Blaine, WA to Seattle, WA arriving on November 3, 2004
- Mail shall be sorted in a USPS plant in Seattle, WA on November 3, 2004
- USPS shall process mail for delivery on November 4, 2004

Below the tracking events is a detailed view of the ballot envelope. It includes the King County Elections logo and address: "King County Elections, King County Administration Building, 500 Fourth Avenue, Room 553, Seattle, Washington 98104-3280, Address Service Requested". It also features a "USPS Permit Seattle, WA" logo. The ballot is labeled "REGISTERED VOTER'S OFFICIAL BALLOT". A barcode and the name "Grace A Bladies" are visible, along with the address "PO Box 621, Blaine, WA 98231-0621".

Piece Level Tracking


The Track and Trace server polls the USPS' confirm system every 2 hours, collecting and aggregating data for pertinent pieces on a near, real time basis. The uniqueness of OnRoute is its user-friendly event display, similar to what many overnight carriers now provide. This event logging displays all occasions when a mailpiece has been scanned by a USPS device. Moreover, it also displays predictive events; therefore, you are not only able to see what has occurred, but what is predicted to occur for estimated delivery times. This information is displayed on a browser based user interface.


This data can be made accessible to county employees, through a secure user and password authorization process. This allows call center personnel and customer facing employees quick and easy access to mail piece status. This can significantly reduce call time when handling inquiries regarding the status of a ballot.

Job Level Tracking

Another key value to Relia-Vote™'s Track and Trace capability is its ability to provide job level reporting and statistics. This enables election officials to monitor the delivery status of mailpieces, and compare delivery standards against the postal services service level agreements. The system provides three reporting metrics:

- Service Level Standard
- Destination Tracking
- Proof of Processing





5.0 – INCOMING MAIL BALLOT SORTATION PROCESS FLOW

Incoming Mail Ballot Sortation Process Flow

This “Incoming Mail Ballot Sortation Process” will create tray level batches of mail ballot envelopes that are ready for extraction and tabulation. This process uses two passes for each mail ballot envelope. Refer to figure 1 for an overview of this process




Figure 1


Preprocessing events

- The Relia-Vote™ database is populated with mailed ballot data from either the Relia-Vote™ outbound process, or the DIMS database.
- Mail Ballot Envelopes received at the elections mail ballot processing center.

Pass one: Incoming Scan Pass

- The sorter will read the application ID barcode on the mail ballot envelope
- An image of the envelope's face is captured. This image, containing the voter's signature (or a cropped region of the signature image), is made available to the signature verification system.
- Envelopes not meeting specific requirements for first pass such as: too thick, too thin, doubles and challenged are out sorted into separate pockets (see figure 2: Sample Incoming Scan Pass Configuration). The mail ballot's challenge status is provided to Relia-Vote™ through the interface to DIMS.


Figure 2
Sample Incoming Scan Pass Configuration



Pass two: Incoming Audit/Batch Pass

- All mail ballot envelopes are brought to the sorter grouped by Legislative District.
- The sorter will read the application ID barcode on the mail ballot envelope
- Challenged envelopes from the signature verification process are out sorted into separate pockets (see figure 3 Sample Incoming Audit/Batching Pass Configuration). The mail ballot signature verification challenge status is provided to Relia-Vote™ through the interface with the signature verification system.
- Valid mail ballot envelopes are opened.
- Mail ballot envelopes are sorted into tray batches of predetermined size (customer definable). A tray tag is generated.
- An audit report of every mail ballot envelope in the tray batch is generated.
- The mail ballots are now ready for extraction and tabulation.

Figure 3
Sample Incoming Audit/Batching Pass Configuration



6.0 – PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Project Management

As part of this quote, a Project Manager will be assigned to work with the King County Project Team during all phases of the implementation. The Project Manager will create and manage the project timeline, as well as coordinate efforts between DIMS, USPS, county personnel (IT, Facility, Operations) and Pitney Bowes resources.

The following phases are part of this implementation:

Phase 1 - Requirements Analysis and Solution Design

Joint face-to-face and teleconference meetings are held between Pitney Bowes and the necessary members of King County project teams to document all of the requirements. Additional features and functions can be considered during this phase.

There are four deliverables from this project phase: a Statement of Work (SOW), a Project Plan, a Final Estimate and a Change Control Process Document. The SOW is the definitive source document of all features and functions to be developed. The Project Plan specifies tasks, schedules and the party responsibilities for each project task. The Change Control Process Document defines the process to be followed for modifications to the SOW and/or the Project Plan.

Phase 2 - Solution Development and Unit Testing

Pitney Bowes consultants perform all assigned development necessary to meet the specifications in the SOW according to the schedule set in the Project Plan. Pitney Bowes is responsible for all unit testing for its development tasks. The Customer is responsible for all unit testing for its development tasks.

During this phase, Pitney Bowes creates a Master Test Plan, to be mutually agreed upon by King County and Pitney Bowes. This Master Test Plan outlines the scope of the Quality Assurance (QA) effort, the types of tests to be performed, the specific features and functions to be tested, any features that are not to be tested, performance tests, testing methodologies, and QA responsibilities.

Phase 3 - Solution Integration and Quality Assurance Testing

In this phase, Pitney Bowes and King County integrate all development items and execute the Master Test Plan. This phase is performed at the Customer's site.

Phase 4 – Turn-over and Knowledge Transfer

In this phase, all documentation needed to sustain the project is finalized. A Knowledge Transfer session(s) is conducted to review the documentation. It is assumed that any Customer personnel assigned to continued operation on this application will participate in the Knowledge Transfer session(s).

The PITNEY BOWES-DMT Project Manager along with the Customer's Project Manager conduct a final Project Wrap-up session for this phase of the Relia-Vote™ installation.


7.0 – PRINT ON DEMAND

Overview

The Relia-Vote™ Print on Demand Module provides an answer to the largest bottle neck in the mail ballot creation process – the generation and inventorying of offset printed ballots by replacing the offset printing process with a digital printing process.

The Relia-Vote™ Print on Demand Module interfaces with your existing Ballot Authoring and Voter Registration systems to generate a digital print stream that can be printed on any certified digital ballot printer. Using these inputs the Relia-Vote™ Print on Demand Module generates the correct ballot style for each voter request.

Print on Demand Process Flow



Process Inputs

The Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module uses two input feeds:

- 1) **Ballot Images** - The Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module uses ballot images that can be either PDF or PostScript format. These are formats that your current ballot authoring tool already generates.
- 2) **Vote-by-Mail Ballot Requests** - The Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module uses an extract data feed created by your existing Voter Registration System to determine how to build the ballot images into ballots style packages. This extract data feed is also used to determine the exact quantity of ballot style packages required based on current voter requests. No overage quantity needs to be generated. Basically, a ballot package will be generated for each voter request.

Relia-Vote™ Print Stream Generation Module

The Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module performs the following actions without altering the original certified mail ballot image file.

- 1) A mail ballot print stream is generated for each voter request using the ballot images from your existing ballot authoring tool, based on the demand instructions from your existing Voter Registration System.
- 2) The barcode required to control the mail ballot insertion process is added to the print stream. The content of the barcode can be either not unique to the voter (protecting the voter's privacy) or voter specific.
- 3) Additional information can be added to the print stream such as a human readable precinct or legislative district code. This requires the barcode described in item (2) above to be unique enough to index back to this additional information during the mail ballot insertion process.
- 4) The print stream is split into production jobs (the size is configurable to optimize your production operation).
- 5) The completed print stream is now sent to your certified digital ballot printer.
- 6) A print job data file is provided to the Relia-Vote™ File Preparation Module for postal code processing.

Relia-Vote™ File Preparation Module

The Relia-Vote™ File Preparation Module performs the following actions on the “print job data file” to generate the “mail run data file” (MRDF) used by your FPS or 8-Series inserter.

- Address Cleansing (CASS)
- Move Update Verification
- Postal Coding (for OnRoute™ tracking)

Ballot Printing

The Print Stream generated by the Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand Module is provided to the Certified Digital Ballot Printer of your choice. (You control the print stream). The ballots generated by your printer or print vendor are printed, pre-folded, and packaged for easy handling and efficient inserter operation. Pitney Bowes can support you in defining your ballot packaging requirements.

Mail Ballot Insertion

The completed ballot packages are loaded into a single upstream feeder on your FPS inserter for processing. This single feeder process is followed for ballot styles that consist of both single and multiple ballot sheets. Other mail ballot package elements such as secrecy sleeves, instructions, and affidavit envelopes are added by down stream enclosure feeders.

Reprint process

Mail ballot packages damaged during processing can be regenerated.

There are two processes that you can follow:

- 1) Create a reprint request to the Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module from your FPS Inserter or Insite workstation. The Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module generates a reprint stream containing only those ballot packages requested using the original print stream. The completed reprint stream is sent to your certified digital ballot printer. The original damaged mail ballot package must be destroyed.
- 2) Create a new ballot package request through your voter registration system (reissue). The Relia-Vote™ Print-On-Demand module generates a print stream containing only those reissued ballot packages. The completed reprint stream is sent to your certified digital ballot printer. The original damaged mail ballot package must be destroyed.

8.0 – CUSTOMER SATISFACTION GUARANTEE

Pitney Bowes Document Messaging Technologies Division (“Pitney Bowes DMT”) is committed to providing our customers with the finest products backed by the highest quality care and service. Our DMT production facility is ISO9000 certified, our products are UL/CSA approved, and our service representatives are A+ certified* ensuring quality products and services. Pitney Bowes DMT promises to provide you the following guarantee, while your system is maintained under a DMT equipment maintenance agreement:

Guaranteed Product Performance – For all new products we guarantee performance to our specifications for the initial term of the lease or three years if purchased outright provided that the equipment has been appropriately maintained according to Pitney Bowes DMT specifications. If, during that period, the product does not perform to our specifications, and we cannot repair it, we will replace it with a comparable product. If during the first ninety days after installation of the replacement, the replacement product does not perform as specified, you will be entitled to a prorated equipment refund. Should a malfunction occur due to the use of a non-Pitney Bowes consumable supply or unapproved software/hardware modification, this guarantee will not apply.

Guaranteed Nationwide Equipment Service – Our nationwide service force will respond to service and preventative maintenance requests as part of your equipment maintenance agreement. Your Service Manager will provide you with a formal escalation process, which will be adhered to in the unlikely event that an extended outage occurs.

Operator Productivity and Training Excellence - For all products that we install, our skilled professionals will effectively deliver the agreed upon installation and training services. We will also certify with our standard training program for customers up to two lead operators for each inserter system purchased.

At Pitney Bowes, we are committed to maintaining long-term relationships with our customers. If our sales and service support team has been unable to satisfy you, I would like to hear from you. Please call Technical Support at 1-866-877-3683.

We won't be satisfied until you are satisfied.

Leslie Abi-Karam
President, Document Messaging Technologies

*A+ certification is a vendor neutral testing program sponsored by CompTIA that certifies the competency of entry level (within six months of employment) service technicians in the computer industry.

Relia-Vote™ Data Tracking Overview

The Relia-Vote™ Mail Piece Data Network includes complete data tracking from beginning to end. It utilizes data from the customer's Voter Registration System to create a Material Run Data File (MRDF) for the Auto Ballot Mailer to process, track, and audit each ballot through the inserting process. This data is then passed to the Image Link Sorter to process, track, and audit each mailpiece through the Outgoing and Incoming process.

Pitney Bowes' Relia-Vote™ File-Based Process uses a small barcode printed on the ballot for assembly, and a barcode on the signature envelope for tracking, to deliver a greater level of mailpiece integrity than any other manual or automated system available today. An unlimited amount of information about each mailpiece is sent to the machine and back to the host computer via input and output files. Working together with the Direct Connect Operating System, the file-based control system includes audit software and a system of scanners and photocells located at strategic points throughout the inserting and sorting process. File-based "data-driven mailing" enables:

- High integrity tracking and logging of each mailpiece through each step of the inserting and sorting process to support proof of mailing and automatic regeneration.
- Database marketing tools, including last minute changes in selective inserting, prioritization of inserts on a per piece basis, and logging of insert information.
- Real-time remote monitoring of mailpiece status and late divert decisions.
- On-line printing of address, return address, marketing messages, piece identifiers, POSTNET barcodes or other handling codes.
- Automatic compensation for scanning errors to avoid system stoppages.

Relia-Vote™ Outbound Mailer Application


Outbound Bulk and Daily Ballot Packs are processed on the Auto Ballot Mailer in the same manner as overviewed in this section.

Ballot Processing - Pre-folded ballots are loaded into the designated enclosure feeder while associated ballot contents from the job Pick List (return envelope, secrecy envelopes, outside mailing envelopes, etc) are loaded into the remaining enclosure feeders. Once the job is initiated, the inserter processes each ballot in sequence by reading the Ballot Type barcode printed on the primary ballot and referring to the next record in the MRDF that requires that specific Ballot Type. This data is used to instruct the inserter on how to build that mail piece from start to finish; including the quantity of ballot sheets, which inserts to pull, and the address information. The Inserter tracks the mailpiece through the entire insertion process utilizing photocell sensors mounted at each feeder and station. All required pieces are collated together and inserted into the mailing envelope and then passed to the output section.

Output Processing - Completed packets are sealed, and transported to the output section for in-line addressing and final verification. The in-line addressing sprays the address onto the mailing envelope as a barcode is printed on the return envelope through an open window of the mailing envelope. This is called the *Application ID* barcode and it contains a unique identification that is used to verify and track the mail

piece through the remaining Relia-Vote process. (Note that this identification is on the return envelope and not on the ballot itself)

As a final verification that the expected quantity of ballot sheets was inserted a feature called *Mail Piece Weight Verification* is utilized. This feature includes an in-line scale and the associated control software to verify that the weight of the piece matches the weight calculated by the system processor. This feature uses a weight that is assigned to the ballot pages, envelopes, and inserts during job setup to calculate the total expected weight of the assembled mail piece.



Tracking and Reconciliation - The Relia-Vote™, Auto Ballot Mailer utilizes a closed loop process for job reconciliation by maintaining linkage back to the original job (MRDF) for life cycle accountability of each mailpiece. The closed loop option offers a simple means for mailpiece accountability, since an insertion job is not considered complete until all mail pieces have been successfully inserted or manually repaired. As each mailpiece is completed, diverted, or removed from the inserter a final status is written to the perspective record within the MRDF.


The inserting process can be repeated as many times for any diverted or re-picked mailpieces as needed in order to completely reconcile a job. In some cases, the number of re-processed mail pieces will be so minimal that a decision will need to be made about whether they should be brought back to an inserter. If it is decided that the re-picks will not be processed on an inserter hand processed mail pieces can be accommodated by allowing the operator to manually key them in to the MRDF as "manually repaired" in order to close out the job completely.

Relia-Vote™ Outbound Sorter Application

Once the Mailer has processed the ballots, the Relia-Vote™ system makes the data file available to the Image Link Sorter via the Mail Piece Data Network. The Image Link processes the sealed envelopes reading the Mailer applied Application ID barcode. During this process each mailpiece is verified and updated against the File-Based control file as a final audit trail prior to mailing.

Outgoing ballots will be processed on the Image Link Sorter in two passes. As the ballot envelopes enter the sorter, each is scanned for the voter/AV ID. If the Image Link successfully reads the ID barcode and finds a match in the voter database, it will sort the piece as a valid ballot and direct to appropriate pocket. For every ballot where the voter ID barcode is successfully read, an image of the entire front of the envelope will be archived on the site server PC. This is to verify and provide the county with a detail of all ballots mailed and an additional level of integrity from the inserting process to the USPS.


The outgoing postal pass will read the POSTNET barcode and sort those envelopes into appropriate pockets based on 3 digit or 5 digit non profit rates and sort schemes if desired.




Relia-Vote™ Inbound Sorter Application

Incoming ballots will be processed on the Image Link Sorter as they are received and as elections laws permit. As the ballot envelopes enter the sorter, each is printed with a time and date, if the Image Link successfully reads the barcode but does not find a corresponding voter ID record in the voter database (designating that the ballot was successfully processed from the outbound database), it will sort the piece as an invalid ballot. If the sorter is unable to read the barcode, it will sort the piece as a rejected ballot. If the sorter successfully reads the barcode and finds a match in the voter database, it will sort the piece as a valid ballot and direct to appropriate pocket. For every ballot where the voter ID barcode is successfully read, an image of the entire front of the envelope will be archived on the site server PC. Also, the signature segment of the absentee ballot envelope will be cropped for sending to the validation stations for comparison purposes.

Upon validation, the sorter will receive a file that contains the results from the validation stations. The mail will then be run through the sorter a second time. If the sorter successfully reads the barcode but does not find a corresponding voter ID record in the voter database (designating that the ballot was not seen on the incoming scan pass), it will sort the piece as an invalid ballot. If the sorter is unable to read the barcode, it will sort the piece as a rejected ballot. If the sorter successfully reads the barcode and finds a match in the voter database, it will sort the piece according to its disposition. Destination pockets for the dispositions will be configurable by the county. Those challenged assignments vary from county to county but include the following: no sig, bad sig, deceased, voted twice, etc. Valid ballots are then sorted into Groups, legislative districts, or down to precincts which are available and configured by the operators for each election.



Tracking and Audit Trail - After the completed ballots are received (from mail or over the counter), they are processed through the Incoming Process on the Image Link Sorter using the same File-Based control file. Each ballot is processed against the same file and record as when it was processed for outgoing. This continuity of data tracking allows for a complete integrity solution therefore enabling automated reconciliation and real-time status and management reporting.



King County list of questions as presented last week with responses.

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Does the proposed solution help in process management - managing the ballot tracking and accountability process?

Please see attached Relia-Vote™ Data Tracking Overview

Friday, April 20, 2007

11:24 AM

Bulk Insertion - 1 million insertions within 7 days

- (3) Inserters
- (1) File Prep Module
- (2) Sorters

Three (3) Outbound Auto Ballot Mailer systems would be required to do 1 million ballot packages within 7 days.

This is based on a average Net production of 3,500 ballot packages per hour per Auto Ballot Mailer.

Net production is number of actual ballot packages completed taking into consideration normal equipment stoppages and operator interactions such as load time, balancing, envelope trayng, etc.

Average run time available per 8 hour shift is calculated at 6 hours.

It would take approximately 16 to 21 Shifts to process 1 million ballot packages.

Remaining available time within a 7 day period would provide additional capacity of approximately 250,000 ballots.

Net production is dependent on correct material preparation, condition and availability, supervised, experienced and knowledgeable operators. These and other workflow processes are critical for a successful implementation.

Daily Insertion - 11,000 over a 16 hour period

- (1) Inserter
- (1) File Prep Module
- (2) Sorters

One (1) Auto Ballot Mailer would take approximately 5 to 6 hours to produce 11000 completed ballot packages. Daily insertion job processes and typically smaller quantities provide a lower net production rate than bulk insertion.

Over the Counter Insertion - 700 / day

- Not Applicable

Outbound Data Capture - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion

- Two (2) Sorters are required to process 1 million ballot envelopes over 7 days as the process is simultaneous with bulk mailings
- 1 million over 7 days as the process is simultaneous with bulk mailings

Outbound Sort - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion

- Two (2) Sorters are required to process 1 million ballot envelopes over 7 days as the process is simultaneous with bulk mailings. It is not practical to run all 1 million pieces in 1 day. All postal qualifications are still based on one day drop to the USPS even when processing over a 7 day period
- 1 million over 7 days as the process is simultaneous with bulk mailings

Inbound Data Capture - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Two (2) Sorters would be required to do 175,000 ballot packages per day

This is based on a average Net production of 6,700 ballot packages per Sorter operational hour per. Two sorters will provide a net through put of 13,400 ballot packages per hour.

Net production includes processing each ballot package twice through the sorter and completing the following processes:

- Image capture,
- Signature verification
- Time and date stamp,
- Legislative district sortation,
- Selective opening,
- Outsourcing and grouping of challenged ballot packages
- Audit pass

Net production is the number of actual ballot packages completed taking into consideration normal equipment stoppages, operator interactions such as load time, balancing, envelope traying, etc.

Average run time available per 8 hour shift is calculated at 6 hours.

It would take approximately 2.5 Shifts to do 175,000 ballot packages per day using 2 Sorters

Net production is dependent on correct material preparation, condition and availability, supervised, experienced and knowledgeable operators. These and other workflow processes are critical for a successful implementation.

Inbound Sort - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

- Can be handled on (2) sorters recommended

Automated Signature Verification - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

- Can be handled on (2) sorters recommended

- Relia-Vote signature comparison solution using verifiers
- Dependency on number of verifiers for non automated ballot envelopes

Opening Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

- Can be handled on (2) sorters recommended

Tabulation Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

- Can be handled with recommended solution

System Integration / Process Management Tool - 1 million ballot packets tracked at any given time with a discrepancy of no-more than 3.4

- Yes

12:16 PM

These are the capacity requirements we are interested in. The number of shifts does not appear to be that crucial because it is dependent upon the capacity of the individual machine and the number of machines we will have.

I believe the 3.4 is per million, the Six Sigma standard?

If you start with machine capacity, then we can determine how many shifts will be required per day.

Machine capacity was listed under Section A of the Voter's ballot packet has been handed off to USPS on page 8. Question answered with more detail previously in this document.

12:16 PM

1. Third party confirmation program for in-house Quality Assurance management.

Please confirm that the planet code and post net barcode on each mail piece will be able to address multi-voter households so that it is tracking by voter and not address. (Page 8, No. 4) If not, how will it be addressed?

A software process included in the File Prep Module called PC Gen creates a unique USPS Planet Code for each voter in the household. This unique Planet Code is what is tracked within the USPS system.

2. Pitney Bowes automated signature verification will not be available prior to the 2008 election.

Does Pitney Bowes anticipate availability of its own ASR for the 2008 election cycle? (Page 9, Track point 3, 1C.)

Our Automated Signature Verification module is not anticipated at this time to be available for use the early 2008 elections.

3. Regarding compatibility and interface between Diebold Automatic Signature Verification Solution and Pitney Bowes.

Please provide details on the interface and protocol that Pitney Bowes will use to communicate/interact with the Diebold's ASR server. (Page 9, track point 3, 1C.)

We currently have working interfaces with the following VR Vendors: VR Systems, Logic Works, DFM Associates and proprietary systems with a few counties directly.

The interface under discussion with DIMS (Ross Underwood) gives Diebold direct access to the Relia-Vote database using a set of stored procedures through socket connection. All data will be pushed and pulled by DIMS through these processes.

4. The system is capable of handling a randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub.

All systems will be capable of handling the unique identifier on the ballot page or stub (when attached) with addition of moving beam scanners/readers to interpret the barcode

12:34 PM

Please provide information on hardware and software used for capturing the randomized unique identifier, and the interface for seamless electronic data interchange between data-capture system and DIMS / voter registration system. (Page 10, track point 4, 6 & 7.)

The interface under discussion with DIMS (Ross Underwood) gives Diebold direct access to the Relia-Vote database using a set of stored procedures through socket connection. All data will be pushed and pulled by DIMS through these processes.

King County would like to:

1. develop a product fact sheet that could be release to the media regarding the hardware and software offered in the solution,
2. gather quotes from some of your existing clients/ jurisdictions,
3. a list of counties/businesses using the hardware / software,
4. photos and a video of the hardware and software demo featured in your solution.


Please provide us the name, email and phone number of your corporate media relations or communications contact so we can approach them for the above.

Carol Wallace
Pitney Bowes, Inc.
Director, External Communications
World Headquarters
1 Elmcroft Road
Stamford, CT 06926-0700
203-351-6974 - phone
203-351-6303 - fax
Carol.wallace1@pb.com



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Kirk-Rudy Duplex Addressing System



The Kirk-Rudy high speed duplex ink jet addressing system feeds each envelope individually, prints three inches of print, turns the envelope over and prints three inches on print on the reverse of the envelope.

Kirk-Rudy is the primary supplier of ink jet printing systems for the mailing, printing and bindery industries. With thousands of installations throughout the world, Kirk-Rudy has established themselves as a leader in paper processing equipment.

Kirk-Rudy Duplexing Ink Jet System \$ 92,965.00

Includes freight, installation, training, ink starter and maintenance kits.

Annual full service maintenance agreement \$ 11,620.63

Includes all parts and service.

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Suite D – 5518 163rd Street East – Puyallup, WA 98375-9039
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Print Resolution/speed/length 600 x 600 dpi 125 ft/min 27"

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INCORPORATED **600 x 300 dpi 250 ft/min 54"**

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GAGNON
INCORPORATED **600 x 150 dpi 480 ft/min 108"**

Ink conservation mode 300 x 600, 300, 200,150 dpi

Software Features

COWART
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INCORPORATED **Variable graphics**

COWART
GAGNON
INCORPORATED **Conveyor zip code and bundle breaks**

COWART
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INCORPORATED **Text, graphics and barcode rotation**

COWART
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INCORPORATED **Ink monitoring**

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INCORPORATED **Multiple font use within text boxes**

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INCORPORATED **All Windows true type fonts**

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INCORPORATED **USPS certified postnet, planet, UPC/EAN, 2 of 5, codabar, and 128 barcodes**

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INCORPORATED **24 Windows Unicode languages**

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INCORPORATED **Data Formats Fixed length, delimited, label, dbf, access, excell**

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INCORPORATED **Pen Controls Pulse warming – keeps ink at optimal print temperature**

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INCORPORATED **Pen calibration –voltage and pulse length tuning for each cartridge**

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INCORPORATED **Short detection – prevents damage when cartridge nozzles wear out**

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INCORPORATED **PC peripherals – Basic configuration plus network card, modem, 10/100-base**

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INCORPORATED **Ethernet, Windows XP**

Kirk-Rudy feed and transport base

COWART
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INCORPORATED **Physical size – 7.5' L x 34" W (includes integrated dryer table)**

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INCORPORATED **Electrical Requirements – 208-220 VAC, single phase, 30 amps, 4 wire**

COWART
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INCORPORATED **Feeder type – Vacuum shuttle. Optional KR 496F friction feeder.**

COWART
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INCORPORATED **Material Handling – Minimum size 3" x 5" post card**


COWART
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INCORPORATED **Maximum size 17" x 14" tabloid**

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INCORPORATED **Thickness 20 lb single sheet up to a maximum of 5/8"**

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INCORPORATED **Shingle conveyor – 6', 8' or 12' variable speed, right angle or inline design**

Accufast Barcode Printer

The Accufast Barcode Printer will have the capability of incorporating with the Agissar Extractor or can be moved to stand alone with its own feeder. When incorporated with the Agissar Extractor, the printer will roll up to the extractor and allow the two extractor operators to grasp the ballot, un-fold it and place it on the vacuum transport where a predetermined barcode will be printed on the ballot. The Ballot will then be transported to a catch tray.



As a stand alone unit, the ballots can be fed via a feeder that will separate each ballot and transport it through the bar code printer, print a unique barcode and place it in a catch tray.

The system includes a computer and software that will generate a unique barcode for each ballot. The barcode printed contains a printer identifier in case more than one inkjet printer is in use. This will ensure that no two ballots will have the same barcode.

An optional barcode reader will be mounted on the ink jet printer and will read the barcode and file the data into an excel spread sheet. This data can be linked via Votehere and/or Diebold software for centralized tracking. Each barcode reader will have its own computer for networking with Votehere and/or Diebold Software.

The Barcode will be printed in an area that will not interfere with the voter's marks on the ballot.



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Accufast Inkjet Printer with Vacuum Transport With Computer, Software and catch tray.	\$ 19,975.00
Second unit	\$ 19,975.00
Ink and Maintenance Starter Kits	\$ 850.00
Optional Streamfeeder with Stand for Stand Alone Operation.	\$ 5,350.00
Barcode Reader incorporated on Inkjet Printer With computer, XP Operating System and Excel Software.	\$ 7,500.00

Prices include freight, installation and training.

Full coverage, annual service contract to cover all parts and service.

Accufast Inkjet Printer (each)	\$ 2,497.00
Streamfeeder	\$ 668.75
Barcode Reader System	\$ 937.50



PARASCRIPT

Parascript® SignatureXpert®

The frontline defense against signature fraud.

Check fraud incurs multi-billion-dollar-a-year business losses and is a problem for all banks, financial institutions, and retailers. Formerly the specialty of professional forgers, check fraud has become a widespread crime. One of the primary reasons for this is advances in technology. Highly sophisticated and low-cost technology is now available to criminals allowing them hone their skills when creating counterfeit checks and forging signatures. This changed situation requires an increased level of alertness for the institutions that want to protect themselves from the threat of check fraud losses. Banks and financial institutions are now turning to advanced fraud protection tools for assistance.

Parascript® SignatureXpert® is a trusted method of handwritten signature verification that meets the requirements of the information age. This signature authentication software detects signature presence, verifies signatures on checks, IRDs and other documents, and reveals all types of signature fraud, including random and skilled forgery. SignatureXpert delivers industry's highest accuracy and lowest error rates and can be easily integrated into existing document processing applications.

A Mature Solution for Banking and Financial Services.

In applications that deal with signed paper documents, only a static, two-dimensional image is available for verification. This poses a challenge when developing an automatic solution, because the detection has to address not only random forgeries that were produced without knowing the shape of the original signature, but also skilled forgeries, generated by people who imitate or trace the original signature as closely as possible. In order to account for the missing important biometric data and produce highly accurate signature comparison results, off-line signature verification systems imitate the methods and approaches used by human forensic document examiners.

Until recently, the technology for automated off-line signature verification did not offer an industrially mature solution that was at least on a par with visual verification. SignatureXpert is a breakthrough in the current state-of-the-art of automatic signature verification, offering a solution that detects random and skilled forgeries of signatures with accuracy that not only equals but far surpasses visual verification.

Product Benefits

- Eliminate background and remove noise from any type of input images**
 SignatureXpert provides advanced capabilities to eliminate background and remove all kinds of noise from check images, IRDs, and signature snippets cut from documents with diverse and unpredictable layouts, such as voting cards, forms, and different formats of reference cards. In particular, it efficiently removes lines, preprinted text, intrusions from other fields, stamps and other undesired elements around the signature to ensure a clean image.
- Automate signature location on input images**
 SignatureXpert automatically locates one or two signatures on check images, IRD images and snippets, allowing the software to efficiently detect fraud on a variety of documents.
- Apply multiple verification engines**
 SignatureXpert combines seven verifiers to analyze dozens of signature features. Additionally, each verifier has a distinctive capability in exploiting a unique verification methodology. These tactics allow unprecedented accuracy of verification by taking into consideration all informative data extracted from a signature image, including biometric characteristics restored from the still image.
- Verify signatures with different resolutions**
 SignatureXpert can reliably verify signatures even if input images presented for verification and reference images have a different resolution.

- **Use multiple reference images**


SignatureXpert may use multiple references to differentiate between natural deviations typical of a genuine signature and deformation digressions that indicate fraud. This allows it to consider more data to detect stable distinctive characteristics in a signature and to focus on them during the verification process, while ignoring random distortions and variations inherent in genuine signatures. You can update reference signatures and add new ones as needed to ensure the availability of up-to-date data for verification.

- **Get diverse output options**

Applications that may benefit from signature verification are

diverse and so are the accuracy requirements, purposes, and scenarios that have to be implemented in these applications. SignatureXpert issues a confidence value that serves as a basis for making a decision about signature genuineness and drawing a conclusion about probable fraud type. You can set the confidence value as a threshold depending on the percentage of false positives versus the percentage of false negatives required by a specific application. This mechanism provides additional flexibility and allows you to implement different scenarios when interpreting results. In addition to the confidence value of the best match, SignatureXpert produces other types of output results, thus enhancing product flexibility and adaptability to any environment and application needs.

How SignatureXpert Works



Technical Product Specifications

Requirements

- Platforms: Windows® NT 4.0 Service pack 4 and higher, Windows® 2000 Professional, Windows® XP Professional, Windows 2003 Server. Porting to other systems is available upon request.
- CPU: Pentium III, 500 MHz minimum required
- RAM: 256 MB minimum required
- Storage: Complete installation requires a minimum of 130 MB of free disk space

Input

- Image Format: Black-and-white TIFF, bitmap (BMP), and JPEG industry-standard images from a file, as well as images from

DIB or from memory. SignatureXpert also accepts grayscale images (TIFF, BMP and JPEG) with 8 bits per pixel.

- Image Resolution: 200 - 300 dpi

Output

- Confidence value of the best match
Note: If a check with two signatures is used as an object for verification, the function returns the confidence value of the verified document. This confidence value is calculated as the lowest of the confidence values received individually for the first and the second signature on a check
- Number of signatures found on a document presented for verification or on a reference document
- Preprocessed (cleaned from noise) snippet of a signature from the document

presented for verification or the signature reference document

- Coordinates of a rectangle that contains a signature found on the document
- The reference signature that is the best match for a specified signature, presented for verification

License Protection

- Softlock

SignatureXpert is just one of many solutions within Parascript's product suite. For more information visit our web site at www.parascript.com



PARASCRIPT®

Parascript White Paper

Intelligent Recognition technology – the final frontier

The basic principle of Parascript® Intelligent Recognition states that handwriting, when reduced to its most basic components, is essentially motion, or a series of movements, made by a writing instrument. According to this theory, any handwriting can be described using elements of a special description language. The eight elements that make up the trajectories of all cursive letters (Figure 1 below) form a ring that illustrates the possible transitions of neighbor elements.




Figure 1




Figure 2

Figure 2 - An example of the letter "d" described using motion theory. The order of elements in the letter description follows the trajectory of a pen. Horizontal lines show the vertical position on the image associated with each element in the letter description.

Principles of Dynamic Intelligent Recognition

Both OCR and ICR deliver high accuracy when analyzing constrained text (OCR with machine print and ICR with handprint) but are ineffective when dealing with cursive, where letters are linked together, and may be poorly written or even illegible. Consider a situation where the symbol segmentation of an image is ambiguous. In Figure 3 below, an OCR/ICR recognition system could determine that the first symbol is a "d" or a combination of a "c" and an "l". Depending on the segmentation, the reading result produced by a letter-based recognition technology may be completely different: "clear" in the first case and "dear" in the second.




Figure 3

As accurate character segmentation is critical, Intelligent Recognition can often recognize poor-quality text that would be impossible for OCR and ICR systems to recognize. Intelligent Recognition dynamically uses context – in a process similar to the one humans employ when reading and interpreting text – to compensate for the inherent ambiguity of human handwriting. The context is used during the recognition process rather than after recognition, when results might already have been misinterpreted, thus improving the accuracy of results. Again, going back to Figure 3, it is not clear if the first symbol is a “d” or a combination of a “c” and an “l”.

The dynamic vocabularies contained in Intelligent Recognition systems do not analyze and store all possible hypotheses of segmentation. If the dynamic vocabulary does not contain a combination of “c” and an “l” at the beginning of the word, the only possible segmentation solution is “d”. The dynamic usage of context eliminates all impossible combinations from the solution set, enabling the evaluation of results “on the fly” during the recognition process. Dynamic context, therefore, provides the highest possible recognition accuracy, because it eliminates the impossible results in real time, during the recognition process.

The Final Frontier

Intelligent Recognition technology often recognizes text that is considered to be of poor quality or even completely unacceptable for OCR and ICR technologies, therefore further improving the recognition rates when compared to other systems.

Working with high quality machine print, OCR provides recognition accuracy of nearly 100 percent (99.9 %), a level of accuracy acceptable for many forms processing applications. ICR cannot guarantee the same levels of accuracy that OCR systems deliver on machine print due to the inherent problems of reading handprint – spacing variations, diversity of human writing styles, etc. Instead, state of the art ICR systems provide the same recognition accuracy for a certain part of the data stream, while the data that cannot be reliably read continue to be sent for visual verification. The following mechanism is used by ICRs to ensure the accuracy required by the application. The stream of images is divided into two parts: those that were recognized reliably with a required accuracy (accepted), and those for which the system does not guarantee the required accuracy (rejected).



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Intelligent Recognition further improves recognition rates and accuracy when compared to traditional machine print (OCR) and handprint (ICR) engines through field recognition and cross-validation of results.

Field Recognition

Intelligent Recognition recognizes a field not a character, and consequently a whole field is either accepted or rejected. Conversely, in the case of a rejected field Intelligent Recognition technology additionally provides information about unreliable characters. Second, the reject mechanism is tuned so thoroughly that it allows accuracy up to 0.1% for the texts of low quality.

Cross-validation of Results

Computing power alone is not able to deliver high recognition results without a human-like recognition approach. Intelligent Recognition employs the most advanced methods of single character recognition while using sophisticated algorithms to cross-validate results during the recognition process.

Intelligent Recognition advances the state of recognition technology, exploiting the strengths and capabilities of its predecessors – OCR and ICR systems – while eliminating their inherent limitations. Intelligent Recognition technology delivers highly accurate machine print, handprint and cursive recognition results, helps eliminate laborious human data entry and has become a proven solution for a broad range of the most demanding applications for government posts, commercial mailers, banks and financial institutions, BPO and data processing centers.



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
Parascript Pricing

Signature Verification Software	\$ 67,600.00
First Year Software Maintenance Fee Based on a license to process up to 2,500,000 Signatures per Year License	\$ 16,900.00
Second Year Software Maintenance Fee	\$ 17,875.00
Installation and Training	\$ 6,240.00

Note: As part of this signature verification software, signatures must be scanned into the system and stored in the signature verification program. This work will need to be done to obtain the signatures to verify. Tritex is only responsible for the software (not the scanning in of the signatures) which can be done by the customer. If Tritex scans in the signatures, the price will be \$ 195.00 per hour. The signature scan rate is 10,000 per hour. To determine the cost of scanning signatures in the signature verification program, divided the number of signatures to be scanned by 10,000 the multiply by \$ 190.00. For example, to scan in 1,000,000 signatures would be \$ 19,000.00.

Accufast Barcode Printer

The Accufast Barcode Printer will have the capability of incorporating with the Agissar Extractor or can be moved to stand alone with its own feeder. When incorporated with the Agissar Extractor, the printer will roll up to the extractor and allow the two extractor operators to grasp the ballot, un-fold it and place it on the vacuum transport where a predetermined barcode will be printed on the ballot. The Ballot will then be transported to a catch tray.



As a stand alone unit, the ballots can be fed via a feeder that will separate each ballot and transport it through the bar code printer, print a unique barcode and place it in a catch tray.

The system includes a computer and software that will generate a unique barcode for each ballot. The barcode printed contains a printer identifier in case more than one inkjet printer is in use. This will ensure that no two ballots will have the same barcode.

An optional barcode reader will be mounted on the ink jet printer and will read the barcode and file the data into an excel spread sheet. This data can be linked via Votehere and/or Diebold software for centralized tracking. Each barcode reader will have its own computer for networking with Votehere and/or Diebold Software.

The Barcode will be printed in an area that will not interfere with the voter's marks on the ballot.



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Accufast Inkjet Printer with Vacuum Transport With Computer, Software and catch tray.	\$ 19,975.00
Second unit	\$ 19,975.00
Ink and Maintenance Starter Kits	\$ 850.00
Optional Streamfeeder with Stand for Stand Alone Operation.	\$ 5,350.00
Barcode Reader incorporated on Inkjet Printer With computer, XP Operating System and Excel Software.	\$ 7,500.00


Prices include freight, installation and training.

Full coverage, annual service contract to cover all parts and service.

Accufast Inkjet Printer (each)	\$ 2,497.00
Streamfeeder	\$ 668.75
Barcode Reader System	\$ 937.50

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88-5 HIGH-SPEED CUSTOM DESIGNED SORTER

The 88-5 can process up to 30,000 letters per hour depending on application. For ballot processing the speed is up to 15,000 per hour. Patented feeder technology allows smooth operations over a variety of letter types. This unit includes real-time scanning, printing and sorting capabilities. The 88-5 can be configured with up to 256 bins. As in all Tritex multi-bin machines, sorting schemes are completely user-configurable. That is, the user can specify which keys are used to sort upon (e.g., barcode, OCR, etc.), how the keys are used to select destination bins (including database lookups), as well as specifying into which bins exception mail is placed. Shown in Spokane County State of Washington

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Features

Scanning and storing images in color, grayscale, and/or black and white.

The systems can produce high-resolution, up to 300 dpi, compressed images (jpeg and tiff formats). In addition, snippets of the images (such as signatures) can be stored simultaneously.

Automatic batch creation and audit trail

Systems can accurately create batches and store information for each piece. The information is stored in a format that is easily incorporated into the customer's existing database and EXCEL programs. The tracking can be used for incoming mail (i.e., to record that an item has been received) or outgoing (i.e., to record that an item is about to be sent).

Barcode reading

Systems are capable of reading all standard barcode formats (including interleaved 2 of 5, Code 39, Code 128, POSTNET, PLANET, PDF 417, Datamatrix, and others). Note: Extra license fees apply to 2D barcodes (e.g., PDF 417 and Datamatrix).

OCR

Systems have top-quality Optical Character Readers to identify and qualify pieces or to store information to audit trail files.

Mark Detection

Systems can detect the presence/absence of marks on documents or mail pieces.

Signature Detection

Systems can detect the presence/absence of a signature on documents or mail pieces.

Signature Verification

Systems can locate signatures and compare the signature to the signature(s) of record. The results can be used to sort the piece (if the unit has bins) or store the result in audit trails.

**Tritek 88-5 "Correct Elect" Presort
And Voter Return Processing System**

\$ 688,714.00

Includes:

- **48 Bins for Over Flow Continuous Operation (when one bin is full - 250 to 300 envelopes – sort is diverted to another bin allowing for continuous machine operation). Allowing for sort to 17 Districts as well as Divert Bins.**
- **Two Ink Jet Printers – One for Outgoing Postnet Printing – One for Printing Time/Date Stamp on Incoming Voter Return Envelope.**
- **OCR Software and Hardware.**
- **Two Cameras for Capturing Obverse and Reverse Images of Voter Return Envelope.**
- **Thickness Detector for Determining Voter Return Envelope Contents.**
- **Outbound Software for Presort.**
- **Integration to DIMS Voter Verification System.**
- **Integration to Diebold Signature Verification.**
- **Compressors for Ink Jet Systems**
- **First Year Software Updates**
- **Freight**
- **Installation and Training**

Full service contract – Parts and Labor

\$ 68,872.00


Options

Over Head Bins (48)

\$ 43,680.00

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LETTER SORTING MACHINE SHOWN WITH OVERHEAD BINS


The Tritex 88-5 letter sorting machine has a throughput speed of over 30,000 letters per hour. The OCR read area is 5" x 12" and has the ability to read all types of printed mail. You can also add handwriting recognition. The 88-5 accommodates an inkjet printer and uses a vacuum feeder to singulates the mail pieces. The machine shown processes for the State of Florida.

PATENTS & LICENSING:

Tritex patented technology available for licensed use:
7,185,748 B2 Object Transport and Sorting Assemblies and Methods
6,571,958 B1 Mail Processing Double Separator
6,523,697 B1 Mail Processing machine drop box
6,651,878 B2 Mail Weighing System and Method
5,544,758 Aperture Assembly
5,226,547 Flat / Mail Transport
5,398,922 Flat / Mail Feeder
5,521,365 Lighting Assembly

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Agissar Triple Cut Dual Flex Opener Extractor



The Agissar Triple Cut - Dual Flex Operator Station is a semi-automatic envelope extractor designed for two operators to achieve maximum throughput. This device differs from the Simple Dual Operator Station in that the 2 operators use independent extract conveyors with unique smart-gating, so that the faster operator is never restricted by the slower operator.

The Triple Cut Dual Flex Operator Station uses an automatic conveyor and vacuum feed design to present envelopes to the operator for extraction.

Like the Triple Cut, the standard and optional features available with the Triple Cut Dual Flex Operator Station give you a solution that meets your unique processing requirements. The ergonomic design and ease-of-use make the Triple Cut Dual Flex Operator Station an outstanding choice. It is ideal for work that requires intensive decision making and/or intensive document handling.

Agissar Triple Cut Dual Flex Opener Extractor

Standard Features:

The Triple Cut Simple Dual Operator Station offers several standard features:

- Work stations for two operators
- Uses independent extract conveyors with unique smart-gating, so that the faster operator is never restricted by the slower operator
- Opens top and both sides of envelope for three-sided slicing
- Sort bins are available for easy reach and maximum pocket capacity
- Cycles up to 4,500 envelopes per hour
- Variable speed control on conveyor
- Vacuum feed design (versus friction feed) eliminates double feeding
- CDM (Contents Detection Monitor) reads contents channel and each side panel of the envelope for loss prevention of un-extracted contents
- Ergonomic Balance - all sortation bins are within 14-16 inch reach, meeting OSHA's reach standards
- Allows extraction speeds up to 3,600 envelopes per hour
- Adjustable and self-sharpening tool steel blades for accurate and precise cutting
- Ergonomically designed work surface

INFOPointe® Real-time Data Collector


Specifications:

- **DIMENSIONS:** Height 35 inches; Width 72 1/2 inches; Depth 40 inches
- **WEIGHT:** 250 lbs
- **ELECTRICAL:** 117 volts; 60 hz; 15 amp
- **HEAT EMISSION:** 4500 BTU/Hour

ENVELOPE SPECIFICATIONS: Handles envelope sizes ranging in size from 3 1/2 inches high by 5 1/4 inches long to 4 7/8 inches high by 9 1/2 inches long.

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The Agissar six pocket Jogger is specifically designed for low noise operation with a timer to ensure that the mail is properly positioned prior to opening and extracting.

The requirement of jogging greatly reduces the damage to documents while opening and provides a uniform product for the Triple Cut Dual Flex Extractor.

(Table not included)

Agissar Triple Cut Dual Flex Extractor

\$ 42,250.00

Agissar Six Pocket Jogger

\$ 6,055.00

Optional Envelope Closer and Stackers
 To close and stack the voter returned
 Envelope for ease of storage and handling.

\$ 20,000.00

Prices include freight, installation and training.

Annual full service maintenance contracts
 Extractor
 Jogger
 Stackers

\$ 5,250.00
 \$ 600.00
 \$ 2,500.00

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King County Process Flow Chart for Ballot Tracking and Accountability

A data base file is created for all election-qualified voters.

1. The addresses of each voter on this list is printed on a Voters Envelope along with a barcode that identifies the voter, the district, the precinct and also a four digit OCR that identifies the election. This process will be done with the Ink Jet Printer. As proposed, there will be no communication with the DIMS voter registration system during this process. The verification that all of the addresses were printed will be by count of number of pieces printed. However, a barcode reader can be attached to the ink jet printer that will confirm, via third party program such as Votehere, back to the DIMS voter registration system that each address has been read as printed. This will create an audit trail as to which voter envelopes have been printed.
2. Bulk insertion for all election-qualified voters on file will begin. The information that was printed on the voter's envelope in process 1 will be read from each envelope as it is fed into the inTelmail inserting system. As this system will incorporate file based processing, the process will begin with an inTelmail feeder feeding and reading an intelligent code containing the package sequence number on a pre-addressed voter's envelope, format for this package sequence number will be provided. At this point the barcode read on the voter's envelope is linked to data contained on the ILCOM (Intelmail Computer) computer for continued FBI (File Based Inserting) processing. The ILCOM computer will look up this package sequence number in its database in order to pull in the selective Insert information needed for this ballot package. This

selective Insert information will direct which return envelope is to be pulled for any given ballot package as well as which ballot(s) to pull and which instruction sheet needs to be pulled for this package. During this FBI process, the system will track and log into data files, the status of each ballot package from start to finish to maintain the package integrity and to facilitate the reporting functions at the end of each job run. Once this selective Insert information is handed over to the inTelmail Intelligent Inserter, the Inserter will then track each individual ballot package through its system insuring that it receives the correct ballots, security envelope and instructions etc. There will be additional document integrity systems that will stop the inserter anytime that there is a no feed or double feed sequence error condition. This will insure that every ballot is mailed and accounted for and that no ballot package receives more ballots than is expected. Each tracked ballot package will then continue down the Inserter track getting the proper voting instruction sheet required for that package. The ILCOM system will then go back and record in its data that the ballot package is complete and properly assembled. Any suspect documents will be diverted and reported back to the ILCOM computer that the ballot package was not completed correctly.

a. *Data/Reports Available for Job Verification at the end of each run:*

*ILCOM File Based Processing Data (each record of the job)
Identifying:*

- Properly Finished Mailed "Ballot Packages"
- Diverted/Suspect "Ballot Packages"
- Duplicate "Ballot Packages"
- Missing "Ballot Packages"

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- General Production Statistics etc.
- A report showing which address was successfully assembled.
- A report showing which address was not successfully assembled.

These reports are available to Votehere for incorporating into an audit trail for the entire process.

3. The finished bulk insertion mailing will be presented to the Tritex equipment for pre-sort processing. This process will read the postnet barcode visible through the window of the outgoing ballot packet envelope and print a postnet barcode on the mail piece and sort to zip code sequence for the post office. A pre-sort report will be generated describing how many envelopes were processed and to which zip code. This information is not linked to the DIMS/voter registration system but can be used for postal reports.
4. The Bulk insertion is delivered to the Post Office.
5. Daily insertion and issuance of ballots will be processed in the same manner as described above in item 2.
6. Over-the-Counter ballots can be pre assembled with the inserting system – however, at this point I am not sure how the voter's information is applied – I need further information on how over-the-counter ballots are handled.
7. Tritex Flow Chart - Incoming Mail
Before being presented to the Tritex sorter, envelopes must be separated into three groups.
 - Envelopes that have been returned by the voter and orientated for processing.
 - Envelopes that have been returned by the Post Office as 'Undeliverable'

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- Other mail that is not related to voting.

Before being presented to the Tritex sorter, envelopes must have the "Security Flap" removed (we are currently working on a machine to remove the security flap).

Begin Tritex Process

- Operator will enter election code. Election code consists of four characters (1-2 letters and 2-3 digits (election type, month, and 2-digit year).
- Feed Returned Envelopes that are acceptable, orientated and have had the security flap removed into the Tritex sorter.
- Print unique date and 6-digit sequence number on envelope.
- Read Pre-printed 3 of 9 Barcode
- Check against approved data list (DIMS). The list will contain all approved voter barcodes and the district/precinct number associated with that voter. If a barcode read on a mail piece is not in the list, the system will consider that piece to be "NOT approved". The approved data list will include the precinct number for each pre-printed 3 of 9 barcode. If no barcode is read, the piece will be placed in a reject bin.
- Read Election Code OCR. The election code is a 4-character code located to the right of the barcode or immediately below the barcode. If no election code is read or it does not match the operator-entered election code, the piece will be placed in a reject bin.

- Capture image of envelope, both front and back. The image of the envelope will be stored in a binary (black and white) TIFF format file. The image files will be stored in a directory on the Tritex computer under date and hour as part of the path. The sequence number added and will be part of the file name (e.g., an image captured on 8/14/06 at 9:45am with a sequence number of 1234 will be stored under C:\ImageStorage\081406\09\001234.tif).
- Determine if Signature is present. If no signature is present, send piece to "NO signature" bin. An image of the signature area will be captured and stored as described below (even though no signature was detected).
- If signature is present continue through process. The signature image will be stored in a gray scale image stored in a JPEG format. This image will be stored in the same location as the address image, but the file name will include "sig" in front (e.g., C:\ImageStorage\081406\09\sig_001234.jpg).
- If no signature is detected, no signature image is stored.
- Sort Decision. Determine which bin the mail piece should be placed into.
- Determine if the envelope contains more or less than expected. If the envelope thickness does not fall within specifications, the envelope will be diverted to a reject bin.
- If the barcode is not read, the piece is rejected for mechanical reasons, no election code is read, the election code does not match the operator entered election code, or no image is captured, the piece will be placed into a reject bin.
- If the barcode is read, but the barcode is NOT approved, the piece will be placed into a "NOT approved" bin.

- If the barcode is approved, but no signature is detected, the piece will be placed into a "NO signature" bin.
- If the piece has an approved barcode and a signature is detected, the piece is considered "accepted". Accepted pieces will be placed into a bin based on its district number. District number is supplied by the election office and included in the preprinted barcode.
- Accepted pieces will be placed in bins of approximately 300 pieces. If a bin contains 300 pieces, the feeder will shut off automatically or continue to run and begin filling a second bin. A message will appear on the screen indicating which bin (or bins) is full. The operator will clear the bin and then use the mouse to indicate that full bins have been cleared.
- **Batch Data.** Information will be stored for each completed batch of approximately 300 pieces (as well as remaining batches of less than 300 when the processing is done). The exact batch number is adjustable in the configuration file. Information for each piece will include: 6-digit sequence number, the barcode read, bin number, election number, Approved/NOT approved flag, image file name, signature file name (if present), time stamp of the piece. As each batch is completed, the information will be appended to an ASCII text file for that particular processing run. This information will be stored on the Tritex computer. In addition, a file for each batch containing only the barcode number for each piece in the batch will be created.
- The information described in above item will constitute the audit trail for each piece. No other information will be stored.
- The information will be created for each of the bins except for the reject bin.

- The reject bin will have a log file for each piece. That is, each piece will contain the sequence number, the barcode read (if any), election number read (if any), bin number, and the reason for the rejection (e.g., no image, no barcode, non-matching election code, etc.). No image is saved for these rejected pieces. These pieces can be rerun as desired (after the date and sequence number are covered up).
- The "No signature" and "NOT approved" bins will also have batch sizes of approximately 300.
- When processing is complete; the operator will use the mouse to indicate that the job is complete. The Tritex system will indicate that the batch data for that job is available for transfer. This data will be transferred to the voter registration system via Votehere.
- Feed envelopes that have been returned as Undeliverable by Post Office. Processed similar to above except that no signature check is made and no signature image is saved. Operator will input data into the machine to indicate if this job is "delivered" ballot mail or "nixie" (undelivered) ballot mail.
- Print date and 6-digit sequence number on envelope.
- Capture image of envelope.
- No sorting is done. Instead, place pieces in bins in sequence-number order. When a bin has approximately 300 pieces, the system will stop and allow the bin to be emptied or, if equipped with enough bins, continue operation by moving the overflow to another bin. Create audit trail text file from barcode data. This file will have an identical format to the ballot mail.
- If the barcode is not read or the piece is not accepted, divert to reject bin (bin 0).

- Re-feed processed envelopes for finer pre-determined sorts (precinct) and checking against acceptance file. At the end of this processing, a bin count is available and an audit trail is available to be uploaded to the DIMS voter registration system via Votehere. Election code should be read. The Audit trail will have an identical format to the ballot mail.
- 8. **Opening the Voter's Return Envelope, Extracting the Security Envelope. Opening the Security Envelope and Extracting the Ballot.**
 - To keep a verifiable count of voter's envelopes vs. ballots, the extraction processes must be done in batches. The contents of each bin from the Tritex system will have an audit trail. This audit can be printed and placed in a tub with the voter envelopes from that bin. This will constitute a "Batch". This batch will be placed in an Agissar Opener/Extractor. This extractor will open the voter's envelope, extract the security envelope, refold and stack the voter's envelope, verify the number of envelopes processed and then the empty voter's envelope can be placed in a storage container with the printed audit trail.
 - The Security Envelope will then be placed in another Agissar Opener/Extractor and the ballot will be removed, unfolded and placed in a tray. Again, a count will be verified and the security envelope discarded.
 - The Batch of ballots will be presented to the Diebold tallying equipment for counting.
 - As each Batch is processed the count can be verified. The Agissar Opener/Extractors accurately count each envelope as it is fed into the machine prior to opening.

**This is the process as I understand it. A question that I do
have is do you want to save the security envelope?**

- 9. All of the processes described can be field modified to provide for a
unique identifier to be placed on each ballot and tracked throughout
the processes. It is my understanding at this time that a decision
has not been made to do this. At our last communication, we were
going to apply a unique barcode on the ballot when it was extracted
from the security envelope. Do you still want to approach doing
this?**

Cowart Gagnon capacity minimums

The Leadership Team has developed the following capacity minimum for each of the functions listed:

Bulk Insertion - 1 million insertions within 7 days

To insert by batch, print the voter information on the assembled envelope and provide proof of mail verification and data collection, file distribution, data achieving and reporting functions would require two inserters running two shifts. Each machine would cost \$335,423.00 for a total of \$670,846.00. This price includes freight, installation and training.

Daily Insertion - 11,000 over a 16 hour period

This could be accomplished on one of the machines listed above.

Over the Counter Insertion - 700 / day

I need further information on this.

Outbound Data Capture - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion

This would be accomplished at time of insertion.

Outbound Sort - 1 million within 7 days if run concurrently with insertion or 1 million within 1 day if run at end of insertion

Tritek can process these but it would require larger machines or known address sequence. For instance, Bank of New York processes 200,000 pieces a day on two 112 bin machines during a 12-14 hour shift. If the ZIPCODES of the mail to be sent onto the machine are known in advance (e.g., a database from the inserters), the sorting of the mail can be optimized, perhaps allowing for smaller machines or quicker times.

Note: The inbound and outbound operations are currently done on the same machine. If both operations were required at the same time, multiple machines would be needed. In addition, as quoted, the Tritex machines processes at 10K / hour. Tritex outbound machines can process at up to 30,000 pieces per hour, but that would require a separate machine or a variable speed selection on the Tritex machine.

Inbound Data Capture - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Tritek machines can process at 10K / hour. So this can be done in 17.5 hours. Trittek machine allows for some immediate release to the other process.

Inbound Sort - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Tritek machines can process at 10K / hour. So this can be done in 17.5 hours. Trittek machine allows for some immediate release to the other process. This operation and Inbound Data Capture operation happen simultaneously. A second pass sort will require additional time. Processing time for the second pass will depend upon the level of sort, the distribution of the mail, and the number of bins in the machine.

Automated Signature Verification - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Tritek machines can process at 10K / hour. So this can be done in 17.5 hours. Trittek machine allows for some immediate release to the other process. This operation and Inbound Data Capture happen simultaneously.

Opening Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

To open 175,000 voter envelopes per day would require two separate processes. The first process would be to extract the security envelope from the voter's envelope. This can be accomplished with two Automatic Contents Extraction (ACE) machines. Each machine will automatically extract the security envelope from the voter's envelope, keep a count for batch processing and place the voter's empty envelope in a hopper for storing. Using two ACE machines the 175,000 requirement could be accomplished in 11 hours.

The Security Envelopes would have to be opened and the ballots extracted. This is a semi-automatic process that would require an operator to remove the ballot from the opened security envelope, un-fold it and place it a tray. (Requirements for scanning and or bar coding the ballot may also be required). The time required to do this is about 3 seconds per ballot or 1,200 per hour on the Dual Flex unit. With two operators per unit at 2,400 per functional labor hours within an eight hour shift equals 12 Dual Flex machines to accomplish the 175,000 in eight hours. There would also be a requirement of two additional people to load

and unload the systems as well. If the 175,000 piece requirement is to be met in one eight hour shift, you would need 2 Ace Machines, 12 Dual Flex Machines, 2 Jogger Stations and 27 people. Total cost for these machines, including installation, training, and freight would be \$652,856.50. If two shifts were run the equipment cost would be cut in half.

Tabulation Tracking - 175, 000 / day (must allow for some immediate release for other next process)

Tabulation Tracking would be done either by batch processing using the audit trail provided by the Tritex System or by Reading a bar code identifier on the ballot. Either system would be done as work in progress and be accomplished as the ballots are manipulated through each position.

System Integration / Process Management Tool - 1 million ballot packets tracked at any given time with a discrepancy of no-more than 3.4

I am not sure what this refers to unless auditing by Votehere and Diebold.

Please let us know if your solutions meet these function capacity minimums. If your solution has the capacity that exceeds those minimums, please specify.

Note: Freight quoted assumes that all equipment will be delivered at loading dock height and a fork truck will be available for unloading. Additional handling may be required for moving equipment to locations not accessible by fork truck.

If the information submitted does not offer solution for those functions, please state so with "Not applicable".

Your prompt response is most appreciated.

Thank you for your attention.

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Suite 650
Bellevue, WA 98004

425 450 2770 F
425 453 4350 F



April 18, 2007

Bill Huennekens
Project Manager for All-Mail Transition
King County Administration Building, #553
500 Fourth Street
Seattle, WA. 98104

Re: Business Process Needs for a Ballot Tracking and Accountability Solution

Dear Mr. Huennekens,

VoteHere is responding to the King County Request for Information for a Ballot Tracking and Accountability solution.

We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your questions related to mail envelope and ballot processing and tracking. Attached to this cover letter are two documents. The first document provides a detailed narrative of VoteHere's Mail-in Ballot Tracker system. The second document, Appendix A, is a direct response to your stated needs in the FYI.

Bellevue-based VoteHere, is the industry pioneer and leader in ballot audit and tracking technology. VoteHere's Mail-in Ballot Tracker system (MiBT) has been successfully used in over 70 elections in Washington State since 2005. MiBT is currently deployed in over 20 Washington State counties and has helped elections officials keep track of over 2 million ballots.

As a King County based company, exclusively dedicated to the issue of mail ballot tracking and accountability, VoteHere is uniquely positioned to serve the staff and voters in our home County.

VoteHere has partnered with Diebold to offer a seamless, comprehensive envelope and ballot accountability system. We hope King County will consider MiBT a vital tool in King County's mission to successfully transition to all-mail elections.

Sincerely,

Bryan D. Finney
Director, Government Affairs
VoteHere, a division of Dategrity Inc.



Mail-in Ballot Tracker Proposal

For King County

Prepared for: King County, WA
Prepared by: VoteHere, a division of Dategrity Corp.
Date: April 18, 2007

Mail-in Ballot Tracker Proposal For King County

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1. VoteHere Background

Founded in 1998, VoteHere, a division of Dategrity Corporation based in Bellevue, WA, is the industry leader in ballot audit technology. VoteHere's Mail-in Ballot Tracker™ (MiBT) has been successfully used in over 70 elections in Washington State since 2005.

MiBT has helped account for nearly 2 million ballots in Washington since the system was first deployed in the September 2005 election. With over 20 Washington state counties ranging in size from Spokane to Ferry County, VoteHere has been working with and learning from Washington elections officials to continually enhance the MiBT system.

As a King County based company dedicated to the issue of mail ballot accountability, VoteHere is uniquely positioned to serve the staff and voters in our home County.

2. End-End Ballot Accountability and Voter Look-up

MiBT is designed to work with any envelope sorter/scanner system the County selects. VoteHere has agreement from Diebold, Pitney Bowes and Cowart-Gagnon to work with MiBT to offer King County an integrated and seamless ballot accountability system. What this means to King County Elections is the proven ability to account for every envelope and ballot through your entire mail-in process, without switching from one database or interface to another.

The VoteHere MiBT ballot accounting software is uniquely proven to receive and aggregate data from various processing points for internal envelope and ballot accountability reporting. King County could then select from a wide array of accounting data to make available to voters to see the status of their envelope and/or ballot.

3. Mail-in Ballot Tracker (MiBT): What is it?

MiBT is an election auditing software system that gives you the ability to ensure that every envelope and ballot issued during an election cycle can be accounted for, from ballot assembly to tabulation.

Designed to integrate seamlessly into your existing election processing structure and work with any Voter Registration (VR) system and hardware sorting vendor, MiBT lets you closely monitor envelope and ballot processing throughout an election cycle, ensuring process integrity while eliminating the need for time and labor intensive hand-counting.

In addition, MiBT is the first election auditing system that can inform a voter whenever his or her ballot was tabulated while protecting the voter's privacy. MiBT's patented Intermix™ technology allows you to provide real-time ballot status information to voters while guaranteeing that every ballot remains anonymous.

3.1 The Four Features of MiBT

MiBT is designed to provide Elections Administrators seamless end-to-end envelope and ballot accountability reporting. MiBT has four primary features which have been used in varying degrees by Washington State counties. King County may determine to use any or all of the following capabilities:

- 1) Account for every envelope and ballot end-to-end, regardless of the VR System or scanning/sorter hardware

- 2) Ensure the correct ballot goes into the correct envelope (for manual assembly)
- 3) Ensure that proper procedures are followed in the handling of mail ballots
- 4) Provide automated voter lookup for envelope and ballot status

4. How MiBT Works

Simply put, MiBT works the way King County needs it to work, providing the level of election accounting and reporting that's appropriate for the County. King County can use MiBT to perform comprehensive envelope and ballot accounting, partial envelope/ballot accounting, or envelope only accounting.

The County's VR system will feed MiBT envelope data, which is combined with MiBT's ballot data into multiple comprehensive automated and real-time reports. Much like a FedEx shipment, MiBT uses barcodes to account for mail ballot envelopes and/or ballots issued during election. These barcodes are scanned at various "processing points" at each stage of election processing.

In addition, you can choose the ballot status information you want to make available to the public. King County will determine which MiBT envelope and ballot processing features your elections office will use.

4.1 MiBT serves dual purposes

MiBT has been used most extensively in Washington State as:

- 1) Internal ballot accountability and reconciliation tool
- 2) Voter Look-up tool

"MiBT has really helped Thurston County continue in our mission to have the highest reconciliation standards possible.

- Kim Wyman, Thurston County Auditor

"Since going to 100% VBM, voters have welcomed the ability to check the status of their ballot and confirm it was handled correctly."

- Pat Gardner, Pacific County Auditor

5. Voter Look-Up Options (Ballot Status)

The decision on which ballot status points to make public may change depending on external and internal County circumstances. Therefore, MiBT offers King County the most flexible array of voter look-up options for voters to see the status of their ballot. VoteHere has been working with DIMS to offer the following options:

- 1) Envelope Status - Automated uploading of selected VR data points
- 2) Envelope and Ballot Status - Accounts for Envelopes and Ballots by batch.

3) Envelope and Ballots Status, including voter's ballot was tabulated

5.1 Voter Look-Up, with ballot tabulated option

Figure 1. The County made available multiple processing stations to voters. King County may decide to include more or fewer processing stations.

**Example County
Elections Department**

Track Your Ballot Status

This site is for each voter in Example County to determine the status of his or her voted ballot. All records may not be available online until after certification of the election (ten days following a Primary or Special Election, 20 days following a General Election).

If you have specific questions about the status of your ballot, please call the Example County Elections Department at 425-455-1234.

Your Ballot Status Information	
Election	May 18 2006 Special Election 5/18/2006
Name	Marken R. Downen
Registration No.	14241
Prepared for mailing	Friday, April 21, 2006 3:03:13 PM
Received from voter by mail	Monday, May 08, 2006 9:20:37 AM
Suspended for no signature	Tuesday, May 09, 2006 3:19:57 PM
Rejection resolved	Monday, May 15, 2006 2:20:00 PM
Signature Approved	Tuesday, May 16, 2006 11:48:02 AM
Scanned for Tabulation	Friday, May 19, 2006 12:15:11 PM

Thank you for visiting Example County's Ballot Tracking website. This site is provided to give you the most up-to-date information on the status of your mail-in ballot.


Please visit us again.

5.2 Voter Look-up Option Decision Matrix

MiBT can provide simple envelope accounting, or more comprehensive accounting, including voter's ballot was tabulated. Figure 2 below shows two options for Voter Look-Up:

- 1) Proof **Envelope** was received
- 2) Proof **Ballot** was tabulated

Figure 2. King County Voter Look-up Options



5.3 Another Voter Look-up Option: Ballot Tracking by Batch

VoteHere has an optional Voter Look-Up ballot accounting feature, beyond those diagrammed above: This option goes further than simply stating a voter's envelope was received and approved. This option does not require MiBT's encrypted Intermix protocol.

This version of ballot accounting associates a batch of ballots with their corresponding batch of envelopes.


- 1) Envelopes are processed in batches.
- 2) The list of voters whose envelopes are the batch is maintained.
- 3) When the ballots are extracted from the envelopes, the ballots are put in the same batches.
- 4) When a batch of ballots is counted, the list of voters associated with that batch is credited with having their ballot counted.

The drawback of this solution is the County can only say that a voter's ballot has been tabulated, within +/- 5%. (Due to exceptions within a batch where a ballot is rejected).

6. MiBT – Agnostic to Hardware

MiBT receives data from various processing points, regardless of hardware or software vendor. MiBT aggregates the processing data to provide comprehensive, end-end automated envelope/ballot reconciliation reports. MiBT is agnostic to the hardware, VR or processing inputs. MiBT aggregates the processing points into multiple points of reconciliation.

Figure 3. How MiBT works with any hardware and VR system to receive processing data.



6.1 Accounting for Challenged or Duplicate Ballots

In addition to accounting for envelopes and ballot through the normal processing steps, MiBT also accounts for items that fall outside of the regular process flow, including challenged envelopes and ballots, duplicated ballots, and so on. This ensures that you can accurately reconcile the numbers of mailing envelopes received and accepted and ballots extracted and tabulated, and verify that challenged envelopes and ballots have been properly reviewed and resolved by your canvassing board.

Figure 4. Bubble chart of potential King County Envelope and Ballot Processing points. Shows recommended processing stations, including those associated with challenged envelopes and ballots. MiBT aggregates all the data below regardless of data input hardware/or VR system.





Figure 5. Shows the bubble chart's (Figure 4 above) corresponding processing points within the MiBT application. MiBT's "Tracking" stations are configurable based on the County's needs.




An additional benefit of MiBT is the ability to easily check the status of a random envelope or ballot. Occasionally an envelope or ballots may fall on the floor, or is discovered somewhere that it should not be. If this happens, you can simply scan the barcode to check who touched the envelope, or ballot, last and where it should properly go.

Figure 6. Example of scanning envelope barcode to get envelope status.

Scan Item History			
Scan for item history	Scan Time	Station	User Name
0000102474	8/10/2006 10:45:5...	Initial-Ballot	David Doyle
	8/24/2006 11:13:1...	Rec-Mail	Marilyn Strauss
<i>Assembled Ballot ID</i>			

Figure 7. Example of scanning ballot barcode to get barcode status.




7. MiBT Reports

MiBT reports are designed to provide real time data on the status of your envelope and ballot processing. MiBT reports provide both a macro and micro-level of envelope and ballot accountability. Figures 8 through 11 show a sample of the type of reports available through MiBT.

Importantly, the raw data can also be directly accessed to allow for customized reporting. The reports themselves are highly configurable by terminology and data analyzed.

Figure 8. Shows sample of the types of reports available through MiBT.



- **Ballot Activity by Batch**
- **Ballot Activity by Ballot Style**
- **Ballot Activity by Date**
- **Ballot Activity by User**
- **Ballot Summary by Batch**
- **Ballot Summary by Date**
- **Ballot Summary by Ballot Style**
- **Ballot Summary by User**
- **Ballot Summary**
- **Ballot Tracks**
- **Unassembled Voters**
- **Voter Website**
- **Summary**
- **History Log**

- **Custom Database Query**
- **Envelope Activity by Batch**
- **Envelope Activity by Date**
- **Envelope Activity by Precinct**
- **Envelope Activity by User**
- **Envelope Summary by Batch**
- **Envelope Summary by Date**
- **Envelope Summary by Precinct**
- **Envelope Summary by User**
- **Envelope Summary**
- **Envelope Tracks**
- **Exceptions**

Figure 9. Sample Summary Report. This report provides a high level report on the status of envelope and ballot processing during a specified time period.

DEMO ELECTION - JUNE 14, 2006									
Summary Report: June 9, 2006 09:31:02 - June 9, 2006 15:59:31									
(as of Apr 14, 2007 17:07:01 PST)									
	ENVELOPES TO OPEN			BALLOTS TO EXTRACT			BALLOTS TO COUNT		
	Received	Approved	Pending	Expected	Extracted	Pending	Expected	Counted	Pending
Total	19,283	17,977	1,306	17,977	17,977	0	17,977	19,977	0

Figure 10. Ballot Summary Report Provides a high level report on the status of every BALLOT processed during a specified time period. (Requires a barcode/unique identifier on ballot.)

DEMO ELECTION - JUNE 14, 2006												
Ballot Summary Report - End of Election Totals												
(as of Apr 14, 2007 17:52:05 PST)												
	RETURNED			CHALLENGED			PLUS RESOLVED			EQUALS EXPECTED TO COUNT	COUNTED	
	Expected Extract	Extracted	No Ballot	Multi-ballot	Duplication	Canvass	Duplicated	Canvass Resolved	Rejected	Total	Tabulated	Pending
Total	209,004	209,004	421	212	18,499	39,111	18,499	39,009	102	208,481	208,481	NONE

Figure 11. Duplication/Canvass Reconciliation Report. Shows reconciliation of duplicated and challenged ballots by User. This report is used in doing the forensics of ballot accounting, as well as personnel management.

DEMO ELECTION - JUNE 14, 2006					
Duplication/Canvass Reconciliation-By User					
(as of Apr 14, 2007 17:52:05 PST)					
	Challenged		Resolved		Pending
	Duplication	Canvass	Duplicated	Canvass Resolved	
Total	312	92	311	92	1
User	Benn	Hauck	Benn	Hauck	Benn

Report Conclusion: User "Benn" scanned 312 ballots requiring duplication. This report shows 311 of the 312 ballots Benn scanned to be sent to duplication were actually duplicated, with 1 pending.

This report also shows User "Hauck" scanned 92 ballots requiring Canvass review. The report shows all of Hauck's ballots that he sent to Canvass were resolved.

8. Envelope Only Accounting vs. Envelope and Ballot Accounting

As the bubble chart in Figure 3 (below) shows, there are as many reasons to automate the accounting of *ballots* as there are reasons to automate the accounting of *envelopes*. MiBT's ballot accounting options:

- 1) **No bar codes on ballots.** This option eliminates the ability to automate the internal process of ballot reconciliation and accounting. King County would continue doing manual reconciliation of the ballots (post-extraction).
- 2) **Printing barcodes on ballots, pre-assembly, using Intermix.** This option enables both automated internal "ballot" reconciliation and the possibility of confirming a voter's ballot has been tabulated.
- 3) **Printing barcodes on ballots, pre-assembly, NO Intermix.** This option enables both automated internal "ballot" reconciliation and the possibility of confirming a voter's ballot has been tabulated.
- 4) **Printing barcodes on ballots, post-extraction.** This solution enables automated ballot-envelope accounting and reconciliation, while mitigating public concerns of placing barcodes on ballots pre-assembly.

In our estimation, King County has three options as it relates to "ballot" accounting. MiBT is flexible enough to successfully integrate either option 2, 3 or 4 above in King County. Since MiBT requires some data input, accounting capabilities would be limited if option 1 (above) were selected.


9. Post-Extraction Barcode Applicator Option

The post-extraction barcode applicator options allows for seamless integration with DIMS, Cowart-Gagnon, or other hardware vendor. In this option, we assume that no barcode is applied to the ballots before mailing, but the County still needs the ability to account for each ballot after extraction from the security envelope.

With this approach, election managers have the tools needed to account for every returned ballot envelope, and envelope batch. Additionally, this approach makes it possible to reconcile ballots extracted v. signatures approved, and subsequently account for each ballot, and each ballot batch, all the way through tabulation.

9.1 System Diagram

Figure 12. Shows the relationship between components.



9.2 Operational Process

- 1) Returned Envelopes are managed using current methods.
- 2) Envelope processing data (envelopes returned, envelopes challenged, and envelopes approved) are processed using the VR System.
- 3) Data from the VR System is shared with MiBT to provide an opening balance of envelopes received and processed.
- 4) Envelope batches are received in the MiBT System to ensure that all ballot envelopes can be accounted for before commencing ballot processing.
- 5) Ballot envelopes are opened by batch following existing procedures.

- 6) Ballots are processed by batch through the Ballot Barcode Printer / Scanner.
- 7) MiBT reconciles the number of ballots extracted, versus the number of signatures approved for each batch to ensure that all ballots have been accounted for.
- 8) MiBT accounts for ballots through subsequent operational steps, including duplication, canvassing, other exceptions, and finally tabulation.
- 9) MiBT reports can be used throughout the process to account for all envelopes and ballots, and identify any issues with reconciliation in real time.

10. Vendor Partnerships – Offering King County a Seamless, Single Vendor Team

VoteHere is committed to working with King County to provide the most comprehensive, seamless array of ballot processing and accountability choices. As King County deliberates on the best methods to successfully transition King County to all-mail elections, VoteHere offers multiple options and a system that can grow with the dynamic needs of King County.

To that end, VoteHere is able to work with each of the following vendors. Beyond those listed below, VoteHere is committed to working with any vendor that King County selects.

10.1 Diebold

Partnered in Marin County, CA. Currently architecting a seamless data exchange between DIMS and MiBT. As currently architected, DIMS would deliver VR data into MiBT. MiBT would aggregate the VR data into MiBT's envelope accounting reports and combine with "Ballot" accounting reports for comprehensive end-end envelope and ballot accountability.

10.2 Cowart-Gagnon (TriTek)

Partnered in Spokane County, WA. Demonstrated ability to offer a seamless, single interface to offer comprehensive processing and accountability. Cowart-Gagnon and VoteHere have been working side-by-side to offer a post-extraction barcode scanning feature for the ballot accounting solution.

10.3 Pitney Bowes

Able to provide integrated and seamless data transfer between ReliaVote and MiBT. As with any envelope scanner/sorter, the sorter/scanner data will feed DIMS. Under most circumstances, MiBT will receive data exclusively from DIMS. Accordingly the need for a data dialogue between the sorters and MiBT is limited.

11. Architectural Introduction

MiBT is built using the Firebird SQL database server, and two Delphi client applications. The two Delphi client applications are divided into election management, and ballot accounting. Most of the ballot accounting logic is implemented in stored procedures in the database server. Reports are implemented as a combination of Perl scripts and Excel macros.

There are three user types (or "roles") defined in the database, as well as an "anonymous" user and the system database administrator ("SYSDBA"). The three roles are "Election Administrator", "Election Authority", and "Tracker".

- The anonymous user is used for reporting, and has read-only permission to most tables in the system.
- The SYSDBA user is used for creating new election databases, for archiving and restore old election databases, and for creating new users or editing existing users.
- "Election Administrator" is used to configure the election database, control the InterMix process (if applicable) and to run reports.
- "Election Authority" is used to hold the secret key used in the InterMix process.
- "Tracker" is all users responsible for scanning ballots. They also have limited reporting ability.

11.1 Election Management Application

- Requires SYSDBA password to access.
- Used to create new election databases.
- Used to manage archived copies of past or current elections.
- Used to add or edit users.
- Used to configure default jurisdiction configuration (county specific workflow configuration as well as information about precincts and splits) which will be used in new election databases.

11.2 Tracking Application

- Requires a username & password to log in.
- Different users can be allowed different access levels to different election databases.

- Election administrator can manage voter and ballot information.
- Election administrator can adjust workflow to adapt system for special circumstances.
- Election administrator can run all reports.

- Election authorities can participate in InterMix steps to securely and accurately determine exactly which voters' ballots were tabulated.

- Each tracking user can be configured to allow access to scanning at specific tracking stations (or all stations).
- Any tracking user can call up the status of any envelope or ballot.
- Any tracking user can call up detail or counts of envelopes or ballots, selected by tracking station, by date range, or by precinct or ballot style.

12. MiBT Features and Benefits

	Aggregates Envelope and Ballot Data	Works with any sorter/scanner hardware	58 processing stations and reports	Customizable envelope and ballot accounting reports	Automated ballot and envelope reconciliation	Confirm each ballot was counted
MiBT	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Features available in latest versions of MiBT (1.51 and 2.0):

- 1) 32 Built-in Ballot and Envelope Processing Stations
- 2) 27 Built-in Report Modules
- 3) Customized Reports
- 4) Direct access to database
- 5) Hardware Agnostic
- 6) Automated Ballot Exception accounting
- 7) Automated envelope-ballot reconciliation
- 8) Voter Look-Up, including proof ballot was tabulated
- 9) Enforces proper processes
- 10) Guarantees correct ballot goes in correct envelope (Manual dailies)
- 11) Envelope and Ballot Status (checks the status of random envelopes/ballots)
- 12) Tabulation confirmation - all ballots were tabulated
- 13) Supports multiple elections
- 14) DIMS Integration
- 15) Post-extraction barcode scan accounting
- 16) Home County vendor available on-demand, on-site 365 days a year

Benefits:

- 1) Provides comprehensive reports that enable election managers to measure their operations from insertion to envelope processing, to ballot tabulation.
- 2) Enforces process to ensure that no voter gets the wrong material, and that every returned envelope and every approved ballot can be accounted for.
- 3) Reduces time spent reconciling returned envelopes and processed ballots.
- 4) Enforces Ballot Assembly process to ensure that Voters get the right ballot.
(Optional)
- 5) Enables election managers to share status of documents through a web interface.
(Optional)
- 6) Integrates with existing VR systems and procedures.
- 7) Integrates with existing ballot handling processes.
- 8) Accounts for exceptions of returned envelopes and ballots to ensure that all documents can be accounted for.
- 9) Saves time by reducing the number of times that people have to hand count documents.
- 10) Reduces stress on election workers and managers by catching errors early, and resolving issues.

13. PROJECT PRICING SUMMARY

VoteHere will offer King County the negotiated Washington State price for the current version of MiBT. It is our strong recommendation that King County consider the purchase of the next release of MiBT, version 2.0

QTY	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	EXTENSION
1	MiBT, mail-in ballot tools application One-time software license for automated ballot and envelope inventory control version 1.51	\$.75 per Absentee Voter	\$675,000 @900,000 Voters
	Recommended Purchase of MiBT 2.0	\$.25	\$225,000
	Optional Professional Services	\$160 per hour	TBD
	Total, including MiBT 2.0		\$900,000

Optional Additions

QTY	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	EXTENSION
	Standard Support Package Includes Help Desk Services, Maintenance Updates to Current Release	15% of license price	\$135,000

14. VoteHere Contact

Please direct all questions about MiBT or this RFI response to:

Bryan Finney
 Director of Government Affairs, VoteHere
 bryan.finney@votehere.com
 (206) 465-5636

Appendix A: Response to King County RFI

The Response to RFI is VoteHere's direct reply to questions presented in King County's Business Process request as applicable to VoteHere and Mail-in Ballot Tracker.

VoteHere has partnered with other vendors to ensure a seamless, unified envelope and ballot accountability solution for King county.

A-1. Response to SECTION 4: Ballot envelope has been opened

A-1.1 King County Requirement: Section 4, Feature 6

Ability to capture unique identifier on ballot for exceptions handling and data management if desired at a later date.


A-1.2 VoteHere Response

Diebold's teaming arrangement with VoteHere offers King County a seamless and proven Ballot Accountability system that captures both envelopes and ballots for a comprehensive, automated end-end accountability solution.

VoteHere's Mail-in Ballot Tracker system (MiBT) has been successfully used in over 70 elections in Washington State since 2005. MiBT has helped keep track of nearly 2 million ballots since the system was first deployed in Washington's September 2005 election.

The DIMS system will feed MiBT envelope data, which is combined with MiBT's ballot tracking data to create comprehensive automated and real-time reports. Much like a FedEx shipment, MiBT uses barcodes to track mail ballot envelopes and/or ballots issued during election. These barcodes are scanned at various "tracking points" at each stage of processing.

Figure A-1. *Regardless of hardware vendor, MiBT aggregates both envelope and ballot tracking points.*




Post-Extraction Barcode Applicator Option (Seamless integration with DIMS, Cowart-Gagnon, or other hardware vendor)

If it is determined that a bar code shall be painted on each ballot pre-assembly MiBT is designed to easily capture the bar codes for real-time reporting into MiBT.

In the diagram below, we assume that no barcode is applied to the ballots before mailing, but the County still desires the ability to track each ballot after extraction from the security envelope.

With this approach, election managers have the tools needed to account for every returned ballot envelope, and envelope batch. Additionally, this approach makes it possible to reconcile ballots extracted v. signatures approved, and subsequently account for each ballot, and each ballot batch, all the way through tabulation.

System Diagram



Operational Process

- 1) Returned Envelopes are managed using current methods.
- 2) Envelope tracking data (envelopes returned, envelopes challenged, and envelopes approved) are tracked using the VR System.
- 3) Data from the VR System is shared with MiBT to provide an opening balance of envelopes received and processed.
- 4) Envelope batches are received in the MiBT System to ensure that all ballot envelopes can be accounted for before commencing ballot processing.
- 5) Ballot envelopes are opened by batch following existing procedures.
- 6) Ballots are processed by batch through the Ballot Barcode Printer / Scanner.
- 7) MiBT reconciles the number of ballots extracted, versus the number of signatures approved for each batch to ensure that all ballots have been accounted for.

- 8) MiBT tracks ballots through subsequent operational steps, including duplication, canvassing, other exceptions, and finally tabulation.
- 9) MiBT reports can be used throughout the process to account for all envelopes and ballots, and identify any issues with reconciliation in real time.

A-1.3 King County Requirement: Section 4, Feature 7

Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.

A-1.4 VoteHere Response

MiBT Integration with DIMS

VoteHere's MiBT System is designed to work with County operational Processes, and inter-operate with existing Voter Registration and Tabulation Systems.

For King County, the system is configured to share appropriate data with the DIMS VR system to enable elections staff to monitor their entire envelope and ballot processing using MiBT's reporting and process enforcement features.

From this integrated approach, MiBT will receive updates from DIMS regarding processing of returned envelopes, by batch, including challenges and signature approvals. After the envelope process is complete, MiBT will be used to manage the ballot process as well.

This integrated approach will enable King County election managers and operational personnel ensure that:

- 1) All returned envelopes can be accounted for, through their complete process, with convenient and comprehensive reports.
- 2) All Ballots can be accounted for, through their complete process, with convenient and comprehensive reports.
- 3) The existing Batch Process used by King County will be supported and enforced across Envelope and Ballot processes.
- 4) The system will enable comprehensive reconciliation, for all batches, and individual envelope and ballot documents, enabling complete accountability, and simplification of the reconciliation process.

Figure A-2. Envelope/Ballot Report. This report provides a high level report on the status of envelope and ballot processing during a specified time period.

DEMO ELECTION - JUNE 14, 2006									
Summary Report: June 9, 2006 09:31:02-June 9, 2006 15:59:31									
(as of Apr 14, 2007 17:07:01 PST)									
	ENVELOPES TO OPEN			BALLOTS TO EXTRACT			BALLOTS TO COUNT		
	Received	Approved	Pending	Expected	Extracted	Pending	Expected	Counted	Pending
Total	19,283	17,977	1,306	17,977	17,977	0	17,977	19,977	0

Figure A-3. Envelope/Ballot Status. Scan envelope or ballot bar code to get envelope status.

Scan Item History			
Scan for item history	Scan Time	Station	User Name
0000102474	8/10/2006 10:45:5...	Initial-Ballot	David Doyle
<i>Assembled Ballot ID</i>	8/24/2006 11:13:1...	Rec-Mail	Marilyn Strauss

MIBT Main Console (User: Bryan Finney)

File Administrator Authority Tracking

Election: Demo Election

Scan Item History			
Scan for item history	Scan Time	Station	User Name
276309	6/13/2006 7:08:30 ...	Initial-Ballot	Scott Axworthy
<i>Assembled Ballot ID</i>	3/19/2007 4:15:37 ...	Extracted	Bryan Finney

Get Scans By User/Station/Precinct/Time

Select One:

Scan Items Details Scan Count Only

Select Parameters

Users	Stations	Precincts	Ballotstyles
All	All	All	All
Start Date	Start Time	End Date	End Time
4/16/2007	8:00 AM	4/16/2007	8:00 PM

Reset Today Show Results

MiBT Features & Benefits:

	Aggregates Envelope and Ballot Data	Works with any sorter/scanner hardware	58 tracking stations and reports	Customizable envelope and ballot tracking reports	Automated ballot and envelope reconciliation	Confirm each ballot was counted
Mail-in Ballot Tracker	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Features available in latest versions of MiBT (1.51 and 2.0):

- 1) 32 Built-in Ballot and Envelope Tracking Stations
- 2) 27 Built-in Report Modules
- 3) Customized Reports
- 4) Direct access to database
- 5) Hardware Agnostic
- 6) Automated Ballot Exception tracking
- 7) Automated envelope-ballot reconciliation
- 8) Voter Look-Up, including proof ballot was tabulated
- 9) Enforces proper processes
- 10) Guarantees correct ballot goes in correct envelope (Manual dailies)
- 11) Envelope and Ballot Status (checks the status of random envelopes/ballots)
- 12) Tabulation confirmation - all ballots were tabulated
- 13) Supports multiple elections
- 14) DIMS Integration
- 15) Post-extraction bar code scan tracking
- 16) Home County vendor available on-demand, on-site 365 days a year

Note: Some features above require custom consultation w/County.

Benefits:

- 1) Provides comprehensive reports that enable election managers to measure their operations from insertion to envelope processing, to ballot tabulation.
- 2) Enforces process to ensure that no voter gets the wrong material, and that every returned envelope and every approved ballot can be accounted for.
- 3) Reduces time spent reconciling returned envelopes and processed ballots.
- 4) Enforces Ballot Assembly process to ensure that Voters get the right ballot.
(Optional)
- 5) Enables election managers to share status of documents through a web interface.
(Optional)
- 6) Integrates with existing VR systems and procedures.
- 7) Integrates with existing ballot handling processes.
- 8) Tracks exceptions for returned envelopes and ballots to ensure that all documents can be accounted for.
- 9) Saves time by reducing the number of times that people have to hand count documents.
- 10) Reduces stress on election workers and managers by catching errors early, and resolving issues.

A-2. Response to SECTION 5: Ballot has been tabulated or not

A-2.1 King County Requirement: Section 5, Feature 1

Capability to capture unique identifier on ballot at time of tabulation for ballot tracking and accountability if desired at a later date.

A-2.2 VoteHere Response

Voter Look-Up Options (Ballot Status)

The decision on which ballot status tracking points to make public may change depending on external and internal County circumstances. Therefore, MiBT offers King County the most flexible array of voter look-up options for voters to track the status of their ballot. VoteHere has been working with DIMS to offer the following range of options:

- 1) Envelope Status - Automated uploading of selected VR data points.
- 2) Envelope and Ballot Status - Tracks Envelopes and Ballots (by batch).
- 3) Envelope and Ballots Status, including voter's ballot was *tabulated*.

Figure A-4. Voter Look-Up, with ballot tabulated option: The County in this figure selected to make available multiple tracking stations to the voters. King County may decide to include more or fewer tracking stations.

**Example County
Elections Department**

Track Your Ballot Status

05/09/06 2:26:11 PM

This site is for each voter in Example County to determine the status of his or her voted ballot. All records may not be available online until after certification of the election (ten days following a Primary or Special Election, 20 days following a General Election).

If you have specific questions about the status of your ballot, please call the Example County Elections Department at 425-565-1234.

Voter Information	
Election	May 13 2006 Special Election 5/13/2006
Name	Marlin R. Bowman
Registration No.	11941
Prepared for mailing	Friday, April 21, 2006 3:03:13 PM
Received from voter by mail	Monday, May 08, 2006 9:26:37 AM
Suspended for no signature	Tuesday, May 09, 2006 3:19:57 PM
Rejection resolved	Monday, May 15, 2006 2:20:00 PM
Signature Approved	Tuesday, May 16, 2006 11:48:02 AM
Scanned for Tabulation	Friday, May 19, 2006 12:15:11 PM

Thank you for using Example County's Ballot Tracking website. This site is provided to give you the most up-to-date information on the status of your mail-in ballot.

Please visit us again.

➤ **Ballot Status Look-up - Option 1: Proof Ballot was tabulated**

MiBT is the first ballot tracking system that tracks each ballot through the entire Mail-in process, including proof that all were counted. MiBT does this while maintaining voter privacy throughout the process. MiBT solves the voter privacy requirement with VoteHere's groundbreaking, patented Intermix technology (US Patent # 6,950,948).

MiBT utilizes barcodes to track mailing envelopes and ballots so they can be effectively audited. The following list describes the MiBT functions:

- 1) Before mailing, barcodes are added to ballots and scanned as part of the insertion and mailing process. MiBT can use existing ballot barcodes, if available.
- 2) Election Administrator and Election Authorities perform election set-up functions.
- 3) Ballots are mailed to voters.
- 4) Voters return voted ballots.
- 5) At any inbound processing station, envelope barcodes and ballot barcodes are scanned. Only the ballot is tracked, not how a ballot is voted.
- 6) Periodically during ballot processing, and for any processing station, the Intermix Authorities (typically the county Canvassing Board) act in concert to generate lists of voters from batches of ballot barcodes.
- 7) Voter lists whose ballots have completed processing are published, and can be made available by web or by phone.

It is important to note that voter privacy is maintained because ballot barcodes are mixed (i.e., randomized) and separated from voter identification information.

Privacy Model

As is typical with mail ballot processing, ballots are processed in batches for accuracy and voter privacy protection. MiBT verifies that a voter's ballot is in a particular batch and that the batch was processed and counted. It's like tracking an express package as it makes its way step-by-step to its final destination.

There are three levels of privacy protection:

- 1) Current ballot handling process stays the same, with multiple envelopes and steps to ensure no one can see the voter's name and ballot at the same time.
- 2) MiBT only tracks ballots (the piece of paper), not how voters vote. Votes are never recorded in MiBT, which is completely separate from the vote tabulation system.
- 3) Voter identification information and ballot barcodes are permanently separated. An audit trail is produced to independently verify that every voter's privacy was protected throughout and that all ballots were processed properly and counted.

In typical mail ballot process, ballots are stored in two envelopes: (1) a blank inner envelope that stores the voted ballot and (2) a voter identifying outer envelope that stores the inner envelope.

To summarize typical ballot processing:

- 1) Voter identity information on the outer envelope is used to determine voter election eligibility;
- 2) Once eligibility is established, inner envelopes are extracted;
- 3) Ballots are extracted from inner envelopes; and
- 4) Ballots are tabulated.

Note: Steps 2 and 3 effectively mix the ballots so that outer envelopes cannot be matched to ballots.

MiBT mirrors this processing but delays the mixing until later in ballot processing so that ballots can be effectively audited. To accomplish this audit, MiBT adds a barcode to the ballot, which can be used to generate voter lists only after the ballot barcodes are mixed by a group of Election Authorities.

These authorities, designated *Intermix Authorities* by MiBT, are typically public officials, such as members of the county Canvassing Board and defined before the election. As is common, election integrity and voter privacy is vested in such boards when acting as a whole. MiBT leverages this separation of powers.

Specific to MiBT, each Intermix Authority holds only a piece of the key, which is useless on its own. However, when used in concert with the other Intermix Authorities, these keys are used to mix batches of ballot barcodes to generate voter lists. These voter lists provide proof that a voter's ballot was counted.

➤ **Ballot Status Look-up – Option 2 : Tracking Ballots in Batch**

No Intermix required. This option goes further than simply stating a voter's envelope was received and approved. Additionally, this option does not require MiBT's encrypted Intermix protocol.

This version of ballot tracking associates a batch of ballots with their corresponding batch of envelopes.

- 1) Envelopes are tracked in batches.
- 2) The list of voters whose envelopes are the batch is maintained.
- 3) When the ballots are extracted from the envelopes, the ballots are put in the same batches.
- 4) When a batch of ballots is counted, the list of voters associated with that batch is credited with having their ballot counted.

Note: The drawback of this solution is the County will have to say that a voter's ballot has been tabulated, *within +/- 5%*. (Due to exceptions within a batch where a ballot is rejected.)

A-2.3 King County Requirement: Section 5, Feature 2

Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data and /or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.

A-2.4 VoteHere Response

MiBT reports are designed to provide real time data on the status of your envelope and ballot processing. MiBT reports provide both a macro and micro-level of envelope and ballot accountability. Figures 6 and 7 shows a sample of the type of reports available through MiBT.

Importantly, the raw data can also be directly accessed to allow for customized reporting. The reports themselves are highly configurable by terminology and data analyzed.

Figure A-5. Shows a sample of the many reports available through MiBT

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ballot Activity by Batch ▪ Ballot Activity by Ballot Style ▪ Ballot Activity by Date ▪ Ballot Activity by User ▪ Ballot Summary by Batch ▪ Ballot Summary by Date ▪ Ballot Summary by Ballot Style ▪ Ballot Summary by User ▪ Ballot Summary ▪ Ballot Tracks ▪ Unassembled Voters ▪ Voter Website Summary ▪ History Log | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Custom Database Query ▪ Envelope Activity by Batch ▪ Envelope Activity by Date ▪ Envelope Activity by Precinct ▪ Envelope Activity by User ▪ Envelope Summary by Batch ▪ Envelope Summary by Date ▪ Envelope Summary by Precinct ▪ Envelope Summary by User ▪ Envelope Summary ▪ Envelope Tracks ▪ Exceptions |
|--|--|

Figure A-6. Ballot Summary Report. Provides a high level report on the status of every BALLOT processed during a specified time period. (Requires a barcode/unique identifier on ballot.)

DEMO ELECTION - JUNE 14, 2006												
Ballot Summary Report - End of Election Totals												
(as of Apr 14, 2007 17:52:05 PST)												
	RETURNED			CHALLENGED				PLUS RESOLVED			EQUALS EXPECTED TO COUNT	COUNTED
	Expected Extract	Extracted	No Ballot	Multi-ballot	Duplication	Canvass	Duplicated	Canvass Resolved	Rejected	Total	Tabulated	Pending
Total	209,004	209,004	421	212	18,499	39,111	18,499	39,009	102	208,481	208,481	NONE



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Website: www.votehere.com



Questions relevant to VoteHere are in Red. VoteHere response is italicized below question in Red.

<p>1. Voter's ballot packet has been handed off to USPS.</p>	<p>1. Insertion – bulk and daily insertion</p> <p>A. Bulk insertion for all election-qualified voters on file – confirm correct ballot materials assembled.</p> <p>B. Daily insertion for new registrants and re-issues – confirm correct ballot materials assembled. Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion.</p> <p><i>Using a bar code on the ballot (either above or below the perforation) MiBT can assure the correct ballot is inserted into the correct envelope. This feature of MiBT works best on manual insertions. Using a simple \$200.00 scanner, the election worker doing the manuals will scan the bar code on the envelope and the bar code on the ballot. MiBT checks the AVID on the envelope to the ballot-style bar code on the ballot. If for some reason the wrong ballot is about to be inserted into an envelope, MiBT will alert the elections worker through an audio beep. Every election where MiBT has been used in this capacity MiBT has prevented a wrong ballot from going to a voter. Combines with bulk assembly results in DIMS to give comprehensive assembly data.</i></p> <p>C. Over-the-counter insertion and issuance of ballots – confirm correct ballot materials assembled. Correct return ballot packet format for data capture to be the same as bulk insertion.</p> <p><i>Same as response in Section B. In addition, MiBT also tracks which employee did the manual insertion and when. Using MiBT King County could also track which employee gave which voter an over-the-counter ballot and when.</i></p> <p>D. Must have capability for possible future addition of randomized unique identifier on ballot and/or ballot stub.</p> <p><i>MiBT is designed to generate random unique identifiers which can be applied by the printer on the ballot before assembly or after extraction from the envelope. If it is determined that a bar code shall be sprayed on pre-assembly, Diebold would spray on the unique identifier. If post-extraction, a machine such as Cowart-Gagnon is recommended. Once the ballot has a unique bar code MiBT can utilize it to automate the ballot accounting as well as proof a voter's ballot has been tabulated.</i></p>
--	---

2. Capture of data from outbound envelope and ballot that confirms correct ballot materials assembled and provide reconciliation report against election qualified voter list.

3. Ability to upload data to and / or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / voter registration system.

MiBT would deliver data to DIMS for those ballots that are manually assembled. The number of ballots assembled in King County would equal the bulk insertions, plus the daily and over the counter. Diebold has stated they will work with VoteHere to seamlessly receive this data.

Returned Ballot Process

<p>2. King County confirms receipt of ballot envelope.</p>	<p>1. Data capture from inbound envelope to confirm KCE receipt of ballots.</p> <p><i>This data will be typically captured by hardware and delivered directly to DIMS. (MiBT can augment unique Envelope tracking points that are not reported in DIMS.)</i></p> <p>2. Ability to upload data to and / or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / voter registration system.</p> <p><i>Unlike MiBT, DIMS does not report ballots extracted, ballot exceptions or ballots tabulated. Therefore it is our recommendation that DIMS data feed into MiBT. The value for this is to have a reporting function that offers comprehensive end-end reports that include ballots assembled, ballots returned and ballots tabulated, together with envelope and ballot exception reports. It would be our recommendation that DIMS would be used for VR related functions and MiBT would be the application for end-end envelope and ballot accountability.</i></p>
--	--

<p>3. Ballot envelope has been signature verified or challenged</p>	<p>1. Automated signature verification that is compatible with DIMS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">A. Ability to capture image of envelope for automated and manual signature verification and public information request.B. Ability to capture data from envelope to confirm voter's signature was verified or challenged.C. Automation to maximize efficiency for signature verification process.D. Automation to maximize efficiency for exceptions handling and data management.E. Ability to upload data to and / or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system. <p><i>This data will be captured by a hardware/signature comparison solution. That data will feed into DIMS. All DIMS data can be automatically downloaded in MiBT as a tracking point in the Ballot Tracker reports.</i></p>
---	---

4. Ballot envelope has been opened.

Please note that the following business process needs in a recommended solution do not have to be accomplished in order specified below:

1. Has scale and dimension differentiation function to pre-qualify ballot packets for opening. These functions will be used to screen out packets with missing ballot / multiple ballots enclosed.
2. Sort signature verified ballot packets by Legislative District or ballot code or other criteria as specified for recount purposes.
3. Slice / open envelopes.
4. Batch in 200-400 on tray to prepare for extraction.
5. Ability to capture data from envelopes to confirm voters' envelopes were opened for extraction.

MiBT reports shows which voters' envelopes have been opened. MiBT does this by receiving data from DIMS regarding which envelopes are expected to be opened. An additional scan is then conducted at the envelope opening boards to confirm that the envelopes expected to open were indeed opened. MiBT offers a report that shows Envelopes Expected to Open vs Envelopes Opened (By Voter)

6. Ability to upload envelope data to and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system.

Working with DIMS, MiBT 2.0 shows the number of ballots expected to extract in a batch vs the number of ballots actually extracted from that batch.

7. Ability to capture unique identifier on ballot for exceptions handling and data management if desired at a later date.

Please reference Appendix A in RFI response.

8. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data and/or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date. *Please reference Appendix A in RFI response.*

5. Ballot has been tabulated or not.

1. Capability to capture unique identifier on ballot at time of tabulation for ballot tracking and accountability if desired at a later date.

Please reference Appendix A in RFI response.

2. Ability to upload ballot unique identifier data and /or provide seamless electronic data interface with DIMS / election management and voter registration system if desired at a later date.

Please reference Appendix A in RFI response.



RFI Response Clarification For King County

Mail-in Ballot Tracker® (MiBT) Process Management Capabilities

Prepared for:
Prepared by:
Date:

King County, WA
VoteHere, a division of Dategrity Corp.
April 20, 2007

Mail-in Ballot Tracker® (MiBT) Process Management Capabilities

King County has requested additional information about MiBT's process management ability. This response will demonstrate how MiBT will help manage the ballot tracking and accountability process for the King County Election Department.

Recommended Solution

MiBT has provided ballot tracking and accountability in 70+ elections throughout Washington State. VoteHere has reviewed election department operational process in over 20 Washington Counties. Based on this experience, VoteHere recommends that King County consider the following solution for Process Management:


- 1) Use DIMS for VR-related functions
- 2) Use MiBT for Envelope and Ballot Accountability Process Management

The value of this recommendation to King County is the ability to have a single comprehensive, end-to-end envelope and ballot reporting system, using only one ballot accountability interface and one database.


The diagram and explanation below demonstrates VoteHere's recommendation for King County. *The County may determine to have fewer or more tracking points.*

MiBT Envelope and Ballot Accountability System

DIMS Envelope Tracking Points
(Tracking data below feeds into MiBT)



MiBT Ballot Tracking Points
(Tracking data below feeds into MiBT)



Detailed Explanation of Above Diagram:

#	Data Point	Source	Methodology	Benefit
1	Envelopes Received	DIMS	Export Data to MiBT for Reporting	Creates an opening record for each returned ballot envelope, and enables subsequent accounting.
2	Envelopes Challenged	DIMS	Export Data to MiBT for Reporting	Records those received envelopes which are challenged (e.g., bad signature, no signature, etc.)
3	Signatures Approved	DIMS	Export Data to MiBT for Reporting	Provides definitive list of ballot envelopes which have been signature verified and is ready to hand over to ballot processing. This number, plus the number of envelopes currently challenged, should ultimately equal the number ballots received.
4	Envelopes Opened	MiBT Scan	Scan batch or individual envelopes as received in Opening Room	Enables internal reconciliation that ballot processing staff has received and accounted for all approved ballots in each envelope batch.
5	Ballots Extracted	MiBT Scan	Scan individual ballot barcodes as they are extracted from security envelopes	Provides initial tracking point for each ballot extracted from its security envelope, creating an opening ballot batch, ensuring that all ballots are accounted for, and enabling process enforcement downstream.
6	Ballot Exception	MiBT Scan	Scan individual ballot barcodes as they are noted for exception handling	Enables accounting of, and process enforcement for every ballot that enters the exception process (e.g., duplication, no ballot in security envelope, too many ballots in security envelope, wrong election, etc.).
7	Ballots Reviewed	MiBT Scan	Scan individual ballot barcodes as they are processed for Canvassing Process.	Some ballot exceptions must be reviewed by the Canvassing Board. Those that require their approval prior to resolution or rejected are tracked to ensure proper accounting.
8	Ballots Rejected	MiBT Scan	Scan individual ballot barcodes for any ballots rejected for cause.	Ultimately, all ballots that enter the system, are either tabulated, or rejected. At the end of the day, the number of ballots rejected + the number of ballots tabulated, should = the number of ballots extracted.
9	Ballots Tabulated	MiBT Scan or Tabulation System Export	Scan individual or batches of ballots either at tabulation or immediately thereafter	Self explanatory.
10	Ballots Resolved	MiBT Scan	Scan individual ballot barcodes as ballot exceptions are resolved.	Enables accounting for every ballot exception that has been resolved, and ensures that proper process is enforced before tabulation is permitted.

Note: DIMS Integration

The ability to run automated, real-time reporting depends on cooperation from Diebold to programmatically access their database. Diebold has confirmed their willingness to meet King County's integration requirements with VoteHere's MiBT system.

Implementation

Prior to implementation of MiBT in each county, VoteHere's professional services group will typically spend time with the election manager to analyze and map the county's unique operational process.

The primary goal of this operational process review is to identify every step that needs to be completed as each document moves through the process. Once identified, these process steps are entered into MiBT as 'stations', which will be used to track each document as it moves through the process.

The relationships between these stations are configured using MiBT's '*enforced topology*', or process enforcement. Once configured, the system notifies an election worker any time he or she attempts to scan a document outside of the desired process flow. This capability provides immediate feedback to election workers, as well as immediate operational insight to election managers, through real time reporting.

Benefits

For Election Managers:

1. System can be configured to reflect the exact terminology and process flow they are responsible for managing.
2. Problems can be prevented before they happen when election workers are immediately notified of errors.
3. Real-time reports enable operational analysis and reconciliation on demand, with real time data.
4. Ease of mind for Election Managers at the end of the day because all documents are accounted for.
5. Reduces workload in document reconciliation and problem solving.
6. Reduces total man hours by automating accounting, eliminating errors, and reducing election worker counting and re-work.

For Election Workers:

1. Reduces stress on election workers handling thousands of documents every day.
2. Immediate feedback from system reduces stress of wondering, 'Did I get that right?'
3. System catches errors before they are made.
4. System eliminates need to manually count, and recount batches of documents.

Conclusion

The unique and large scale demands of the King County Elections Department requires an envelope and ballot tracking system dedicated exclusively to Ballot Accountability and Process Management. Although it is a highly successful Voter Registration system, DIMS is not a comprehensive tool for end-end ballot tracking accountability and process management unless combined with MiBT.

For end-to-end ballot and envelope accountability, King County should implement a combined MiBT and DIMS solution.

EVALUATION OF VENDOR PROPOSED SOLUTION

SCALE: 10 Does not meet requirement / criterion; 9 Meets some elements of requirement / criterion; 8 Meets (satisfactory) criterion; 7 Exceeds all elements of requirement / criterion; 6 Meets typical; 5 Meets												
(a) Different weight is assigned to the score given for each functionality. Essential functionalities are given a weight of 3 (highest) while "non-essential, nice to have" functionalities are given a weight of 1 (lowest). Scores given will multiply with the assigned functionality weight to give the weighted score. The weighted scores are then added up for each vendor proposed solution.												
(b) X=NA, X (Not applicable) is applied to vendor on the evaluation items when the functionalities and/or the criteria are not considered applicable. VoteHere only offers services around its mail-in ballot tracker (MBT) software application and must work with other vendors' equipments for most data download. Hardware related items are assigned X (NA) for VoteHere.												
PROCESS	TRACK PT	EVALUATION ITEMS	WEIGHT	DIEBOLD ES	DIEBOLD ES	PITNEY BOWES	PITNEY BOWES	COWART-GAGNON	COWART-GAGNON	VOTEHERE	VOTEHERE	
FUNCTIONALITIES	CONFIRM RECEIPT OF BALLOT	DATA CAPTURE TO CONFIRM RECEIPT	3	Captures ballot packet id, endorses with date/time and batch number. Use NPI sorter that captures back side of envelope. 3 (9)	9	Captures ballot packet id, endorses with date/time, compares to database for validity of id. To be done at first pass through vendor scan/sort equipment, has ability to find ballot packet id any where on ballot envelope. 4 (12)	12	Meet functional requirement including endorsement with comparison of database to ballot packet id. No mention of having the ability to capture data/barcode anywhere on the envelope. 3 (9)	9			
		ABILITY TO UPLOAD DATA	3	Real-time link with ability to automate. Use VoteRemote /DIMS-Net "Direct-Connect" system. 4 (12)	12	Provides data file for upload, provides links to signature images. To be done with vendor database, but with manual intervention. Includes cost estimate for DIMS electronic data interface. But details of this ability not provided. 3 (9)	9	Manual upload. Meets ability to upload data requirement. 3 (9)	9			
	SIGNATURE VERIFICATION	CAPTURE SIGNATURE	3	Cip signature from larger envelope image. Use NPI sorter. 3 (9)	9	Cip signature image from larger envelope image. To be done at first pass through vendor equipment. 3 (9)	9	Cip signature image from larger envelope image. To be done at first pass through Tritek equipment. 3 (9)	9			
		CAPTURE ENVELOPE	1	This could be done with the NPI Scanners 2 (2)	2	Capture full image of one side of envelope. To be done at first pass through Relia-Vote equipment. 3 (9)	3	Capture full image of both sides of envelope on first pass through Tritek equipment. 4 (4)	4			
		COMPARE 2 SIGS / PERFORM ASR	3	Integrated ASR process with the application set. Proven solution in multiple jurisdictions in CA. 3 (9)	9	Does not have own ASR solution. Under development, pending OSOS approval. However, can make images available for other vendor ASR solution. References using Diebold in '07 and availability of PB ASR in '08. 2 (6)	6	Meet some elements of requirement. Vendor solution proposes purchase, interface development and integration of Parascript SignatureExpert with Dims. 2 (6)	6			
		UPLOAD ASR RESULTS AND EXPORT SIG IMAGES FOR VIEWING WITHIN DIMS	3	Real-time link with ability to automate. Use VoteRemote /DIMS-Net "Direct-Connect" system. 4 (12)	12	Provides data file for upload, provides links to signature images. Use of Diebold in '07 and availability of PB ASR in '08 with DIMS electronic interface. 3 (9)	9	Provides data file for upload, provides links to signature images. 3 (9)	9			
		DIFFERENTIATION FUNCTION TO PRE-QUALIFY BALLOT PACKETS FOR OPENING	1	Does not offer ability to differentiate returned ballot packet weight and dimension variations. No differentiation functionality provided. 0 (0)	0	Will differentiate based on weight and thickness and packet id, and election id. To be done at first (one) pass through vendor equipment. 4 (4)	4	Has thickness, packet id and election id differentiation. 3 (3)	3			
	ENVELOPE OPENED	SORT SIG VERIFIED ENV BY LEG OR SPECIFIED CRITERIA	3	Solution provides for either a separate sorter or an integrated sorter (integrated sorter has not been used in production mode yet). Can use NPI sorter machine proposed and/or in conjunction with USPS "mailbox" sort. 3 (9)	9	Adjustable sorting schemes and expandable number of bins. Digital display of sorter bin contents. Can add challenge code to outside of ballot packets after signatures were verified on 2nd pass if desired. 4 (12)	12	Adjustable sort schemes and expandable number of bins. 4 (12)	12			
		SLICE / OPEN ENVELOPES	1	Did not offer any solution for slicing / opening of envelopes. 0 (0)	0	Relia-Vote sorter/scanner equipment can slice open the ballot packet after signatures are verified on a 2nd pass. 3 (9)	3	Ace Machine for automated extraction of security envelope. Can install scanner for data capture. Agissar Extractor, jogger, stacker suite for opening station. 3 (3)	3			
		BATCH IN 200-400 ON TRAY TO PREPARE FOR OPENING & EXTRACTION	3	NPI machine will batch envelopes as in current process for ballot processing procedures. 3 (9)	9	Ability to batch at specified size although vendor recommends a change in process and order of procedures. 3 (9)	9	Ability to batch at specified size. 3 (9)	9			
		DATA CAPTURE TO CONFIRM ENVELOPE OPENED	3	Offers no solution to capture data to confirm envelope is opened. X	X	Pitney Bowes envelope scanning station to capture data post extraction. 3 (9)	9	Proposal is for Agissar Triple Cut Dual Flex Opener with scanner to capture voter data on envelope at opening. 3 (9)	9	Proposal is for scanners each opening station or high speed scanner at QC Station and use of MBT database. 3 (9)	9	
	SUBTOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE			71	71	85	85	82	9			
	NO. OF FUNCTIONALITIES EVALUATED			10	11	11	11	1				
	PROCESS MANAGEMENT	SYSTEM INTEGRATION, PROCESS MANAGEMENT TOOL		3	References VoteHere solution and vague language regarding DIMS being the repository of this information. Did not offer solution for working with DIMS on expanding data fields in table for comprehensive process management. 0 (0)	0	Vendor offers reporting to confirm preparation of outbound ballot packets with USPS paperwork. Outbound reporting not applicable to county needs. Machine level reporting on inbound process does not meet criteria for process management tool. 0 (0)	0	Vendor offered to review criteria and develop solution but recommended purchase of VoteHere if comprehensive package desired. 0 (0)	0	Proposal is for MBT for end to end ballot tracking with ability for voter look-up. 3 (9)	9
		SUBTOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE			0	0	0	0	0	9		
NO. OF FUNCTIONALITIES EVALUATED			1	1	1	1	1					
TOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE			71	71	85	85	82	9				
NUMBER EVALUATED			10	11	11	11	1					
RANK			3	3	1	1	2			NA		

